YĀMUNA'S
ĀGAMA PRĀMĀṆYAM

OR

TREATISE ON THE VALIDITY OF PAÑCARĀTRA

Sanskrit Text and English Translation

BY

J. A. B. van BUITENEN
Prof. of Sanskrit, Chicago University
Author of Bhagavadgita of Ramanuja
Translator of Vedarthasangrahah

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PUBLISHERS' PREFACE

Our Research Society has been formed to publish in English all the works of our Alwars and Acharyas— Yamuna, Ramanuja and Vedanta Desika. Several North Indian Scholars and American Students are now researching in various aspects of Visistadvaita Philosophy.

Last year December we published an English Edition of *Thirupavai* with eighty pages of introduction and eighty pages of *Swapadesam* by the late M. B. Srinivasa Iyengar. Five other books of this series of *Nityanusandhanam* will be published very soon.

Though Nathamuni is our Prathama Acharya, none of his works is now available. Yamuna is our Next Acharya, whose books formed the basis on which Ramanuja later on built up our *Siddhanta* which was perfected by Vedanta Desika, two centuries afterwards.

The first book of Yamuna to be published was *Githarthasamgraha* in English by the late Dewan Bahadur V. K. Ramanujachariar. Some years later Prof. M. R. Rajagopala Iyengar translated the Stotraratna and Chathusloki in English. In the Annamalai University Series Prof. R. Ramanujachari and K. Srinivasachari got the English translation of all the three Siddhantas published some years ago.

The only other work of Yamuna that has not so far been published in English was 'Agamapramanyam.'

Our good friend Dr. van Buitenen, Prof. of Sanskrit, Chicago University, sent us a translation of the text and an introduction in English of the Agamapramanyam. Though we started printing the books more than three years ago due to the serious illness of our Honorary Secretary it was delayed, and we are happy that we are able to publish it at least now. Our Readers are aware that Dr. van Buitenen has already published 'Vedarthasamgraham' and 'Gita Bhashya' of Ramanuja in English, and is a well-known authority on Visistadvaita Philosophy.

Our good friend Dr. K. C. Varadachari who read the manuscript, undertook to write a scholarly Preface in his own inimitable style. But he passed away before the printing was completed. So we requested Prof. R. Ramanujachari who had mastered all the works of Yamuna, and has acceded to our request and has written a Preface.

We are heavily indebted to Sri D. S. Krishnachar of Prabha Printing House, Bangalore, who has undertaken the arduous task of printing the book faultlessly from the typed manuscript. But for his hearty cooperation we could not have published this book at all.

V. Srinivasa Raghavan
Honorary Secretary
Ramanuja Research Society

PREFACE TO ĀGAMAPRĀMĀṆYAM

The works of Yamuna are of special importance to students of vedanta not only because they are the earliest available visistadvaita classics, but also because they present an authentic account of this system of thought and belief, having been inspired and shaped by the rich contributions of previous acharyas including Nathamuni transmitted to him through an unbroken tradition. Āgamaprāmāṇyam is one of the most important among his writings; and, strangely enough, there has been till now no critical edition of the text. In this context, my esteemed friend, Dr. van Buitenen has rendered invaluable service by bringing out a critical edition of this masterpiece with a scholarly introduction and English translation, eminently readable and faithful to the original. This timely publication has achieved a twofold purpose, that of giving the text, fast becoming scarce, further lease of life, and of making the thought imbedded in this treatise available even to those unacquainted with Sanskrit. An orientalist of great repute, he has made the field of vedanta, especially visistadvaita vedanta, his own. Already he has earned the gratitude of all interested in our cultural heritage by his excellent publications, such as Ramanuja's *Vedarthasamgraha* and *Ramanuja on Bhagavat Gita*. A warm welcome awaits this excellent publication.

Yamuna, more properly known as Alavandar, occupies a central place among the illustrious visista-

dvaita acharyas who, reformed and revivified this ancient system of thought and belief. Nathamuni set visistadvaita vedanta on a new and glorious phase of its career; Yamuna strengthened it considerably by his writings; and Ramanuja systematised and fortified it. Kuresa pays reverential homage to the illustrious hierarchy of acharyas commencing from Laksminatha (Supreme God, the Consort of Laksmi) and ending with his own preceptor, Ramanuja, with Sage Natha and Yamuna at the centre:

> Laksmīnātha samārambhām
> Nāthayāmuna madhyamām ।
> asmadācārya paryantām vande
> guruparamparām ॥

The grandson and spiritual successor of Nathamuni, Yamuna had the unique privilege of inheriting his grandsire's immeasurable spiritual wealth[1] and of passing on that legacy to Ramanuja, having enriched it by his own invaluable contributions. At an early age, he achieved great distinction and fame for his erudition and dialectical skill. He easily defeated a court poet, Akkialvan, who was a terror to all learned men, far and near; and, in recognition of this victory he was hailed as Alavandar (Man come to save, rule) and granted the gift of a territory. He ruled over this principality and led a life of pomp and luxury, forgetting the high traditions of his grandfather, until he was won over to the higher life, thanks to the great efforts of Ramamisra, the chosen disciple of Pundarī-

1 ...stoṣyāmi naḥ kuladhanam kuladaivatam tat
Pādāravindamaravinda vilocanasya ॥
Stotraratna, St. 6

kākṣa who was himself the foremost among the disciples of Nathamuni, charged with the duty of instructing his grandson in the sacred lore. When the awakening came, Yamuna realised the futility of the life he had been leading, became a sannyasin, settled down at the holy spot of Srirangaṁ, the great centre of Vaisnava thought and devoted the rest of his life to disseminating the truths handed to him by Ramamisra and writing treatises and in unremitting and one-pointed devotion to the Lord.

In his exposition of visistadvaitic thought, Yamuna follows the lead of the ancient masters like Bodhayana, Tanka and Dramida and Nathamuni, whose masterpiece, Nyayatattva greatly influenced his own writings. He follows in the foot-steps of Nathamuni so closely that Vedanta Desika describes *Atmasiddhi* of Yamuna as a brief version of Nyayatattva. (*Nyayatattva prakaranam hi Ātmasiddhi.*)

Though steeped in tradition, he was no blind follower. The following stanza shows how he insisted on high standards of thought and discussion :

Hanta ! brahmopadeśosyam
śraddadhānesu śobhate |
vayamaśraddadhānāh smo
ye yuktim prārthayāmahe ||

Samvitsiddhi, p. 191

"Well, all this dogmatic teaching may carry conviction with (blind) believers ; we are lacking in such faith, and we search for logical reasons to convince us."

Endowed with a sharp intellect and piercing logic, he could easily see through sophistry, and was averse to using crooked ways of thinking (nirasta jimhaga sparśe, *Yatirajasaptati*, St. 8). He presented his views with precision and clarity and in a manner that would compel assent. A sparkling sense of humour is discernible in his discourses. To cite one illustration while refuting the doctrine of absolute identity based on the upaniṣadic text—ekam evādvitīyam Brahma—Yamuna says in his *Samvitsiddhi*: "The statement 'the permanent ruler of the Cola country now reigning is without a second in this world' is intended to deny the existence of a ruler equal to him It does not deny the existence of servants, sons, consort, and so on."

The learned editor designates Yamuna as a "temple priest" (vide infra, p. 6) and includes Ramanuja in the class of "theologians and officiating priests" (Vedārthasamgraha, p. 33) and suggests that the inspiration came to them from religion and theology. The appelations 'temple priest' and 'theologian', taken literally, do not imply any derision, and may not be inappropriate designations of these eminent thinkers and ardent devotees who considered service to God and god-lovers as the supreme goal of life; but '*temple priest*' is suggestive of one making a living by temple service, one who cares merely for outward, formal routine of worship. Likewise, 'theologian' has veiled association with dogmatic, uncritical acceptance of beliefs. This suspicion gets somewhat strengthened when we read the learned editor saying "What Pancaratra signifies for him (Yamuna) is dīkṣā and the other sacraments; ārādhana and the various aspects of the ritual of

worship of the God ; puja . . ." In point of fact, they were not temple priests, but eminent sannyasins and accredited leaders and exponents of visistadvaitic thought and vaiṣnava religion, who set great store by logic and sought convincing evidence before accepting any belief. It is therefore necessary to consider if these are fair and factual descriptions.

In his learned introduction Dr. van Buitenen refers to a number of problems that challenge attention and call for further study. One of these is 'the reticence of the illustrious vaiṣnava philosopher, Ramanuja, about the Pancaratra system.' "Ramanuja remains" he says, "wholly silent about the element, both of doctrine and of religious practice of Pancaratra." In his earlier publication, Ramanuja's Vedarthasamgraha, Dr. van Buitenen says, that although the orthodoxy of the Pancaratra had been established, "it is not utilised as a source of knowledge in its own right to corroborate Ramanuja's system of vedanta." There is reference again to "Ramanuja's evident indifference towards Pancaratra." He has himself suggested a plausible reason for Ramanuja's not quoting even a single pada from the veritable ocean of the Pancaratra. A master of dialectics, to win support for his interpretation of vedic teachings, form vedantins of all shades of opinion, he would take his stand only on śruti and universally accepted smrti; he would not like to jeopardise a good case by quoting from what may be dubbed sectarian. For an indentical reason, he studiously avoided all reference to the Divyaprabandha, though it has been one of the shaping forces of his thought.

As regards Ramanuja remaining "wholly silent about the elements both of doctrine and of religious practice of the Pancaratra," it may be said that he presented a synthetic account of vedanta incorporating into it the vedic, agamic and prabandha contributions. The genealogy of the specific items was not indicated because most of them are found in all the scriptures. Ramanuja looked upon the varied scriptures as setting forth identical doctrines, though their language and idiom vary.

It is certainly not difficult to identify the agamic elements in Ramanuja's teaching. In the first place, the prapatti doctrine, though ancient and based on the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavat Gita, gets special elaboration in the Pancaratra. The credit for having stressed its importance as a self-sufficient and independent means to mokṣa and of explaining its angas (steps) goes to the Pancaratra. As this path is accessible to all irrespective of caste or rank, it has a universal appeal. That everyone, whatever his station in life, is entitled to mokṣa, and that it may be attained in this very birth is a characteristic Pancaratra teaching. Ramanuja utilised this doctrine and incorporated this in his exposition of the visiṣtadvaita. Though he makes a passing mention of it in the Sri Bhasya and the Vedarthasamgraha, he emphasises it in the Gita Bhasya especially in commenting on the Carama sloka. More than all, in his *Gadyatraya* which is a confession of his faith, he presents saranagati as hita par excellence.

Another feature of the Pancaratra which Ramanuja has utilised is its insistence on an austere life. In

Nityagrantha it is prescribed as part of the daily routine throughout life. The day is divided into five periods, each to be devoted to an appropriate duty. The first is abhigamana, when one is to approach God as soon as daily ablutions and pujā are over. The second is called upādāna, a period to be spent in earning a livelihood in legitimate and appropriate ways. Then follows ijya (literally, sacrifices), referring not to vedic sacrifices but to *pancamahā yagna*, which include among others, noonday prayer, offering unto God the food prepared and even partaking of meal, which is regarded as a religious act. What pleases the Lord is not the sacrifice which entails much material and effort, but sincere, unselfish and devout approach. True worship is something inward, involving mental purity, earnestness and steadfast faith. Next comes the path of *svādhyāya* or study. It is a duty cast on every householder to study our sacred lore and to teach the same to others (pravacana) where possible. The concluding part of the day is devoted to quiet concentration (yoga). One is to retire to bed with thoughts of God uppermost in one's mind. Without bisecting life into the sacred and the secular and thereby making either valueless, the Pancaratra invests all our acts with sanctity. Everything that man does, eating and sleeping not excepted, are worship of the Divine. In a word, man's life is to be a God-centred life, all day long and all through life. Life should be characterised by this pervasive note.

Yet another fruitful idea which Ramanuja selects from the Pancaratra for elaboration is the concept of disinterested action. Action performed without

thought of personal gain and in the spirit of dedication to God leads progressively to self-knowledge, self-realisation and knowledge of God, which leads to meditation on God and flowers into live of, and surrender to God and final beatitude. "Sātvikatyāga pūrvaka karma yogyena karmana" is a typical Pancaratra formula. In the Gita Bhasya Ramanuja explains the full implications of this concept while commenting on St. 15, Ch. IV of the Bhagavat Gita. "Such a person sees non-action in action; and action in non-action. He is the man of wisdom, worthily engaged; and he is the performer of all actions."

Yamuna *composed eight works, and they are:* Ātma-siddhi, Isvara-siddhi, Samvit-siddhi, Gitartha-samgraha, Purusanirnaya, Stotraratna, Catussloki and Āgamapramanya. The first three are usually referred to by the collective name, Siddhitraya. A good part of each of these three siddhis has been lost due to neglect and the ravages of time; but even the little that remains gives us a clear idea of the author's views on important philosophical problems and of the masterly way in which he expounds them. Ramanuja quotes profusely from these splendid manuals in his Sri Bhasya.

Gitarthasamgraha is a marvel of epitomising effort. The inspiration for this undertaking came *from Ramamisra who initiated* Yamuna *into the* inmost secret of the Bhagavad Gita. In thirty-two stanzas, it sums up the teaching of the Lord's Song as understood by the *school which he represented and* indicates how the teaching is developed logically and step by step and how the Gitasastra is a consistent

exposition of the doctrine that it is only through bhakti (loving devotion) brought on by karma and jnana (svadharma jnana vairagya sādhya bhaktyaka gocarah) that the Lord could be reached. This work served as a ground-plan, as it were, for Ramanuja's luminous exposition of the Gita.

Purusanirnaya is designed to show the supremacy of Lord Visnu. The book is not extant now.

Stotraratna and Catussloki

Stotra-ratna and Catussloki are hymns in praise of Lord Visnu and Goddess Lakshmi respectively. They are held in high esteem as portraying the author's fervent religious feelings and inmost longing for Divine communion and as expounding in an easily intelligible form the central philosophical doctrines of Visiṣtadvaita regarding *tattva* (God, man and nature), *hita* (the way) and *puruṣartha* (the nature of the supreme goal). This poem, as Vedanta Desika says, is the spontaneous overflow of the author's ecstatic religious experiences brought on by constant meditation on Divya Prabandha, especially the Tiruvoimozhi of Saint Satakopa. To him the Alwar was father, mother, consort, children, wealth, in a word, everything.

Mātāpita yuvatayah tanayā vibhuti
sarvam yadeva niyamena matanvayānām |
ādhyasya nah kulapateh vakulā-bhiramam
srimad tadanghri yugalam pranamāmi mūrdhnā ||

Stotraratna, St. 6

One could see that the stotra is replete with the ideas culled from Tiruvoimozhi; and some of the stanzas seem to be Sanskrit renderings of the Tamil

hymns. The key-note of the stotra is that prapatti is the only effective means of attaining transcendental felicity. Vedanta Desika has written a commentary bringing out the treasures imbedded in it; and he wrote a brochure on one of its stanzas under the heading Anjalivaibhava. Ramanuja felt moved as he heard Stotraratna recited; and he got there from the cue for his Vaikuntagadya.

Catussloki

Catussloki is an exceedingly brief poem singing the glories of Goddess Lakshmi. The four stanzas comprising it attribute to Sri the qualities of the Lord elaborately set forth in the four chapters of the Brahmasutras. The first stanza refers to the vibhutis of Goddess Lakshmi and shows that they are beyond praise; the second states that Her greatness is incomprehensible even to Her omniscient Consort, even as He cannot comprehend His own greatness; the third speaks of the saving power of Her grace; and the last describes how Her resplendent forms are inseparable from, and co-existent with, those of the Lord.

Āgamaprāmāṇyam

Āgama pramanya is devoted to vindicating the authority of the Pancaratra tantras. The extensive Pancaratra works called agamas or tantras or samhitas and also Bhagavat Sastra, for the reason that Sriman Narayana is believed to have promulgated them Himself, have always been considered canonical; but detractors have not been wanting, who challenged their authority. Hence Yamuna felt the need for this

defence of the Pancaratra. The main adversaries against whom he had to contend are the Mīmāmsakas of the Bhātta and the Prabhākara school, the Advaitins and the Naiyayikas. From their respective standpoints they directed their attacks on the Pancaratra tantras. With the aid of reason and scripture, Yamuna meets this many-pronged attack and establishes that the tantras are authoritative. In Āgamapramanya, more than in Siddhitraya, we see Yamuna at his best. A master dialectician, he exposes the fallacies in the arguments of his rivals and demonstrates the correctness of his own views, with a wealth of incontrovertible evidence. In the course of the discussion, Yamuna indicates his views on a wide range of problems including those of linguistics, psychology, epistemology and exegesis.

Yamuna discusses at length the proper interpretation that is to be put on the Utpatyadhikarana of the Brahmasutra, as this section has been taken by Sankara to be a refutation of the Pancaratra. With surprising unanimity all commentators have taken Brahmasutra II–ii, 39– 22 as dealing with the Pancaratra although there is no word or expression directly or remotely specifying this theme. They differ however, in their interpretation of these aphorisms. Sankara interprets the four sutras as adducing four reasons for rejecting the Pancaratra; but Yamuna takes the first two as stating the prima facie case against it, and the last two as establishing conclusively the validity of the Pancaratra after exposing the hollowness of the prima facie view. The location of this adhikarana in a pada devoted to the refutation of rival systems, namely, those

of Kapila, Kanada, Sangaba, (Arhata) and Pasupata, which are either outside the pale of, or opposed to veda seems to lend support to Sankara's view that the Sutrakara meant to reject the Pancaratra along with the others. Against this view, it is mentioned that with the rejection of the Pasupata agama the impression may be created that the Pancaratra also is devoid of authority; to allay this apprehension the Sutrakara specifically raises the question of the Pancaratra to clinch the argument.

Sankara's interpretation of the sutras :—

(i) *utpattyasambhavat*: "On account of the impossibility of origination (the system that subscribes to the view that soul originates, i.e. the Pancaratra is unacceptable)." "There occurs in the Pancaratra the statement, "From Vasudeva there originates the Jiva known as Sankarṣana; . . ." This is an instance where the Pancaratra is opposed to the vedic teaching that the soul is neither born, nor does it die. Hence it is to be rejected.

(ii) *na ca kartuh karanam*: "Besides, the instrument cannot originate from the agent (hence the Pancaratra which accepts such a doctrine is to be discarded)". There is the Pancaratra statement . . . from the individual soul called Sankarṣana manas, known as, Pradyumna originates; from Pradyumna originates Ahamkāra known as Aniruddha." The Jiva who is an agent engages in his activity only with the aid of manas; when that is so, how can the Jiva be said to give rise to manas? Moreover, the vedas declare that manas and the like proceed from Brahman alone. Hence the Pancaratra is to be rejected.

(iii) *vijnānādibhāve vā tadapraṣedhah* :

"Should it be said that they are only Brahman, the objection, namely, impossibility of origination is not got over." That is, even if it be said that Sankarṣana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha are not Jiva, manas and Ahankara respectively, but really Brahman, since they are all alike Brahman there cannot be the causal relation among them; no one of them could give rise to the next in the series. It is everywhere observed that the cause and its effect differ from each other in some of their characteristics.

(iv) *vipratiṣedhat* : "And because of contradiction (the Pancaratra lacks authority)." As the Pancaratra is self-discrepant and as it contradicts the vedic teachings, it is liable to be rejected. For example, the Pancaratra maintains that jnana is at once guna and guni. Bhagavan is of the essence of jnana for His attribute. Further, the Pancaratra denounces the veda. It is well-known, Sandilya declares, that failing to find the highest felicity in the veda, he learnt the Pancaratra and attained thereby what he could not get from the veda. Hence the Pancaratra contradicts itself and speaks disparagingly of the veda, it is to be rejected.

Yamuna's interpretation :

Yamuna, and, following his lead, Ramanuja, argue that this adhikaraṇa establishes precisely the opposite conclusion, namely, the validity of the Pancaratra. While there is substantial agreement between Sankara and Yamuna in their interpretation of the first two sutras, Yamuna takes the third and the fourth sutras as meeting the objections

that may be urged against the Pancaratra. The expression *va* occurring in the third sutra is indicative of a change in the direction of the argument, as in many an instance where this expression occurs.

(iii) *Vijnānābhāve va tadapratiṣedhah* :—

"Or if they are of the nature of jnāna and cause, i.e., Brahman, the authority of the Pancaratra is unassailed, i.e., there can be no valid objection to the Pancaratra." Either the Vyūhas (Vasudeva, Sankarṣana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha) are independent *sovereigns or they are the four-fold forms, chosen* out of His own free-will by the Supreme Lord out of compassion for purposes of protecting the world. The first alternative is ruled out, as the Pancaratra does not admit of a plurality of God, but is an uncompromising monotheism. On the other alter*native of a single Deity in fourfold forms, the question* of origination does not arise. Sankarṣana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha are really the highest Brahman; they are not jivas, manas and ahamkara respectively. If they are so called, it is because they control these factors from within. Thus, in truth the Pancaratra does not, as it is alleged, countenance the view that the soul has an origin. Whoever says it does advocate the non-vedic doctrine of the origination of the soul is really ignorant of the Pancaratra teaching.

(iv) *Vipratiṣdhāt* :

"Moreover, on account of contradiction (the authority of the *Pancaratra cannot be assailed*)." *The* Pancaratra agamas actually deny origination to the soul and assert its eternity. Thus the objections raised against them are not tenable. The allegation that

there is denunciation of the veda, is baseless, because the statement is not to be construed as meaning that the veda is no guide to transcendental felicity, but only as signifying the inability of Sandilya to ascertain the profound truths of veda and the Pancaratra helping him to comprehend easily the vedic teachings. Far from belittling the veda, it proclaims the greatness of Bhagavat Sastra and suggests that while the veda and the agamas contain an identical teaching, the latter are easier of comprehension.

Yamuna presents quite a number of alternative interpretations of the third and fourth sutras, all alike strengthening the conviction that the authority of the Pancaratra cannot be gainsaid.

It passes one's understanding how Badarayana (Vyasa) foremost among those proficient in the veda who loudly proclaimed the glories of the Bhagavat Sastra in his *Mahabharata* could be taken as having denied it any authority in his *Brahmasutra* the most authentic exposition of vedantic teachings.

Thus with unparalleled dialectical skill and with a wealth of convincing arguments Yamuna turns the table against his opponents and establishes conclusively the orthodoxy of the Pancaratra.

R RAMANUJACHARI

PREFACE

The present study was undertaken to increase the materials for a historical study of Vedānta thought. Yāmuna's treatise on the scriptural validity of Pañcarātra introduces a very significant chapter in Vedāntamīmāṃsā, both because of its author, who was the predecessor of the famous Rāmānuja, and in certain essentials anticipated the latter's fully worked-out system of Viśiṣṭādvaita, and because of the intrinsic interest of the work itself, which in effect makes a plea for other and new authority beside the traditionally acknowledged authoritative scriptures.

The translation of this relatively brief Prakaraṇa proved to be difficult, for its language as well as its subject matter. No commentaries seemed to exist, nor has the text been translated before. I have used as my basis the edition of Rama Miśra Sastri, reprinted from the Pandit at Benares, 1937. I was unable to consult original manuscripts of the work, so that my dependence of the printed text was complete. The edition is good, with not too many misprints, though it is somewhat unreliable in its punctuation. There are a number of obvious corruptions, whose restoration was easy and a few not so obvious ones, the emendation of which must remain doubtful. The acompanying Sanskrit Text is based upon the Pandit edition as well as a text in Telugu character, and includes my emendations which have been noted in the annotations when it was a less than obvious case of correction.

The work is written in a mixture of ślokas and prose, but the kārikā portions form such a complete unity with the prose passages that, with accompanying Sanskrit Text, it seemed pointless to distinguish them in the translation. More useful may prove my division into paragraphs for more convenient reference, which has been carried through in both text and translation.

I have tried to keep the English readable, as far as the concise and highly technical style of the author allowed. Although the reading of the work will remain difficult, I hope that thus this interesting treatise will be more accessible to scholars and laymen who lack the knowledge or the leisure to read the Sanskrit. To many of them it will prove to be rewarding. The historian of Indian thought, and especially of Vedānta at the start of its medieval development will find here a lucid exposition of the scope of the scriptural authority accepted by the tremendously influential sects of southern Vaiṣṇavism. The cultural anthropologist alert to the historical role of the sects as vehicles of social and cultural change will be interested in the manner in which a leading exponent of Vaiṣṇavism defines his sectarian position within the orthodox tradition of the Vedas and Smṛtis. The historian of religions will be arrested by the exceedingly well-reasoned apologia for a valid scriptural basis of "Tantric" religious experience and practice.

But for the enlightened sponsorship and most obliging patience of Mr. V. S. Raghavan of Park Town, Madras, the publication of this study would

have been long delayed, if it could have taken place at all. Mr. Raghavan has looked upon his venture as an act of Kaiṃkārya, of selfless service to his Guru, and it is in a kindred spirit that I have continued the study, which was originally begun in India, during my stay at the University of Chicago. Illuminated support of studies in the history of the Indian Culture is urgently needed if a great tradition of scholarship, both in India and the West, is to continue and to meet the challenges of a new world. Mr. Raghavan's example of generosity in promoting serious studies in the classical works of Vaiṣṇavism is a hopeful sign that such support will continue to be forthcoming.

Chicago J. A. B. van Buitenen

INTRODUCTION

1. Nāthamuni and Yāmuna: The almost total disappearance of prior works which gave a systematic exposition of the theology of Vaiṣṇavism within the framework of Vedānta makes Yāmuna the first Vaiṣṇava Vedāntin, about whose views we are informed to a significant degree. Though we may not be as well informed as we could wish—his most important work, the *Ātmasiddhi*, is now incomplete—, his works allow us to form a good impression of this author, whose significance has long been overshadowed by that of his pupil Mahāpūrṇa's great pupil Rāmānuja. The extent to which Yāmuna's works have been neglected is measured by the fact that his most important collection, the *Siddhitraya*, has been permitted to be truncated and that at least two of his treatises, the *Puruṣanirṇaya* and the *Kāśmīrāgamaprāmāṇya*, now appear to be lost. Modern research has largely bypassed him, and only quite recently English translations have become available of his *Siddhitraya*[1] and *Stotraratna* [2]

Tradition has it that Yāmuna was the grandson of Nāthamuni with whom the line of Alagiyas or Ācāryas begins. At the conclusion of his Āgamaprāmāṇya Yāmuna devotes a stanza to his predecessor, and follows it with a stanza, closing the treatise, which extols the greatness of those scriptures "whose spirit has been increased by the glorious Nāthamunindra."[3] The addition of these laudatory strophes would indeed seem most appropriate at the end of a treatise which expounds the scriptural validity of Pañcarātra Āgama;

for in writing this exposition Yāmuna was acting very closely in Nāthamuni's spirit. Just as Yāmuna was to claim authority for a class of texts which had not before been given official recognition as part of the Vedānta literature, so Nāthamuni before him claimed authority for the collection of Tamil hymns known as the *Prabandha*. Within a few generations the canon of Vaiṣṇava Vedānta was thus increased enormously and it may be useful to enlarge on the implications.

As so often, it would seem that the Vaiṣṇava hagiographers, for all the pious and at times miraculous detail they were moved to add, translated into legend a core of historical fact, which remains recognizable. It is told that Nāthamuni, after a pilgrimage to the hallowed places of the North—Mathurā, Vṛndāvana, Haridvārā, Dvārakā and Purī—, became aware of the ritual use that had been given to the Tamil hymns of the Ālvārs. The *Prapannāmṛta*, written one generation after Rāmānuja, or five generations after Nāthamuni, notes that at Kumbhakoṇam the study of these hymns was considered damaging to Vedic orthodoxy, and that the offending texts had even been thrown in the Tāmraparṇi river. There are several, and not always consistent, accounts of the manner in which the scriptures were saved. It is said that Madhura-kaviy ālvār, a pupil of Namm-ālvār's, was instrumental in transmitting his master's work the *Tiruvāimoli* to Nāthamuni, or the latter received it directly from Namm-ālvār's hands. Perhaps the most interesting fact is that when Nāthamuni wanted a second hearing of the text for purposes of study, he was referred to a local artisan who ("by Namm-ālvār's

inspiration") revealed the work to him. If we may regard the details of the miraculous recovery as edifying embroidery, the fact stands out that Nāthamuni had to go to the common people in order to collect the hymns of the Ālvārs that had been rejected by the orthodox authorities. Although the Tamil scriptures had not received official sanction for use in high temple worship, they were current among the people, and certainly also in use at their devotional worship. What Nāthamuni in effect did was to incorporate these scriptures, henceforth known as the Draviḍa Veda, in the temple worship at Śrīrangam.

P. N. SRINIVASACHARI remarks that "this innovation effected a silent revolution in temple worship, as it raised the status of the *Prabandha* to the level of the Veda, and liberalized the meaning of Revelation.[4] It is important to recall that it was the bhakti movement which produced the Ālvārs and made their perfervid exultation in the God live among the people. By incorporating the Tamil Prabandha among the sacred scriptures that served in temple worship orthodox tradition was enabled to ally itself to the popular movements which had a tendency to break away from Brahmaṇism, and to be itself revivified by them. For a long time to come Vaiṣṇavism in the South looked for its spiritual leadership to Śrīrangam.

Nāthamuni lived to the ripe old age of 96 and died in 920. He was succeeded at Śrīrangam by Puṇḍarīkākṣa Uyyakkoṇḍār and then by Rāmamiśra Maṇakkāl-nambi. Rāmamiśra was Yāmuna's teacher. Legend has embroidered his early life with many

details, not all of them consistent. As so frequently in the hagiographies of great saints, Yāmuna showed early signs of great knowledge and at the age of twelve defeated in debate the learned Ākkiālvān of the Cola court. He was rewarded with 'half the kingdom' and led a life of great luxury, until a new encounter with his old teacher Rāmamiśra, who handed over to him his grandfather's legacy of the shrine of Śrīrangam, opened his eyes to his spiritual obligations.

Like his distinguished successor Rāmānuja, Yāmuna too is supposed to have lived to the age of one hundred and twenty years. From this pontificate at Śrīrangam must date a comparatively small oeuvre of theological and philosophical treatises. They comprise several small devotional poems, the *Stotraratna* and the *Catuḥślokī* (both commented upon by Venkaṭanātha in his *Rahasyarakṣā* in which he seeks to define the theology of Lakṣmī on the basis of the *Catuḥślokī*), a very brief summary in stanzas of the Bhagavadgītā *Gītārthasaṃgraha* (which became the programme for Rāmānuja's *Gītābhāṣya*[5] and was further enlarged upon in Venkaṭanātha's *Gītārthasaṃgraharakṣā*), and a series of expositions in mixed *kārikā* and prose style, the *Ātmasiddhi*, *Iśvarasiddhi* and *Saṃvitsiddhi*, usually bundled together under the title *Siddhitraya*; a lost work *Puruṣanirṇaya* "Argumentation for a Personal God"; and finally two disquisitions on the authority of Āgama, the *Āgamaprāmāṇya* and the *Kāśmīrāgamaprāmāṇya*.

Precisely what we have to understand by *Kāśmīrāgama* is not clear, but Yāmuna's use of Āgama in the other work is abundantly evident. In this treatise,

Yāmuna sets out to prove by scripture and logic that the texts of Pañcarātra Āgama have an authority equal to that of the Vedas, because they are God's direct revelation. He argues this validity not so much to a particular school of philosophical or theological thought as against established orthodox opinion[6] which reserves exclusive authority for the Vedas and the accepted Traditions that derive from them. Striking even more than in the *Ātmasiddhi* is Yāmuna's polemical tone and argumentative manner. Throughout his works the impression which he creates is that of a high temple priest who is not content routinely to continue the temple services as they had grown in Śrīrangam, but is apostolic in his fervour to persuade orthodoxy not only of the existence, but also of the truth, of a complete Vaiṣṇava philosophy and theology. He may rightly be called the first apologist of a Vaiṣṇava theology.

Like his predecessor Nāthamuni, who had made room for the Tamil Veda in the temple worship, Yāmuna too effected a silent revolution. Not in temple worship, to be sure, since the contents of typical Pañcarātra texts abundantly demonstrate that they had grown out of temple service and recorded practices that had been observed since long. The revolution which he effected was in Vedānta tradition, and it has proved to be a crucial one. After Śankara who continued an orthodox tradition of monism, and Bhāskara who continued a not less orthodox tradition of dualism-monism, traditions both which based themselves principally on the Upaniṣads, Yāmuna gave Vedānta a completely new scope. Not only did he argue a

theistic Vedānta—as others had done before—, he argued it with texts that so far had had no place in the tradition of *uttaramīmāṃsā*. The significance does not lie principally in the fact that he accepted as canonical a certain class of sectarian Vaiṣṇava texts, but that he argued it within the aupaniṣada tradition. Several schools had arisen which, while paying lip service to the Vedic scriptures, in practice ignored them in favour of more accessible and more popular texts. The interest and the importance of the *Āgamaprāmāṇya* lie in the author's intention of bringing within the Vedānta tradition, and thus in a way subjecting to this tradition, a body of religious literature that often had been denied to be part of it.

The motivation of this attempt was in part surely to restore to Vedānta thought the religious inspiration that, one cannot help but feel, was threatened by the philosophical acrobatics of the monistic schools. This religious inspiration was for Yāmuna that of the religion of worship and devotion that had swept Southern India. As a temple *priest*, he saw this religion guided and contained in the temple worship which itself was guided by Pañcarātra tradition. From this point of view the *Āgamaprāmāṇya* was a plea for the emancipation of popular religion.

2. EARLY PAÑCARĀTRA: The origin of Pañcarātra is obscure, because it has not one origin. Investigation into the meaning of the word *pañcarātra* in so far as it might shed light on the origin of the tradition associated with that name has been hampered by the too great emphasis laid by recent authors on the 'philosophical'

content of the tradition. It is noteworthy that Yāmuna himself does not accent this philosophical content at all in the *Āgamaprāmāṇya*, and that he understands Pañcarātra principally as a tradition of ritual worship. What Pañcarātra signifies for him is *dīkṣā* and the other sacraments; *ārādhana* and the various aspects of the ritual worship of the God; *pūjā*, devotion to the *arcā*, function and use of *nirmālya* and *naivedya*; and rites like the *pañcakālikā*. A similar significance does it have for Venkaṭanātha in his *Śrīpāñcarātrarakṣā*. As has been pointed out by other scholars, the cosmological and philosophical content of the Pañcarātra Saṃhitās are far less considerable than their ritual contents.

In these ritual contents we have the cumulative growth of many centuries, and at the present stage of our knowledge concerning the history of non-*yajña* ritual it is vain to identify the origins and early development of the numerous rites and ritual speculations. Inevitably the name *pañcarātra* has invited speculation[7] that the tradition is historically linked with Vedic ceremonials, like the Pañcarātram Sattram;[8] it is, however, impossible to find convincing arguments for such a construction.

The question thus rises whether it is permissible to separate the cosmological super-structure from the ritual content, and to seek to connect the name *pañcarātra* with the former. This is tempting because in the Mahābhārata we find several references to a Pañcarātra system just in connection with certain speculative tenets. I believe that although without a

doubt the system referred to in the epic as Pañcarātra is basically the same as the cosmological system described, or taken for granted in the later Pañcarātra Saṃhitās, the original meaning of the name *pañcarātra* cannot be elicited from the epic.

All but one of the occurrences of the term are to be found in the Nārāyaṇīya book, chapters 334-351 of the Sāntiparvan. One of the most distinctive features of the doctrine there set forth is the fourfold nature of the Supreme Being, which immediately recalls the Vyūha doctrine of Pañcarātra. There are two series of names to describe the four aspects, one of very minor importance, and one of major, and remaining importance MBh. 12.334 relates that the eternal Nārāyaṇa was born the son of Dharma in the Kṛta age during the Svāyambhuva manvantara, as Nara, Nārāyana, Hari and Kṛṣṇa Svayambhuva.[9] The devotion to Nārāyaṇa, the general concern of the Nārāyaṇīya, which is also called Sātvatamata[10] and proclaimed by the Sun,[11] is associated particularly with the people of Śvetadvīpa north of the Milk Sea.[12] Although thus there is a very definite identification of both doctrine and devotion with the name of Nārāyaṇa, the most common description of the quaternity of God is in Kṛṣṇaite terms, as Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa (Baladeva), Pradyumna and Aniruddha. But in these terms is also captured a particular doctrine of the relationship between God, soul and body, in terms which strongly recall the essentially theistic Sāṃkhya of the epic. The Puruṣa, the Supreme Being, who is the soul of all beings, is Vāsudeva. This Puruṣa enters the body which is constituted of the five elements.[13] The context conveys

that from this contact between puruṣa and body the jīva appears, which is the embodied soul, or the puruṣa as embodied. The Jīva is called Śeṣa,[14] but more generally Saṃkarṣaṇa,[15] by the name of Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva's half-brother. Saṃkarṣaṇa produces the *manas*, [16] which is described also as an incarnation of Sanatkumāra,[17] but specially as Pradyumna,[18] Kṛṣṇa's son by Rukminī. From the *manas* Pradyumna originates he who is the "agent, cause and instrument, from whom the universe of moving and unmoving entities derives, the God manifest in all actions,[19] the *Ahaṃkāra* named Aniruddha after Pradyumna's son.

This doctrine must have enjoyed considerable currency and in many places of the epic, outside the Mokṣadharma, there are references to it. It is also a most interesting doctrine, since it combines a particular cosmological-psychological view with a devotional religion concentrated on the person of Kṛṣṇa The philosophical basis is easily recognizable; the doctrine is that of the eight prakṛtis and God/puruṣa. It differs from the most common descriptions of the eight prakṛtis in that the three superior ones, *jīva*, *manas* and *ahaṃkāra* not only deviate from the usual series *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra* and *manas*, in name as well as function, but that the three are put in a very close relation to the puruṣa-Vāsudeva, a relation so close that they can be described as forms of the God. Nevertheless, the three are different from God, as the kinship pattern in which they are arranged clearly illustrates. In a way this part of the doctrine resembles the doctrine of the *sūkṣmaśarīra* or *liṅgaśarīra*.[20] The place of *manas* is puzzling since regularly the *manas* appers after and

below the *ahaṃkāra.* But this may be not more than a particular use of the term; not infrequently in older texts we observe that *manas* can be a name for that entity that is elsewhere known as *buddhi.*[21]

The kinship pattern in which the cosmology is put is quite important, because it very lucidly illustrates how the relationship between God and the world is represented and by itself refutes the later objection against Pañcarātra that it allows the *jīva* to "originate" from God. The fact that God is called Vāsudeva, and that the *jīva* is designated by the name of Saṃkarṣaṇa proves that some sort of independent coexistence was admitted of God and individual soul, for *Vāsudeva* was the half-brother of Kṛṣṇa, not the son. The relationships this pattern illustrates are:

Puruṣa — *jīva*
Manas (*Buddhi*)
Ahaṃkāra

At this point it becomes clear that the doctrine is basically not an eight prakṛti doctrine, but a seven prakṛti doctrine, which is the older form of the former. The *jīva* is the individual soul which heads a series of seven evolvents. That at one stage the relation between *jīva* and *manas* was not viewed as a simple cause-effect relation may be shown by the fact that the *jīva* is called Saṃkarṣaṇa, who was not the father of Pradyumna.

In the absence of evidence in the epic that Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha were, in their own right, the objects of cult worship, the conclusion is justified that their role was primarily that of providing the cosmological doctrine with an imme-

diately, and popularly, comprehensible pattern. The puruṣa of the doctrine was identified with Kṛṣṇa who himself was equal to Nārāyaṇa; the others illustrated the relations between the various orders of the cosmological doctrine. Hence they have no independent existence from Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva, as for example different *avatāras* of one God may have a separate existence of their own. In the form of the doctrine known from the Saṃhitās, this is formulated in the doctrine of the Vyūhas, which is that of the one God in a quaternity of forms, which should not be equated with the cosmological orders, for they are each God. This point will occupy us when we consider the interpretations of the *utpattyasaṃbhavādhikaraṇa* in the Brahmasūtras.

It is not clear from the Nārāyaṇīya what relation the series of Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha entertains with the series Nara, Nārāyaṇa, Hari and Kṛṣṇa. After the latter four have been described as manifestations of the Supreme,[22] it is the former manifestations which are described in detail when an account is given of Nārada's visit to Śvetadvīpa.[23] And on Nārada's return to the Badarī hermitage,[24] only Nara and Nārāyaṇa are brought further to the scene. Perhaps we can think of regional variations in the developing Vaiṣṇavism which will be absorbed almost without trace in the Pañcarātra system. This much is clear that Nara-Nārāyaṇa (themselves frequently equated with Arjuna-Kṛṣṇa) were closely linked to the doctrine of the four Kṛṣṇaite manifestations which thereupon seems to have superseded a Nara-Nārāyaṇa tradition.

The tradition in which the cosmology of *puruṣa jīva*, *manas* and *ahaṃkāra* was formulated in the terms of Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva and his family and certainly involved a Kṛṣṇa devotion, is described as Sātvata and Pañcarātra. But the literal meaning of the term "Five Nights" does not permit of interpretation in this context. It is noteworthy that the Nārāyaṇīya itself seems to make an attempt to reinterpret the term *Pañcarātra*. In the Nārāyaṇa litany 12.338.4 Nārāyaṇa is called *pañcayajña*, *pañcakālakartṛpate*, *pañcarātrika*. This series of three epithets each compounded with *pañca* can best be interpreted as a unit and translated as follows: "(Homage to) Thee of the Five Offerings, Lord of those who perform the Pañcakāla ritual, Thee of the Pañcarātra." Unless I am mistaken, this points at an interpretation of Pañcarātra as "The tradition which observes the Pañcakāla ritual." An explicit reference to this *pañcakāla* ritual is to be found in a previous chapter of the Nārāyaṇīya 12 336.51:

> *tair iṣṭaḥ pañcakālajñair harir ekāntibhir naraiḥ |*
> *bhaktyā paramayā yuktair manovākkarmabhis tadā ||*

If my suggestion that *pañcarātra* is here connected with pañcakāla is correct, we still have to regard it as a reinterpretation of the word, for *pañcarātra* "a span of five nights (and five days)" cannot really signify "five times" as a name of a ritual that took place five times a day.

The only other explicit reference to Pañcarātra in the Mahābhārata is not very helpful. Here (12.218. 11-12) in a very early layer of the Mokṣadharma (but probably interpolated) the thinker Pañcaśikha is thus described:

pañcasrotasi niṣṇātaḥ pañcarātraviśāradaḥ |
pañcajñaḥ pañcakṛt pañcaguṇaḥ pañcaśikhaḥ smṛtaḥ ||

The śloka is obviously inspired by the name of this thinker. He was an early Sāṃkhya philosopher in whose doctrine there is no association with Vaiṣṇava-Kṛṣṇaite Pañcarātra.

A critical survey, then, of the epical evidence for the term Pañcarātra does not produce a solution for the problem of the original meaning of the word. Therefore, there is perhaps some merit in approaching the question from an entirely different direction. Could the case be made that in Pañcarātra we have a specialized use of a term that originally had a wider and more general use ?

The juxtaposition of Pañcarātra with traditions like Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Pāśupata,[25] the references to the esoteric nature of the doctrine, and the intimations of the ascetic life of its followers suggest that the Pañcarātra way of life was typically that of seekers of wisdom and enlightenment whose beliefs and practices were not necessarily part of Vedic ritualist sacerdotalism, but who were wandering sages, and recluses, and pilgrims. Like so many of those *mumukṣus* who from the sixth century B.C. (and doubtless before) went about teaching or settled down in semi-retirement from active life in a life of contemplation, the Pañcarātrikas too, whose doctrine later on remains linked with the innovators rather than with conservative ritualists, may have been part of the same movement that in the first millenium B.C. largely reformed the ancient āryan tradition. These sages were not necessarily organized in definite groupings, although the

very fact of the early appearance of orders in Buddhism and Jainism must indicate that many of them observed similar or comparable regulations and vows which could become the basis of monastic life-rules. Among the commonest of these vows were self-chosen homelessness and its corollary, religious mendicancy. On the practice of these vows, however, nature imposed certain limitations. Surely the rainy months always forced the homeless wanderer to seek a temporary retreat in a village, and the normalization of this in early Buddhism, which led to the Vihāra system, must reflect a generally observed practice.

These observations may provide an approach to the explanation of the name *pañcarātra*. Non-doctrinaire literature knows of Pañcarātrikas without any apparent creedal affiliation. Thus for example, the oldest extant Sanskrit version of the *Bṛhatkathā*, contained in Budhasvāmin's *Bṛhatkathaślokasaṃgraha*, describes a certain *gṛhastha* as a Pañcarātrika who leda n 'ascetic' life.[26] This *gṛhastha*, which in this text generally means *vaiśya*, in the present case, specially a prosperous farmer, gives up his old life in quest of salvation. His complete lack of allegiance to any school is brought out with humorous emphasis. The farmer reviews the practice of pilgrimage to Avimukta and Benares, the philosophy of Vedānta and the doctrine of the Buddha, and finally decides himself in favour of the last "for the doctrine of the Buddha has a reputation for efficiency."[27]

It is clear from the context that the Pañcarātrika is not distinguished by any particular faith or creed,

but by a more or less ascetic life-rule. And elsewhere the same text tells us precisely what kind of life-rule is expressed in the term *pañcarātra*. The setting is a conversation between a disguised Pāśupata and a young brahmin friend. He remarks to his friend that his affection has caused him to stay several months at Rājagṛha and that he is now obliged to depart. For even householders have to obey certain observances for their own good, let alone the seekers after the highest good; whereupon he observes:[28]

ekarātram vased grāme pañcarātraṃ muniḥ pure |
iti pravrājitācāram etaṃ veda bhavān iti ||

"The hermit should live one night in a village for every five nights that he stays in town; you know that this is the life-rule for those who have left their homes as *pravrājakas*."

This rule clearly does not apply to Pāśupatas alone. It is far more likely that it is inspired by the hoary practice of homeless wanderers to retreat during the two rainy months and to go abroad during the remaining ten. Towns rather than villages were the scene of their preaching and mendicancy, but the villages were their retreats Quite consistently with the *gṛhastha pañcarātrika* who became a 'Buddhist' pilgrim, this Pāśupata too thereupon departs on an extensive pilgrimage. The context shows also that one need not leave town every five nights, yet the five-nights were made characteristic of a whole way of life.

A *pañcarātrika* in this very large sense is therefore an itinerant religious recluse, who follows the Five-Nights rule regardless of doctrinal allegiance. With

the growing systematization of doctrine which identified certain wandering saints ever more precisely with definite schools and traditions, Pañcarātrika became specialized in its meaning and was mostly, though not invariably, associated with the Vaiṣṇava tradition since known by that name. Pañcarātra, from which *pañcarātrika* or *pāñcarātrika* was formed, was reanalysed from the name: a *pañcarātrika* was a *pāñcarātrānusārin*, and Pañcarātra became the reinterpreted name of the tradition he followed.

This explanation of the name seems on the whole somewhat more plausible than that which postulates a relation with the *pañcarātraṃ sattram* mentioned in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa. Pañcarātra as a system allied itself from the beginning more with popular devotional religion—bhakti is repeatedly mentioned in the same contexts of the epic—, than with the brāhmaṇaic ritualism that was obviously losing its hold.

3. PAÑCARĀTRA IN THE BRAHMASUTRAS: According to the commentatorial tradition the concluding sūtras of the Tarkapāda 2.2 of the Brahmasūtras deal with the doctrine of Pañcarātra. The sūtras concerned are extraordinarily cryptic, and without a firm tradition to that effect one could hardly make out that its orthodoxy is at stake in sūtras 42-45. The four sūtras read: *utpattyasaṃbhavāt; na ca kartuḥ karaṇam; vijñānādibhāve vā tadapratiṣedhaḥ; vipratiṣedhāc ca.*

According to Sankara, who interprets the lines as a condemnation of the system, the point at issue is the relationship in the Pañcarātra doctrine between *puruṣa* –Supreme Brahman, the *jīva* (*Saṃkarṣaṇa*)–soul, and the

manas (Pradyumna). This view is accepted alike by Bhāskara, Yāmuna (who also adds alternative interpretations) and Rāmānuja. In Śankara's and Bhāskara's view the four sūtras enumerate arguments against Pañcarātra, according to the others the first two contain the *pūrvapakṣa*, the latter two the *siddhānta*.

However unsatisfactory in most cases a prima-facie-translation of single Brahmasūtras must be, it may be useful to make some attempt to discover how the Author (or as some maintain the interpolators of the *Tarkapāda*) viewed the Pañcarātra. If indeed the Pañcarātra is at issue in 2.2.42-45 (and this we must take on faith), some primary observations can be made. In all previous cases the traditions discussed are condemned. Secondly, the Brahmasūtras are not concerned with saving any particular tradition, e.g., Pañcarātra from outside attack; their concern is to defend the *aupaniṣada* tradition against rival traditions whose views are in conflict with it and which can be shown to be unscriptural.

Therefore, if we find, after the refutation of several heretic traditions, an *adhikaraṇa* devoted to Pañcarātra, our first assumption is that the Author has something to refute in it. But against this, it may be argued that the Author was himself in favour of Pañcarātra and wished to conclude his argumentations of the *Tarkapāda* on a positive note, asserting by way of *siddhānta* the orthodoxy of this tradition. On the basis of the sūtras themselves neither of the two assumptions can be proved.

One more argument can be made. The fact that Bhāskara's commentary on the sūtras follow that of

Sankara very closely while the *aupādhikavāda* philosopher lets no opportunity pass to attack his advaitin adversary when a controversial point is at issue has led INGALLS to conclude that both Bhāskara and Sankara virtually copy a pre-existing bhāṣya by a Proto-commentator since Bhāskara cannot be expected to copy his arch-antagonist.[29] Following this line of argument the hypothetical proto-commentator must have rejected the authority of Pañcarātra and explained the sūtras concerned as containing a condemnation of the system, because both Sankara and Bhāskara explain them thus. Even if INGALLS' hypothesis is right, this does not bring us much nearer to an understanding of the true sense of the sūtras. Moreover, the hypothesis is unconvincing; although there are indications that there existed a traditional explanation of the sūtras (the principal argument for which is the firmness of the tradition concerning (the upaniṣad passages explained in the sūtras), there may have been several and they may have been minimal. Considering the extreme paucity of surviving comments from before Sankara, on which I have enlarged elsewhere, I find it easier to believe in orally transmitted school traditions, which might differ from place to place, than in a fixed text available to both Sankara and Bhāskara

On the whole one is inclined *a priori* to expect that the Brahmasūtras include a discussion of the Pañcarātra in order to refute that part of the doctrine that the Author considers unscriptural. Whether the Author, or as the case may be, the interpolator was correct in his condemnation is another matter.

The first of the four controversial sūtras reads *utpattyasaṃbhavāt*. This must be the *hetu* to an implied

proposition, on which all commentators—Sankara, Bhāskara, Yāmuna and Rāmānuja—agree: "[This tradition is unscriptural (like the preceding ones)], because of the impossibility of origination." The only entity of which it can be said in this context that it cannot originate is the soul.

The second sūtra is clear enough: *na ca kartuḥ karaṇam.* Considering the previous sūtra where the origination of the soul was in question, it is clear that here too we must supply a word like *utpadyate*: "And the instrument does not originate from the agent."

The difficulty lies mainly in the third sūtra: *vijñānādibhāve vā tadapratiṣedhaḥ* The genitive to be supplied is to be supplied from the previous sūtras; it is either "(soul) or *karaṇa*, or both. The commentators take the last possibility, treating soul and *karaṇa* in Pañcarātric terms as *vyūhas* which in turn imply the other two. The translation then would be: "Or in case [the four vyūhas are taken] in the sense of vijñānādi, there is non-rejection of that." For *bhāve* "in the sense of..." one may also render "if they are...". All commentators allow that *vā* introduces a new argument; for Śankara and Bhāskara this is a different characterization of the *vyūhas*, not as entities in cause-effect relationships but as personifications of the divine properties of God, for Yāmuna and Rāmānuja the new argument is a refutation of the previous objection. The latter two do not take *vijñānādi* to refer to the divine properties. Yāmuna suggests no less than three different explanations: as *dvandva*: "knowledge as well as beginning," i.e., a

description of the supreme brahman; as a *tat-puruṣa*: "the beginning of knowledge," in which case the genitive to be supplied to *vijñānādibhāve* is *asya pañcarātrāgamasya*: "since Pañcarātra is the source of true knowledge"; and finally is a *bahuvrīhi* with the same supplement of *asya pañcarātrāgamasya*: "since Pañcarātra has its origin in the true knowledge of God." Of these explanations Rāmānuja retains the first one.

If we may accept that the supplied genitive is indeed *teṣāṃ vyūhānām*, the explanation of *vijñānādi*: "The divine properties of knowledge, etc." would seem not only hermeneutically the most obvious one (... *ādi*- in the expected sense), but also contextually the most relevant. Then the problem shifts to *tadapratiṣedhaḥ*: non-rejection of what? Either of the impossibility of the origination of the soul, or of the impossibility of the origination of instrument from agent, if we stick to what the sūtras themselves have supplied. What happens if Saṃkarṣaṇa is not taken as *jīva*, nor Pradyumna as *manas*, literally, but as aspects of the deity which each represent certain divine properties? These aspects are all equally God, and cause-effect relationships simply do not obtain. If this is indeed the correct interpretation—and Śankara's and Bhāskara's contrary ones are far-fetched—, this would in effect mean that the Author reverses himself.

The discussion closes with a last argument in *hetu* form *vipratiṣedhāc ca* "and because of conflict," which is such a general ground that it can be interpreted any way, depending on how one interprets the previous sūtra. Brief and general though it is, the sūtra offers

a problem of its own: *ca*. The commentators in general ignore the syntactical patterns of the sūtras and, as here, treat *hetus* in the ablative and propositions like *na ca kartuḥ karaṇam* as being on the same level, with no apparent reason for the difference of syntactical formulation. But what does *ca* join? According to Śankara's and Bhāskara's explication the *hetu vipratiṣedhāt* with both the *hetu utpattyasaṃbhavāt* and the *hetu* analysed from *na ca kartuḥ karaṇam*, according to Yāmuna and Rāmānuja *vipratiṣedhāt* with the *hetu* analysed from *vijñānādibhāve vā tadapratiṣedhaḥ*. Perhaps it is possible to link directly *utpattyasaṃbhavāt.... vipratiṣedhāc ca*. These two *hetus* are interrupted by a parenthetical discussion *na ca kartuḥ karaṇam, vijñānādibhāve vā tadapratiṣedhaḥ*. This is a kind of construction well represented in philosophical style of which this sūtra style is a severe abbreviation. A possible interpretation then would be: " .. because of impossibility of origination (also the instrument does not derive from the agent; or, if these entities are taken in the sense of knowledge, etc., we need not reject this part of the doctrine), and because of conflict." Under this interpretation the final conclusion would be against Pañcarātra.

It is obvious that the above attempt at a philological interpretation must remain inconclusive. It may, however, have its use by showing how completely dependent we are on the commentators, and how completely absent our criteria are to judge between one and the other. I am not without hope that a comprehensive study of the style and syntax of the sūtra collections eventually may provide criteria of judgment; in the absence of such a study we must for the

time being resign ourselves to the fact that we cannot utilize the Brahmasūtras in specific detail for the history of Vedānta and of Indian Philosophy generally, because we cannot independently make sense of them.

4. Sankara and Bhāskara on Pañcarātra

Hereunder, I add new translations from the commentaries on the *utpattyasaṃbhavādhikaraṇa* by Sankara and Bhāskara which are our earliest evidence of the attitude which at least one tradition in Vedānta took to the orthodoxy of Pañcarātra. As both philosophers point out, it is not the general orthodoxy of Pañcarātra as a system of religious practice which is at issue, but the orthodoxy, or conformity of specific points or theological doctrine. Somewhat in contradiction with this view of the matter is the interpretation by both commentators of the last sūtras which clearly implies that Pañcarātra is non-Vedic in orientation; but neither thinker gives much weight to this point, though it must be noted that for Yāmuna this was the fundamental objection raised against Pañcarātra.

1. Sankara, Brahmasutrabhāsya (2.2.42-45)

utpattyasaṃbhavāt (2.2.42)

The views of those who maintain that the operator is not the material cause, that the Lord is only the operative cause, have now been refuted. Presently the view of those who hold that the Lord is the cause in both ways, material as well as operative, is confuted.

Objection. But in previous sūtras,[30] it has been decided on scriptural authority that the Lord is in fact

both operative and material cause. Why then should the Author now wish to refute this point?

REPLY. Even though a certain part of a doctrine may not be open to disagreement, because it conforms and holds the same view, nevertheless other elements of doctrine may give rise to disagreement; and it is with this point in view that the Author now embarks on his refutation.

The Bhāgavatas maintain concerning the question the following doctrine: the venerable Lord, the unique Vāsudeva, whose essence is unaffected knowledge, is the supreme reality. He exists in four forms, into which He has divided Himself, as Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. Vāsudeva is called the Supreme Soul, Saṃkarṣaṇa the individual soul, Pradyumna the mind, Aniruddha the ego-factor. Vāsudeva is the supreme cause, Saṃkarṣaṇa and the others are effects. When one has worshipped this Supreme God for a hundred years with the rites of preparing the way, preparing the gifts, offering them, and studying, and when all one's sins have been cleansed, one will attain to the venerable Lord.

That part of the doctrine which states that Nārāyaṇa, who is well-known to be transcendent over the *avyakta*, who is the Supreme Soul and the soul of the Universe, divides himself into more than one being and exists in this condition, is not rejected; for it is found from such texts as "He exists as One, he becomes three, etc.," that the Supreme Soul exists in a plurality of forms. Nor is it denied that propitiation of this venerable Lord with rites of preparing the way, etc. is

to be constantly observed with exclusive concentration, for religious devotions to the Lord are quite well-known in both śruti and smṛti. But as to the contention that Saṃkarṣaṇa originates from Vāsudeva and Pradyumna from Saṃkarṣaṇa, and Aniruddha from Pradyumna, we maintain that this origination of the individual soul, called Saṃkarṣaṇa, from the Supreme Soul, called Vāsudeva, is impossible, because it entails the defect of non-eternality. For if the individual soul has an origin, such defects as its non-eternality follow. Consequently, its attainment of the Lord cannot mean salvation, for if an effect returns to its cause it is completely merged with it. Also, the Author denies the origin of the individual soul in the sūtra: *"Not the soul, because there is no śruti to that effect, and because, its eternality follows from the śrutis.*[31] Therefore, the assumption is not consistent with the truth.

na ca kartuḥ karaṇam—43.

Besides the assumption is inconsistent, because experience shows that an instrument, e.g., an axe, does not originate from an agent, e.g., Devadatta. The Bhāgavatas however maintain that the instrument, sc. the mind called Pradyumna, originates for the agent, sc. the soul called Saṃkarṣaṇa. Out of this mind, itself born of the soul, the ego-factor called Aniruddha originates. Without an example we cannot ascertain that such is indeed the case; nor do we find a śruti to this effect.

vijñānādibhāve vā tadapratiṣedhaḥ—44.

Or else it may be that these three beings Saṃkarṣaṇa, etc. are not really meant to be identical with

soul, etc. But then what are they? They are all to be accepted as Gods who possess the divine properties of knowledge, sovereignty, power, strength, heroism and splendour. They are all Vāsudevas, defectless, causeless, immaculate. Consequently the afore-mentioned defect, namely, the impossibility of origination does not obtain.

REPLY. Even so, there is no refutation of it, that is to say, non-refutation of the impossibility of origination still obtains; that means that the same defect, sc. impossibility of origination, obtains in a different manner. How? First, if the meaning is this that these four, Vāsudeva, etc., are mutually distinct and are all four co-equal Gods, and that they are not identical in essence, then the assumption of a plurality of Gods is senseless, because the functions of God can be accounted for by one single God. Also this violates their own doctrine, because they hold that only the venerable Lord Vāsudeva, is the supreme reality. Secondly, if the meaning is this that these four are the co-equal divisions of this one venerable Lord, still the impossibility of origination obtains under this condition. For Saṃkarṣaṇa, cannot originate from Vāsudeva, nor Pradyumna from Saṃkarṣaṇa, nor Aniruddha from Pradyumna, because no one exceeds any other one. For it is necessary that the cause exceeds the effect, as in the case of the clay and the pot; for without such excession, the effect can be regarded as the cause. And those who follow the Pañcarātra doctrine do not accept any difference in degree of the properties of knowledge, sovereignty, etc. between anyone of the four divisions, or between all four of them, for they

hold that all the divisions are Vāsudevas, without any differentiation. Nor are the divisions of the venerable Lord limited to four, since we find that all things in the Universe, from Brahmā to a blade of grass, are divisions of the venerable Lord.

vipratiṣedhāc ca—45.

A variety of conflicts are observed in this system, like, for example, the assumption that property is substance: for we find that knowledge, sovereignty, power, strength, heroism and splendour are properties, yet they themselves are all Lord Vāsudevas. Also there is conflict with the Veda. For we find that the Veda is being censored in statements like this: *"Failing to find the supreme good in the four Vedas, Sāṇḍilya learnt this system."* Therefore, it is established that the Pañcarātra theory does not conform.

2. Bhāskara, Śārīrakamīmāṃsābhāṣya, 2.2.42-45.[32]

utpattyasaṃbhavāt—2.2.42

Now the doctrine of Pañcarātra is examined. The objection is raised that there is no justification for doubting[33] its validity, because it does not militate against revelation.[34] Why? They maintain that Vāsudeva is the material as well as the operative cause of the Universe; and a discipline of ritual acts is the means of attaining Him. It is taught that when one has propitiated the venerable Lord Vāsudeva with ritual disciplines like preparing the way,[35] preparing the gifts, the offering of them, and studying, one will attain to Him. All this is quite well-known from revelation too. Therefore, we find nothing in it that is to be condemned.

REPLY. The ritual acts, characterised as worship, meditation and contemplation of the God, as well as the knowledge concerning such acts,[36] are considered valid. However, if some part[37] is found among acceptable elements that is in conflict, that part must be rejected.

According to the doctrine of the Bhāgavatas Vāsudeva is the Supreme Material Cause, and the Supreme Soul. From him the individual soul called Saṃkarṣaṇa originates, from Saṃkarṣaṇa the mind called Pradyumna,[38] and from him the ego-factor called Aniruddha. Against this view this sūtra is laid down: "because of the impossibility of the origination of the individual soul from the Supreme Soul Vāsudeva." Why this impossibility? Because this entails the defects of non-eternality,[39] etc. In the absence[40] of beings which are involved in heaven, hell, or release, the authority of the Veda is vitiated, and the ordinary practice of the world is brought to a stand-still. Therefore this assumption is unjustified.

na ca kartuḥ karaṇam—43.

It is also unproven that the mind called Pradyumna, which is the inner organ, originates from the agent, namely, Saṃkarṣaṇa the individual soul. For the axe does not originate from Devadatta.

vijñānādibhāve vā tadapratiṣedhaḥ—44.

The particle vā in the sense of indicating an alternative meaning. All these beings are indeed Lord Vāsudevas and as such without cause and defectless, possessed of the divine properties of knowledge, sovereignty, power, strength, heroism and splendour.

The reply to this is as follows: even if these are knowledge, etc., this does not invalidate the argument, that is to say, there would not be refutation of the defect of impossibility of origination:[41] the same defect obtains. If all four are equal, there is impossibility of origination because no one exceeds the others; or if they are unequal, the impossibility mentioned above obtains nonetheless.

vipratiṣedhāc ca[42] —45.

In stating that the mind is called Pradyumna and that Aniruddha is the ego-factor, it is stated that they are instrument and ego-factor respectively. Thus the postulation that they are all souls in the above assertion "all these souls...." is self contradictory. And there is conflict with śruti: "Failing to find the way to the supreme good in the four Vedas,[43] Śāṇḍilya composed this system."

5. Rāmānuja on Pañcarātra

In view of his predecessor Yāmuna's concern with Pañcarātra, the reticence of the illustrious Vaiṣṇava philosopher Rāmānuja about the same system is somewhat puzzling. Except for his commentary on the *utpattyasaṃbhavādhikaraṇa*, in which he follows Yāmuna, Rāmānuja remains wholly silent about the elements both of doctrine and of religious practice of Pañcarātra. Elsewhere, I have suggested[44] that Rāmānuja was motivated by a desire to reach all Vedāntins and did not wish to limit his appeal, which he based on śruti and universally recognized smṛtis, by emphasizing his allegiance to any particular school and by quoting as decisive authority, sactarian texts that others would

refuse to accept. Also the cosmogonical doctrine in which most of the philosophic superstructure of Pañcarātra consists was of no immediate concern to Rāmānuja's ontological preoccupations. Still it remains curious that even in his introduction to the *Gītābhāṣya*, where Rāmānuja enlarges upon the manifestations of God in their different gradations, no room whatever is given to even a passing mention of, for example, the *Vyūhas*. Rarely, moreover, will one find him use the appellation Vāsudeva. When it occurs in the texts, he comments upon, it is translated into Nārāyaṇa, which is his favourite name for God.

Therefore it may be useful to include here the full translation of Rāmānuja's commentary on the *utpattyasaṃbhavādhikaraṇa*, both for its own sake and for its relationship to Yāmuna's discourse. In the numbering of the Srībhāṣya this adhikaraṇa comprises Brahmasūtras, 2.2.39-42.

utpattyasaṃbhavāt—39.

Another doubt that may arise, viz., that the Pañcarātra system—which being promulgated by the Venerable Lord Himself actually sets forth the means of attaining the *summum bonum*—has also no authority because it would be in the same class with Sāṃkhya and other systems, is presently disposed of.

With regard to this system the objection is raised: The individual soul, Saṃkarṣaṇa by name, originates from Vāsudeva, who stands for the Supreme Brahman, the ultimate cause. From Saṃkarṣaṇa orginates the manas called Pradyumna. From that again originates the subjectifying organ called Aniruddha: Thus is, as

is well-known, the doctrine of the *Bhāgavatas*. So it is held that the individual soul has an origin; but this is contrary to the śruti: for the śrutis maintain that the soul has no beginning: "*The intelligent being is not born nor does it die.*"[45]

na ca kartuḥ karaṇam—40.

"From Saṃkarṣaṇa originates the manas called Pradyumna" means that the instrument manas has its origin in the agent soul—which is impossible because the śruti declares that the manas, too, has its origin in none but the *Supreme* Brahman: "*From Him spring breath, mind and all senses.*"[46] Consequently, this system is also denied authority since its teachings are in conflict with the śruti.

At this point we propound:

vijñānādibhāve vā tadapratiṣedhaḥ—41.

With *vā* this view is exchanged for the opposite one. *Vijñānādi*, i.e., *vijñāna* "knowledge" as well as *ādi*—"beginning"—refers to the Supreme Brahman. Where Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha are of the Supreme Brahman's being, the doctrine which declares this very fact cannot be denied authority. In other words: that the origination of the soul is promulgated in contradiction with the śruti is an objection raised by people who do not really know the doctrine of the *Bhāgavatas*. Actually this doctrine is that the Supreme Brahman—called Vāsudeva—, moved by affection for those who take refuge in Him, exists Himself and by His own will in a quadruple form in order to serve as a refuge for His votaries. So in Pauṣkarasaṃhitā: "*Agama is that in which the Brahmins*

who adhere to the tradition make a duty of worshipping the quaternity under its different names," etc. That this "worship of the quaternity" is the worship of the Supreme Brahman under the name of Vāsudeva is declared in the Sātvatasaṃhitā: "*The great* upaniṣada *of Brahman is the most important śāstra as it imparts discrimination to the Brahmins who worship the real Brahman under Vāsudeva's name.*[47] This Supreme Brahman called Vāsudeva, whose personality is constituted by the six qualities in full measure, the votaries will attain when they have worshipped Him through acts following on knowledge, and each will attain Him in proportion that he is qualified: in His subtle form, or as Vyūha, or as Vibhava, in which He is differentiated Through worship of the Vibhava he will attain the Vyūha, and through worship of the Vyūha he will attain the Supreme Brahman in His Subtle form in which He is called Vāsudeva. This is their view. Vibhava is defined as the sum-total of the manifestations Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, etc.; the Vyūha has the four forms of Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha; the Subtle is the Supreme Brahman called Vāsudeva whose personality is constituted by the six qualities alone. So in Pauṣkarasaṃhitā: "*That śāstra by means of which one attains the Supreme Brahman called Vāsudeva completely through acts following on knowledge,"* etc.

Therefore, Saṃkarṣaṇa, etc. also constitute the voluntarily assumed personality of the Supreme Brahman who, according to the śruti, "*is born in many ways without being born*:"[48] so, since it is declared that Brahman has births in the form of voluntary assumptions of individuality occasioned by His affection for

His votaries, the śāstra that declared the same cannot therefore be denied authority. Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha are in that system, the operators of the categories of soul, manas and subjectifying organ, so that there is no contradiction if they are denoted by the words for soul, etc., just as Brahman is denoted by the words space, etc.

vipratiṣedhāc ca—42.

Besides, in that very system the origination of the soul is emphatically denied: as in Pauṣkarasaṃhitā: "*The nature of prakṛti is declared to be non-spiritual, subservient to the other, eternal, ever-developing, governed by the three guṇas, the field of experience for beings subject to karman. The conjunction of prakṛti and puruṣa takes place through pervasion, for the puruṣa is determined as being in reality without beginning or end.*" Therefore, since all the Saṃhitās declare thus that the soul is eternal, the origination of the proper form of the soul is denied in the Pañcarātra system. It will be said later on, in the sūtra *nātmā śruteḥ*,[40] why in Vedic and profane usage the soul is said to be born, to die, etc.

To conclude: the very doctrine denies the origination of the soul, so that the objection that it is not authoritative, since it holds that the soul originates is absolutely rejected.

Then there is the outcry of some who think that since Sāṇḍilya studied the Pañcarātra doctrine because he could not find a proper basis in Vedas and auxiliary sciences, and that this signifies that no proper basis for man's ends in life is found in Vedas and auxiliary sciences, it follows that the tantra is incompatible with

the Vedas. But this is obviously no more than a parti-pris of people who have not the faintest idea about the purport of the Veda and not the slightest consideration for all the canons which corroborate the Veda. For example, in the text: "*Morning after morning those tell lies who offer the Agnihotra before sunrise,*"[50] the censure with which the oblation before sunrise meets serves to exalt the merit of the oblation after sunrise. Or, for example, in the opening text of the so-called *bhūmavidyā* Nārada begins: "My Lord, I have studied the Ṛgveda, the Yajurveda, the Sāmaveda, and fourthly, the Atharvan, and fifthly, epic and purāṇa,"[51] continues to sum up all the branches of knowledge and concludes: "but, My Lord, here I am knowing the mantras but not the soul." That he thus declares to have found no knowledge of the soul in all the branches of knowledge except the *bhūmavidyā* means that he exalts the value of the *bhūmavidyā*, which he is about to set forth—or else, the contention of this Nārada is occasioned by the fact that he was unable to find out the Supreme Reality that is set forth in Vedas and auxiliaries. Similarly Sāṇḍilya's contention, as may be gathered from his exposition later on of the Supreme Reality Brahman called Vāsudeva, who is to be known from the Vedānta. So it is said in the Paramasaṃhitā that in view of the difficulty of understanding the meaning of the Veda, the śāstra has commenced in order to facilitate this understanding: "*My Lord, I have studied in great detail all the Vedas with the auxiliary and subsidiary sciences, and I have listened to the auxiliaries together with the disputations. But nowhere in all those texts have I found beyond all doubt the road to bliss by which the end is attained,*" and "*the*

Lord Hari, who knows, has taken the essence from the Vedānta and summarized it in an easy form to show His mercy to His devotees."

Therefore, it is beyond reproach that the Lord Vāsudeva who is identical with the Supreme Brahman and who is known from the Vedānta—absolutely opposed to all imperfection, solely comprising perfection and ocean of immeasurable perfect qualities like infinite knowledge, bliss, etc. and whose every will is realized—has gazed upon His devotees, distinguished according to the system of the four stations and four stages of life and conformably pursuing the four ends of man's life, dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa; and shoreless sea of compassion, clemency, and affection, He considered that the Vedas which teach true knowledge of His proper form, His supernal manifestation, the means of His propitiation and the fruit thereof, were difficult to grasp for all gods and men different from Himself, as they are divided in Ṛg, Yajuḥ Sāman and Atharvan, with numberless branches and consisting in injunction exegesis and formula, and therefore He Himself composed the Pañcarātra Śāstra to teach the true purport of the Vedas.

Moreover, if others interpret the four Lessons of the Sūtras in such a way that they deny the authority of an incompatible component part, this interpretation runs counter to the very letter of the Sūtras and to the intention of the Author of the Sūtras. For the Author of the Sūtras, after having promulgated the Sūtras that set forth the canons of Vedānta, composed in support of the Veda the hundred thousand ślokas of the

Bhāratasaṃhitā, in the *jñānakāṇḍa* of which, the Mokṣadharma, he declared: "*When a householder or an initiated, or a hermit, or a wandering mendicant wants to attain the final aim, which deity is he to worship then?*"[52] and so on and proceeds to propound the doctrine of the pañcarātra śāstra in a long disquisition: "*This has been extracted from the Bhārata epic in its full length of one hundred thousand ślokas after it has been churned with the stick of thought: like butter is extracted from curds, and curds from milk, the Brahmin from the bipeds, the Āraṇyaka from the Vedas, the Amṛta from the herbs*[53] *this Mahopaniṣada which is consistent with the four Vedas and the demonstrations of Sāṃkhya and Yoga is called the Pañcarātra.*[54] *This is bliss, this is Brahman, this is absolutely salutary.*[55] *Consistent with Ṛg, Yajuḥ and Sāman and the Atharvāngirasas.*[56] *This discipline will of a certainty be authoritative.*"[57] The words *sāṃkhya* and *yoga* above denote jñānayoga and karmayoga, compare "*the sāṃkhyas through jñānayoga and the yogins through karmayoga.*"[58] Further in the Bhīṣmaparvan: "*Brāhmaṇas, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas and śūdras as described are all to worship, to serve and to honour Mādhava according to the sātvata ritual that has been promulgated by Saṃkarṣaṇa.*"[59] Now, how would it be possible that the foremost of Vedic scholars Bādarāyaṇa, who has said this Himself, would say that the sātvata śāstra, which sets forth the ways of worshipping and propitiating Vāsudeva, the Supreme Brahman, the One known from the Vedānta has really no authority whatever?

However, in texts like: "*Are Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Pañcarātra, Vedas and Pāśupata all founded on the same principle or have they different foundations,*" *O Sage?*[60] and so on, it

is said that Sāṃkhya, etc. do also deserve our respect, whereas they are refuted in the Śārīraka. Hence it would be the same with this system too.—No, for in the Mahābhārata the same argumentation is embodied as in the Śārīraka. The meaning of the question: "*Are they founded on the same principle or not*" is this: Do Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Pāśupata, Vedas and Pañcarātra set forth the same fundamental or different ones? And if they set forth one and the same fundamental, what is it? But when they set forth different fundamentals, their teachings are incompatible and since we have no option in matters of reality, it follows that only one can be admitted: what is that one?" To this question he replies: "*Know what these different theories of knowledge really are, O Royal Sage. The founder of Sāṃkhya is Kapila,*"[61] etc. and he declares that Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Pāśupata have their origins in persons because they are creations of Kapila, Hiraṇyagarbha and Paśupati; then in "*the teacher of the Vedas is held to be Avāntaratapas,*"[62] he states the impersonal origin of the Vedas, and finally he says in "*founder of the entire Pañcarātra is Nārāyaṇa Himself,*"[63] that no one but Nārāyaṇa has promulgated the Pañcarātra system. What the author here intends to say is this: Inasmuch as the *personal* systems hold mutually irreconcilable views on reality and maintain tenets that are incompatible with the reality as we know it from the Veda without the slightest possibility of such errors as inaccuracies, etc. since its origin is *impersonal*, they can hardly be deemed to carry any authority on reality such as it is. And Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Brahman, is the One known from the Veda. Therefore, we may accept the fundamentals of *pradhāna, puruṣa, paśupati*, etc. as propounded

by these various systems only in so far as they are ensouled by Nārāyaṇa the Supreme Brahman, who is the One known from the Veda. So he says: "*In all these different systems of knowledge, eminent prince, we see that according to tradition and logic the sovereign Nārāyaṇa is the only basis:*"[64] i.e., he who ponders over reality *yathāgamaṃ yathānyāyam*, sc. as propounded by these different traditions and corroborated by arguments sees clearly that Nārāyaṇa alone is the basis of all reality. That is to say: as the fundamentals are not declared in these systems to be ensouled by Brahman, the one who, on the authority of śrutis "*all this is verily Brahman*,"[65] "*Nārāyaṇa is all*, etc."[66] realizes that everything in fact is ensouled by Brahman, understands that Nārāyaṇa alone is the basis.

Consequently, considering that Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Brahman, the One known from the Vedānta, is Himself the founder of the entire Pañcarātra, and that this system sets forth His proper form and the means of worshipping Him, it is evident that no one can seriously maintain that this system is on a par with the other systems. Hence, it is declared in the same epic: "*Thus it is said that* sāmkhyayoga *and* vedāraṇyaka *—which are mutually complementary—constitute the one Pañcarātra:*"[67] *sāṃkhyayoga* is "Sāṃkhya and Yoga:" *vedāraṇyaka* "the Vedas and the Araṇyakas": these are said to be mutually consistent and to constitute the one Pañcarātra because they form a whole inasmuch as they all propound one truth. In other words: the Āraṇyakas accept the 25 fundamentals of the Sāṃkhya, the discipline of *yama*, *niyama*, etc. of the Yoga and declare that these fundamentals are ensouled by

Brahman, that this discipline is a form of worshipping Brahman, and that the acts of the Vedas are propitiations of Him, so that they hereby propound the proper form of Brahman: it is precisely this that the Supreme Brahman Nārāyaṇa Himself elucidates in the Pañcarātra Tantra. And what is rejected in the Śārīraka is not the fundamentals as such of the Sāṃkhya, but the tenet that they are not ensouled by Brahman; and what is rejected of Yoga and Pāśupata is not the discipline and Paśupati as such but the tenet that the Lord is only the operative cause, the fallacious opinions on major and minor fundamentals and certain unorthodox practices. Therefore, the text: "*Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Pañcarātra, Vedas and Pāśupata are all in essence authoritative and are not to be invalidated by argumentations,*"[68] which means that their fundamentals as propounded in these systems are to be accepted and the systems are not to be anathematized in their entirety like the fundamental doctrines of Jainism and Buddhism: for this is in agreement with the statement that "*according to tradition and logic the sovereign Nārāyaṇa is the only basis.*"[69]

NOTES ON INTRODUCTION

1. *Ātmasiddhi*, *Īśvarasiddhi*, and *Saṃvitsiddhi*, Sanskrit text and English translation by RAMANUJACHARYA and SRINIVASACHARYA, *Journal, Annamalai University*.
2. *Stotraratna*, edited and translated by SWAMI ADIDEVANANDA (Madras 1950).
3. §139
4. P. N. SRINIVASACHARI, *The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita* (Adyar 1946), p. 511.
5. cf. my *Rāmānuja on the Bhagavadgītā* (The Hague 1953), Introduction, ch. 3; appendix.
6. As represented by, e.g., Śankara and Bhāskara, whose common objections (*infra* ch 4) keep recurring in Yāmuna's argument.
7. So still F. OTTO SCHRADER, *Introduction to the Pāñcarātra and the Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā* (Adyar 1916), p. 26, where he states the opinion that the name refers to "the Pañcarātra Sattra of Nārāyaṇa (spoken of in Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, 13. 6. 1.) interpreted philosophically as the five-fold self-manifestation of God by means of his *Para*, *Vyūha*, *Vibhava*, *Antaryāmi*, and *Arcā* forms." However, though the earliest sources in the epic know the Vyūhas, there is indication of the five-fold nature, whereas references to the term *pañcarātra* tend to another interpretation, see below.
8. Śat Br. 13. 6. 1. 1. *sa etaṃ puruṣamedhaṃ pañcarātraṃ yajñakratum apaśyat*, where *pañcarātra* should mean "lasting five days and five nights."
9. cf. also 12. 339. 14; all references are to the Bombay Edition.
10. 12. 335. 19; 24; cf. 12. 242. 78; 348, 55.
11. 12. 335. 19.
12. e.g., 12. 336. 30.

13. 12. 339. 33 ff.

tad (sc. *śarīram* of five elements) *āviśati brahman na dṛśyo laghuvikramaḥ* |

utpanna eva bhavati śarīraṃ ceṣṭayan prabhuḥ ||

na vinā dhātusaṃghātaṃ śarīraṃ bhavati kvacit |

na ca jīvaṃ vinā brahman vāyavaś ceṣṭayanty uta ||

14. 12. 339. 36.

15. 12 339. 36; cf. 5. 67 : *Saṃkarṣaṇam agrajaṃ sarvabhūtānām*, created by Kṛṣṇa; thus 12. 207. 10; 344. 16; 13. 159.

16. 12. 339. 37 f.

17. cf. 1. 67: Pradyumna as incarnation of Sanatkumāra; 10. 12, Sanatkumāra is described as Kṛṣṇa's *son* by Rukminī.

18. cf. 6. 65: Kṛṣṇa creates himself as Pradyumna out of himself and evolves Aniruddha from Pradyumna; in 13. 159 Pradyumna is described as Kṛṣṇa's third form.

19. 12. 339. 38.

20. In the sense that the four vyūhas, or Vāsudeva and the three others constitute the ensouling principle of the gross body (12. 339. 34 ff.), yet Vāsudēva *is the soul to* Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha; comparably the *Pañcarātra* theory of the subtle and gross creations.

21. cf. my "Studies in Sāṃkhya III : Sattva," *JAOS* 77.2; 1957.

22. 12. 334. 9.

23. 12. 336. 27 ff.

24. 12. 339 110 f.

25. e.g., 12. 339. 111; 349. 64.

26 ...*parivrāṭ pañcarātrikaḥ*; the edition is by the French scholar Félix Lacote, Budhasvāmin: *Bṛhat-kathā, Çloka-saṃgraha* (Paris 1908–29). The same farmer complains (ib 63);

dhyānādhyāyapradhānaṃ ca vihitaṃ bhikṣukarma yat |

vaiśyakarmābhiyuktasya tasya nāmāpi nāsti me ||

27. ib. 65–67.

28. ib 22. 220.

29. Daniel H. H. INGALLS, "Śaṃkara's Arguments against the Buddhists," *Philosophy East and West*, III.4, 1954, p. 292 ff.

30. BrS. 1. 4. 23.

31. BrS. 2. 3. 17.

32. The only edition in existence (by Pt. V. P. DVIVEDI, Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series 70; 185; 209; Benares 1915) is very poor; the Amendations suggested hereunder are based on an examination of all extant MSS, collated for a new edition which I have in preparation.

33. Read *cintā* for *citrā*

34. Read *śrutivirodhābhāvāt* for *śrutir virodhābhāvāt*.

35. Read *abhigamano* for *adhigamano*—.

36. Read *karma jñānaṃ ca* for *karmajñānaṃ ca*.

37. Read *aṃśāntaraṃ* for *avāntaraṃ*.

38. Read *Pradyumnasaṃjñaṃ mano* for *Pradyumnaḥ sṛjyamāno*.

39. Read *'nityatvādi-* for *nityatvādi-*.

40. Read *'bhāvād* for *bhāvād*

41. Read *utpattyasaṃbhavadoṣasyāpratiṣedhaḥ* for *utpattyasaṃbhavād doṣaḥ syāpratiṣedhaḥ*.

42. Read *tathāpy utpattyasaṃbhavaḥ pratipāditaḥ / VIPRATIṢEDĀC CA* for *tathāpy utpattyasaṃbhavaḥ / pratipāditavipratiṣedhāc ca*, and thus restore the submerged sūtra.

43. Read *vedeṣu caturṣu*; all MSS have *cakāra*; all other authors have *avagatavān*.

44. *Rāmānuja's Vedārthasaṃgraha* (Poona 1956), Intr. ch. 3, p. 36 ff.

45. Kaṭh Up. 2. 17.

46. Muṇḍ Up. 2. 1. 3.

47. Sātvat S. 2. 5.

48. Taitt. Ār. 3. 12.

49. Br S. 2. 3. 17 (18).

50. Ait. Br. 5. 316, see translation note 196.
51. Ch Up. 7. 1. 2.
52. MBh. 12. 334. 1.
53. MBh. 12. 343. 11-13.
54. MBh. 12. 339.111-112.
55. MBh. 12. 335. 32.
56. MBh. 12 335. 40.
57. MBh. 12. 335. 44.
58. Bhg. 3. 3.
59. MBh. 6. 66. 39-40.
60. MBh. 12. 349. 8.1.
61. MBh 12. 349. 64-65.
62. MBh. 12. 349. 66.
63. MBh. 12. 349. 68.
64. MBh. 12. 349. 68-69.
65. Chhp. 3. 14. 1.
66 Mārhp 13.
67. MBh. 12. 348. 61.
68. not identified.
69. MBh 12. 349 69.

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1. Dedication to Viṣṇu.

2. Introduction.

PART ONE: THE MAJOR OPPOSITION 3—52

"Pañcarātra Śāstra is not a valid means of knowledge."

3. The validity of Pañcarātra must depend on other means of knowledge. It cannot depend on Perception.

4. Nor on a supposed all-embracing divine Perception.

5. *Objection.* The scope of Perception depends on the percipient; in a supreme percipient supreme Perception is possible.

6. *Refutation.* No Perception can be supreme, since it is limited by its organ.

7. *Objection.* Even so, Perception as a whole could be total.

8. *Refutation.* No, the finite can never become infinite. Thus there can be no all-embracing perception and the validity of Pañcarātra, dependent on such Perception, collapses.

9. Nor can its validity depend on Inference.

10. Nor on Scripture, whether explicitly found, or proved to exist by Inference, Analogy or Circumstantial Implication.

11. *Objection.* The same reasoning applies to the validity of any Smṛti.

12. *Refutation.* No, since the validity of Smṛti resides in the fact that its injunctions are observed by the same agent as observe the Vedic injunctions.

These agents do not observe Pañcarātra injunctions, because those are condemned by exemplary exponents of the three Estates.

13. *Objection.* But since the Bhāgavatas are Brahmins, this should validate Pañcarātra.

14. *Refutation.* But they are not Brahmins.

15. Discussion of the caste rank of Bhāgavatas and Sātvatas ; the evidence of Smṛti.

16. Evidence of their customs and conduct.

17. Pañcarātra is invalid, because it opposes the Veda and is therefore heretical.

FIRST MINOR COUNTER-OPPOSITION : THE NAIYAYIKA VIEW 18–23

18. Pañcarātra is independent of Veda, both corporal of verbal statements being accounts of the universal Perception of the same Personal God.

19. For the Veda too must have been composed by a Personal Creator.

20. This Personal Creator has complete knowledge of Dharma and Adharma.

21. For these are the means of world creation and must therefore be completely known by the world creator.

22. Proof for the existence of such a Creator is furnished by the proved producedness of the world.

23. The ritual acts of individual performers cannot be ultimate causes of world creation and destruction. The existence of a divine Creator is abundantly evidenced by Scripture and Tradition.

REFUTATION 24–32

24. There is no authority for such a creator of the Veda either in Perception or in Inference, since such an author would be motivated by bodily existence and since, if Dharma were provable by other means of knowledge, there would be no purpose for the authority of the Veda.

25. The argument that someone must know Dharma because someone has created the world is fallacious, since there is no scope for a world creator.

26. Nor does a creator need to know the means for his creations.

27. Nor can it be proved that the world as a whole is produced.

28. If it were produced, the producer could not be God.

29. The God of reason is a person with personal defects.

30. He could not operate independently of his personal karman, which renders him superfluous.

31. No author of the Veda is remembered.

32. The preterpersonal virtue of the Veda.

33. *Conclusion.* Since there can be no divine author of the Pañcarātra, it must have been composed by someone in order to deceive.

34. *Objection.* God need not be proved by Inference. He is proved by Scripture.

35. Scriptural testimony is informative of fact as well as of kārya, and Vedic statements on God therefore have full authority.

SECOND MINOR COUNTER OPPOSITION: THE PRĀBHAKARA VIEW 36–41

36. Only injunctive Vedic statements are denotative.
37. Factual statements are denotative only if connected with injunctions.
38. Generally denotation belongs to words in so far as they are connected in an injunctive sentence.
39. Otherwise indicative statements with injunctive sense are impossible.
40. Thus the Upaniṣads are informative only in so far as they are construed as subordinate to an injunction, which even then does not prove the existence of its content.
41. Consequently Scripture cannot prove the existence of God.
42. Continuation of the Bhāṭṭa opposition. Even if God existed, he could not be omniscient, since all knowledge derives from sense perception.
43. The omniscient Gods claimed by different sects cancel one another.
44. *Objection.* Vāsudeva, the omniscient promulgator of Pañcarātra, is proved by Scripture and must therefore not be compared with the Gods of other systems.
45. Scriptural statements concerning the omniscience of Paśupati are figurative.
46. *Refutation.* If Vāsudeva is indeed proved by Scripture, the promulgator must either be a deceiver or Vāsudeva in his role of illusionist. Consequently Pañcarātra has no validity.
47. Pañcarātra Tradition cannot be compared with Manu's Tradition, since that would make the promulgator dependent.

48. Pañcarātra is traditionally known as a heresy.

49. And it is also heretical because of its unscriptural doctrine that the soul has a beginning.

50. Pañcarātra cannot be eternal.

51. Arguments against the Pāśupata and other such Traditions apply equally to Pañcarātra.

52. *Final Conclusion*: Pañcarātra is not a valid means of knowledge.

PART TWO: MAJOR ARGUMENTATION 53–139.

53. SYLLOGISM. "*Pañcarātra is valid, because it produces faultless knowledge, like the Vedic Statements*".

54–55. The thesis is not disproved by Perception and Inference.

56–57. It cannot be shown logically that Pañcarātra is outside the Veda.

58. The thesis is not disproved by the Veda.

59. The ground of the syllogism is not defective.

60. It cannot be shown that Pañcarātra as language statement is defective because it derives from a person.

61–62. Nor can the Prābhākara view be admitted that all non-injunctive statements are non-denotative.

63. The Prābhākara view should be restated as "denotation of connected meanings generally."

64. Kārya is but one of several factors which decide denotation.

65. Kārya statements can only be understood if the words constituting them are already known.

66. It is inadmissible to assume different denoting powers for different kinds of statements.

67. It cannot be shown that a Kārya statement proves that Kārya itself is instrumental in bringing about the fruit.

68–69. Not Kārya but heaven is the Sādhya.

70. *Objection.* A fruit is not essential to a Kārya.

71. *Refutation.* It must be, or all acts are fruitless. *Conclusion*: Factual statements can produce knowledge of their contents.

72. *Objection.* But this knowledge arises from Inference, not from the verbal statement itself.

73. *Refutation.* No, since a word naturally communicates its meaning.

74. *General Conclusion*: The substantive statements of the Upaniṣads concerning God are authoritative.

75. The fact that the content of a statement may be known through other means of knowledge does not render this statement non-authoritative.

76. Omniscience is not acquired through the senses.

77. The scriptural statements to this effect cannot be disproved.

78. The view that statements are only denotative if they prompt to action is incorrect.

79. The person celebrated in the Upaniṣads is Viṣṇu.

80. It is not stated that this Person is Śiva.

81. Viṣṇu's supremacy, and consequently the acceptability of His composition, are not sectarian assertions but are proved by orthodox scriptures.

82. The necessity of Pañcarātra.

83. The same cannot be proved of other Tantras. The Kāpālika and Kālamukha doctrines are heretical.

84–85. The Pāśupata and Śaiva doctrines are in part heretical.

86. These doctrines have been promulgated by Śiva in order to deceive the world.

87. Since the other Tantras are not based on Scripture they cannot compare with Pañcarātra.

88. Even if Pañcarātra is based on Scripture this does not mean that its author was not independent.

89. Pañcarātra is a digest of the Vedic tradition.

90–91. Pañcarātra does not censure the Veda.

92. The fact that Pañcarātra enjoins additional sacraments does not render it non-Vedic.

93. The fact that Pañcarātra is not included among the fourteen sciences does not render it non-authoritative.

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137. Naivedya as means of the prāṇāgnihotra.

138 Bhāgavatas do not reject the Vedic sacraments; the Ekāyanaśākhīyas do, but on the authority of their own Vedic śākhā.

139. Concluding benedictions of Nāthamuni and the Vaiṣṇava sacred texts.

श्रीः

श्रियै नमः

श्रीधराय नमः

भगवते यामुनमुनये नमः

श्रीमते रामानुजाय नमः ॥

श्रीमद्यामुनमुनिविरचितम्

आगमप्रामाण्यम्

जगज्जन्मस्थितिध्वंसमहानन्दैकहेतवे ।
करामलकवद्विश्वं पश्यते विष्णवे नमः ॥ १ ॥

येऽमी केचन मत्सरात्सवयसो दुर्मानसारा नराः ।
गम्भीरां गुणशालिनीमपि गिरं निन्दन्ति निन्दन्तु ते ।
सारासारविचारकौशलदशापारे परेऽवस्थिताः ।
सन्तस्सन्त्यनसूयवोऽपि बहवः शंसन्ति ये मद्गिरम् ॥ २ ॥

अभिनिवेशवशीकृतचेतसां बहुविदामपि सम्भवति भ्रमः ।
तदिह भागवतं गतमत्सरा मतमिदं विमृशन्तु विपश्चितः ॥ ३ ॥

४. इह केचिद् यतस्ततोऽवगतकतिपयकुतर्ककल्कविस्फूर्जितविजितमनसस्त्रयीमार्गसंरक्षणव्याजेन निजविमर्शकौशलातिशयमुपदर्शयन्तः परमपुरुषविरचितनिरतिशयनिःश्रेयसगोचरपञ्चरात्रतन्त्रप्रामाण्ये विप्रतिपद्यन्ते ।

वदन्ति च ।

द्वेधा खलु प्रमाणत्वं वचसामवसीयते ।
एकं मानान्तरापेक्षमनपेक्षमथेतरम् ॥

तत्रापि ।

न तावत्पुरुषाधीनरचनं वचनं क्वचित् ।
आसीदिति प्रमाणत्वमनपेक्षत्वलक्षणम् ॥

पौरुषेयं हि वचः प्रमाणान्तरप्रतिपन्नवस्तूपस्थापनायोपादीयमानं वक्तुस्तदर्थसिद्धिमनुरुध्यमानमेव प्रमाणभावमनुभवति। न च पञ्चरात्र-तन्त्रप्रतिपाद्यमानविलक्षणदीक्षापूर्वकभगवदाराधनाभिलषितस्वर्गापवर्गादिसाध्यसाधनसंबन्धं प्रत्यक्षादीन्यावेदयितुं क्षमन्ते। न हि प्रत्यक्षेण दीक्षाराधनादीनि निरीक्षमाणास्तेषां निश्रेयससाधनतां प्रतिपद्यामहे।

न चार्वाचीनाः केचिदतिमानुषशक्त्योऽमीषामभिलषितसाधनताम्ध्यक्षितवन्त इति प्रमाणमस्ति, यतस्तेषामपि चक्षुरादीन्द्रियं दृश्यमानमिन्द्रियस्वभावं नातिक्रमितुमुत्सहते।

५. ननु च।

> प्रकृष्यमाणं प्रत्यक्षं दृष्टमाश्रयभेदतः।
> अतस्तदाश्रये क्वापि ध्रुवं परिनितिष्ठति॥

सर्वं हि सातिशयं निरतिशयदशामनुभवद् दृष्टं वियतीव परिमाणं, सातिशयं च काकोलूकगृध्रादिषु प्रत्यक्षमीक्षितमिति तदपि तथा भवितुमर्हति। इयं च ज्ञानस्य परा काष्ठा या सर्वगोचरता, अधिकविषयतयैव हि जगति ज्ञानानि परस्परमतिशेरते।

> इत्थमैश्वर्यवैराग्यसामर्थ्यादिगुणा अपि।
> निरस्तातिशयाः पुंसि क्वचित्सन्तीति सूरयः॥

अतो यस्यैतदखिलभुवनावलम्बिभावभेदसाक्षात्कारिप्रत्यक्षं स तत्समीक्षितदीक्षाराधनादिधर्मभावो भगवानेवं व्याचष्टेति किमनुपपन्नमिति।

> ६. तत्र प्रत्यक्षविज्ञानप्रकर्षः कल्पितोऽपि यः।
> स्वगोचरमतिक्रम्य नान्यदास्कन्दितुं क्षमः॥

तथा हि

> रूपरूपितदेकार्थसमवायिषु चाक्षुषः।
> प्रकर्षो भवितुं युक्तो दृश्यमानप्रकर्षवत्॥

एवम्,

इन्द्रियान्तरविज्ञानं विश्वं गोचरयेन्न तु ।
कथं प्रत्यक्षविज्ञानं विश्वं बोधयितुं क्षमम् ॥

७. ननु तत्कृतसामर्थ्यं विद्यमानोपलम्भने ।

असति हि स्वभावानुबन्धिनि विद्यमानोपलम्भनत्वे प्रत्यक्षतैव परावर्तते, न ह्यजातमतिवृत्तं वाऽवगमयदनुमानादि प्रत्यक्षपक्षनिक्षेपं क्षमते, तेन अशेषविषयतालक्षणप्रत्यक्षप्रकर्षः स्वभावनियमनिर्मूलितोदय इति न हृदयमधिरोहति ।

८. इदमपि सातिशयेन निरतिशयमनुमिमानः पृष्टो व्याचष्टाम्— "सातिशय एव किन्तु तां दशामनुभवति यतः परं न संभवति महिमेत्यभिनिविशसे बाल इव स्थविरभावम्", अथैकस्मिन् सातिशये केनाप्यन्येन निरतिशयेन भवितव्यमिति, आहोस्वित्समानजातीयेनान्येन निरतिशयदशामधिरूढेन भवितव्यमिति ।

न तावदग्रिमः कल्पः कल्पतेऽनुपलम्भतः ।
न हि दृष्टं शरावादि व्योमेव प्राप्तवैभवम् ॥

यदि च तदेव सातिशयमसंभावनीयपरप्रकर्षं परिनितिष्ठेत्, हन्त ? तर्ह्येकेन घटमणिकादिना ब्रह्माण्डोदरविवरमापूरितमिति तत्प्रतिहततयेतरभावभङ्गप्रसङ्गः ।

व्योम्नैव लब्धसाध्यत्वान्मध्यमः सिद्धसाधनः ।
कल्पान्तरेऽपि दुर्वारं प्रागुदीरितदूषणम् ॥
विभुस्तम्भान्तरव्याप्तःस्तम्भस्सातिशयो न हि ।
दृष्टपूर्वैस्तथाऽन्योन्यव्याघातः स्थित एव सः ॥

यदपि वियति परिमाणमिह निदर्शितं तदपि विमर्शनीयमेव । परिमाणं हि नाम देशावच्छेदः इयत्ता परितोभाववेष्टनमिति यावत् । न च नभसि तदस्तीति कथमिव तदिह निदर्शनतया निर्दिश्यते । यदि च नभसि तदनुमन्वीत तदपि तर्हि सम्भाव्यमानपरप्रकर्षमिति पुनरपि साध्यविकलता ।

९. न च अतिशयेन प्रत्यक्षेण दीक्षाराधनादयो धर्मतया अवबोधिता इत्यपि प्रमाणमस्ति; तस्मादस्मदादिषु आलोचितपर-चेतनातिरेकपरिकल्पनाऽल्पीयसीति नाभिप्रेतसाध्यसाधनसम्बन्धे प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणं, नतरां तन्मूलतया पञ्चरात्रस्मृतिः प्रमाणम्।

१०. न च करणपथदूरवर्तिनि प्रस्तुतवस्तुन्यविनाभावावधारणा-धीनोदयमनुमानमुत्पत्तुमलं, न ह्यदृष्टचरवह्नयस्तदविनाभावितया धूम-मनुसंदधति।

११. न चागमस्सात्वतसमयसिद्धक्रियाकलापकर्तव्यतोपस्थापन-परः परिदृश्यते, येन तन्मूलतया पञ्चरात्रस्मृतयः प्रमाणं स्युः। न चादृश्यमानोऽप्यनुमानगोचरः, यथैव हि तन्त्रप्रसिद्धदीक्षाराधन-तत्फलाभिमतस्वर्गादिसाध्यसाधनभावो नानुमानगोचरः सम्बन्धाव-धारणविरहात्, एवं तन्मूलागमोऽपि तत एव नानुमातुं शक्यः।

न चागमेनापि प्रस्तुतस्मरणमूलभूतागमावगमः सम्भवति। स हि द्वेधा पौरुषेयापौरुषेयभेदात्।

न तावत्पौरुषेयेण वचसा तस्य सम्भवः।
विप्रलब्धुमपि ब्रूयुर्मृषैव पुरुषा यतः॥

अद्यत्वेऽपि हि दृश्यन्ते केचिदागमिकच्छलात्।
अनागमिकमेवार्थं व्याचक्षाणा विचक्षणाः॥

तदिह पञ्चरात्रप्रबन्द्धृणामपि तन्मूलभूतागमावगमपुरःसरी किं स्वनिबन्धनानां वेदमूलत्वप्रतिज्ञा, किं वा यथारुचि रचयतां प्ररोचनाय तथा वचनमिति शङ्कामहे।

तावता च प्रमाणत्वं व्याहन्येत समीहितम्।
न हि नित्यागमः कश्चिदस्ति तादृशगोचरः॥

न चोपमानात्तन्मूलश्रुतिसिद्धिरसम्भवात्।
कथं ह्यदृष्टपूर्वा सा सदृशज्ञानगोचरा॥

न चार्थापत्तितस्तन्मूलश्रुतिसिद्धिः, अनुपपत्त्यभावात्, स्मरणान्यथाऽनुपपत्त्या हि तत्कल्पना प्रादुर्भवति। स्मरन्ति हि पञ्चरात्रप्रणेतारः—दीक्षाराधनादि धर्मतयाऽष्टकादीनिव मन्वादयः। न चाननुभूते वस्तुनि स्मरणशक्तिराविर्भवति, अनुभवश्चेन्द्रियलिङ्गशब्दसदृशानुपपद्यमानार्थपूर्वकः, ईदृशविषयेऽनुभवः प्रमाणान्तरेभ्योऽनाविर्भवँश्चोदनामेव मूलमुपकल्पयतीति। सिध्येदप्ययं मनोरथः, यदि हि यथार्थत्वनियमोऽनुभवानां प्रामाणिकः स्यात्, यदा पुनारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशादिपरीष्कृतान्तःकरणानामयथार्थानुभवभाविता भावनाः स्वानुरूपाः स्मृतीरारचयन्ति कथमिव तदा स्मरणानुपपत्तितः प्रमाणभूता श्रुतिरुपकल्प्येत अन्यथाऽपि स्मरणोपपत्तेः।

मन्वादिस्मरणेष्विदानीं का वार्त्ता। ननु तत्रापि प्रागुक्ता युक्तयः पराक्रमन्ते न ह्यष्टकां दृष्टवतामिष्टसाधनमिति मतिराविरस्ति। न चानुमानं, संबन्धादर्शनात्, न च शब्दः, तदनुपलम्भात्, न चानुपलभ्योऽनुमातुं शक्यः, संबन्धादर्शनादेव, न चोपमेयः, सदृशानिरूपणात्, न च कल्पयितुं शक्यः, अनन्तरोक्तत्वात् स्मृत्यन्यथोपपत्तेः।

वेदसंयोगिपुरुषस्मरणानुपपत्तितः।
कल्प्यते चेच्छ्रुतिस्तत्र ततोऽन्यत्रापि कल्प्यताम्॥
यतो नारदशाण्डिल्यप्रमुखाः परमर्षयः।
स्मर्यन्ते पञ्चरात्रेऽपि संप्रदायप्रवर्तकाः॥

ततश्च।

तुल्याक्षेपसमाधाने पञ्चरात्रमनुस्मृती।
प्रमाणमप्रमाणं वा स्यातां भेदो न युक्तिमान्॥
त्यज्यतां वा प्रमाणत्वं मन्वादिस्मृतिगोचरम्।
विशेषः पञ्चरात्रस्य वक्तव्यो वा—

१२. स उच्यते॥

अपि वा कर्तृसामान्यात् प्रमाणमिति सूत्रयन्।
सूत्रकारः स्फुटीचक्रे वैलक्षण्यं विवक्षितम्॥

तथा हि श्रुतिविहितानामग्निहोत्रदर्शपूर्णमासज्योतिष्टोमादिकर्मणां स्मृतिविहितानामष्टकाचमनसंध्योपासनादिकर्मणां च पित्राद्युपदिष्टत्वात् परमहितबुद्ध्या त्रैविद्यवृद्धानां निर्विशेषमनुष्ठानं दृष्टं, तेन तादृशशिष्टत्रैवर्णिकपरिग्रहदृढिम्ना स्पष्टदृष्टाष्टकादिकर्तव्यताप्रतीतिः स्वोपपादनपटीयसीं श्रुतिमेव मूलभूतामवलम्बते। न चैवमाचमनोपनयनादीनिव श्रुतिविहिताग्निहोत्रादिपदार्थानुष्ठायिनस्तान्त्रिकाचारानुपचरतः पश्यामः।

प्रत्युतैनान् विगर्हन्ते कुर्वाणान् वेदवादिनः।
तस्माद् यत्कर्तृसामान्यात् प्रामाण्यं स्मृतिपूदितम्॥
नैव तत्पञ्चरात्रादिवाह्यस्मरणमर्हति।
न हि त्रैवर्णिकाः शिष्टास्तदुक्तार्थानुपासते॥

१३. ननु तत्रापि श्रुतिस्मृतिप्राप्तशिखायज्ञोपवीतादिधारयद्भिर्भागवतब्राह्मणैरहरहरनुष्ठीयमानार्थत्वेन चोदनामूलत्वे संभाव्यमाने कथमिव प्रामाण्यप्रत्यनीकभूता भ्रमविप्रलम्भादयः स्मरणकारणतया कल्प्यन्ते।

१४. उच्यते।

हन्तैवंवादिना साधुः प्रामाण्यमुपपादितम्।
यत् त्रैवर्णिकविद्विष्टादिशिष्टा भागवता इति॥

ननु ते कथमशिष्टा ये त्रैवर्णिकाग्रगण्या ब्राह्मणाः? तन्न; तेषां त्रैवर्णिकत्वमेव नास्ति। दूरे ब्राह्मणभावः; न हीन्द्रियसंप्रयोगसमनन्तरं केषुचिदेव देहविशेषेषु अनुवर्तमानमन्यतो व्यावर्तमानं नरत्वातिरेकिणं ब्राह्मण्यं नाम जातिविशेषमपरोक्षयामः, शिखायज्ञोपवीतादयस्तु ब्राह्मणादीनां विधीयमाना न तद्भावमापादयितुं क्षमन्ते, नाप्यवगमयन्ति, दुष्टशूद्रादिषु व्यभिचारदर्शनात्, अतो निर्विवादसिद्धवृद्धव्यवहार एवात्रावगमनिदानम्।

१५. न च भागवतेषु ब्राह्मणपदमविशङ्कं लौकिकाः प्रयुञ्जते। भवति च भेदेन व्यपदेशः—इतो ब्राह्मणा इतो भागवता इति। स्यादेतद्

ब्राह्मणेष्वेव कुतश्चिद् गुणयोगात् सात्वतभागवतादिव्यपदेशः यथा तेष्वेव परिव्राजकादिशब्दा इति तन्न ।

रूढ्या सात्वतशब्देन केचित् कुत्सितयोनयः ।
उच्यन्ते तेषु सत्स्येषु शब्दो नान्यत्र वर्तते ॥
रूढिशक्तिप्रतिद्वन्द्वियोगशक्तिपरिग्रहः ।
अयुक्त इति युक्तिज्ञा रथकारपदे यथा ॥

अपरथा कथमिव रथकारशब्दोऽध्ययनसिद्धयुक्तयश्चत्वमङ्गेनापि यौगिकीं वृत्तिमपहाय जातिविशेषमभिनिविशते । सन्ति च सात्वता नाम उपनयनादिसंस्कारहीना वैश्यमात्यान्वयिनोऽपरजन्मानः केचिद् यथाऽऽह मनुः ।

वैश्यात्तु जायते मात्यात् सुधन्वाचार्य एव च ।
भारुषश्च निजङ्घश्च मैत्रसात्वत एव च ॥

इति,

भागवतशब्दश्च सात्वतेषु वर्तत इति नात्र कश्चिद् विवादः ॥

स्मरन्ति च ।

पञ्चमः सात्वतो नाम विष्णोरायतनानि सः ।
पूजयेदाज्ञया राज्ञां स तु भागवतः स्मृतः ॥ इति

तथाचोदीरितमात्यप्रसूतिवृत्त्युपापतयेदमेव स्मरन्ति यदमी ह प्रत्यक्षमेव वृत्त्यर्थमनुतिष्ठन्तो दृश्यन्ते ; तथा चोशना सर्वेषां कृषिशास्त्रोपजीवनं आचार्यसात्वतयोर्देवपूजनं इति, तथा ब्राह्मे पुराणे विष्णोरायतनानि स पूजयेदाज्ञया राज्ञाम् इति, तथाऽन्यत्रापि सात्वतानां च देवायतनशोधनं नैवेद्यशोधनं प्रतिमासंरक्षणम् इति ।

तथा चेदृशसंदेहव्युदासाय मनोर्वचः ।
प्रच्छन्ना वा प्रकाशा वा वेदितव्याः स्वकर्मभिः ॥ इति ।

१६. अपि चाचारतस्तेषामब्राह्मण्यं प्रतीयते ।
वृत्तितो देवतापूजा दीक्षानैवेद्यभक्षणम् ॥

गर्भाधानादिदाहान्तसंस्कारान्तरसेवनम् ।
श्रौतक्रियाऽननुष्ठानं द्विजैस्सम्बन्धवर्जनम् ॥
इत्यादिभिरनाचारैरब्राह्मण्यं सुनिर्णयम् ।

स्मरन्ति हि वृत्तितो देवपूजाया ब्रह्मकर्मस्वनधिकारहेतुत्वं यथा ।

येषां वंशक्रमादेव देवार्चावृत्तितो भवेत् ।
तेषामध्ययने यज्ञे याजने नास्ति योग्यता ॥ इति ।

तथा च परमसंहितायां तेषामेव वचः—

आपद्यपि च कष्टायां भीतो वा दुर्गतोऽपि वा ।
पूजयेन्नैव वृत्त्यर्थं देवदेवं कदाचन ॥ इति ।

यदपि समस्तविशिष्टविगर्हितनिर्माल्यधारणनैवेद्यभक्षणाद्यनुष्ठानं तदपि तेषामब्राह्मण्यमेवाभिद्योतयति इति ।

अपि च यदवलोकनादावपि विशिष्टाश्चान्द्रायणादिप्रायश्चित्तानि विदधति कथं तत्परिग्रहः श्रुतिमूलत्वमवगमयतीति संभावयामः । स्मरन्ति हि देवलकावलोकने प्रायश्चित्तं देवलकाश्चामी देवकोशोपजीवित्वाद् वृत्त्यर्थं देवपूजनात् । तथा च देवलः । देवकोशोपजीवी यस्स देवलक उच्यते । इति,

तथा, वृत्त्यर्थं पूजयेद्देवं त्रीणि वर्षाणि यो द्विजः ।
स वै देवलको नाम सर्वकर्मसु गर्हितः ॥ इति ।

अपि पुनर्वंशानुपरम्परया वृत्त्यर्थमेव देवमाराधयन्तो दृश्यन्ते, अतो देवलकत्वमकामेनाप्यभ्यनुज्ञातव्यं तथा च ।

विड्वराहं च षण्डं च शूपं देवलकं शवम् ।
भुञ्जानो नेक्षयेद्विप्रो दृष्ट्वा चान्द्रायणं चरेत् ॥

इति प्रायश्चित्तं स्मरन्ति । तथा च विशदतरममीषामेवोपब्राह्मण्यं वर्णयत्यत्रिः । अचालुका देवलकाः कल्पदेवलका गणभोगदेवलका

भगवतश्रुतिरिति चतुर्थः एते उपब्राह्मणा इति। तथा च भगवान् व्यासः।

आह्वायका देवलका नक्षत्रग्रामयाजकाः।
एते ब्राह्मणचण्डाला महापथिकपञ्चमाः॥ इति।

एवं जात्या कर्मणा च त्रयीमार्गादपभ्रष्टभागवतजनपरिग्रह एव पञ्चरात्रशास्त्रप्रामाण्यप्रतिक्षेपाय पर्याप्तो हेतुः,

तथा हि।

१७. विवादाध्यासितं तन्त्रं न मानं पुण्यपापयोः।
त्रयीबाह्यैर्गृहीतत्वाच् चैत्यवन्दनवाक्यवत्॥

अपि च तेषां त्रयीमार्गत्यागपुरस्सरः सर्वधर्मोपदेश इति स्ववाक्यान्येव उपख्यापयन्ति चतुर्षु वेदेषु परं श्रेयोऽलब्ध्वा शाण्डिल्य इदं शास्त्रमधीतवान् इत्यादीनि तदिह कथं चतुर्णामपि वेदानां निश्रेयससाधनावबोधकत्वमुदासीन आरभमाणः तत्प्रसादावगतमर्थं पुमर्थतया कथयतीत्युत्प्रेक्ष्येत।

मन्वादयो हि विवक्षितसकलसमीहितसाधनावबोधकमागमैकमूलमभिदधाना दृश्यन्ते।

वेदोऽखिलो धर्ममूलं स्मृतिशीले च तद्विदाम्।

श्रुतिस्मृतिविहितो धर्मः। स सर्वोऽभिहितो वेदे सर्वज्ञानमयो हि सः। इति च।

(१) यदपरम् उपनयनादिसंस्कृतानामधिकृतानां च अग्निहोत्रादिसमस्तवैदिककर्मसु पुनरपि भगवदाराधनाधिकारसिद्धये दीक्षालक्षणसंस्कारवर्णनं तदवैदिकतामेवानुकारयति, वैदिकत्वे हि तैरेव संस्कारैर्भगवदाराधनादावप्यधिक्रियेरन्।

(२) यदपि धर्मप्रमाणतया समस्तास्तिकजनपरिगृहीतेषु चतुर्दशविद्यास्थानेष्वपरिगणनं तदप्यवैदिकत्वे लिङ्गम् अन्यथा हीदमपि तदन्यतमत्वेन स्मर्येत। न च स्मर्यते, तदवसीयते अवैदिकमेवेदं पञ्चरात्रसरणमिति।

(३) अत एव च भगवता बादरायणेन त्रयीमार्गप्रत्यनीकभूतकणभुगक्षचरणसुगतमतादिबाह्यसमयनिरासावसरेऽस्य तन्त्रस्य निरासः। उत्पत्त्यसंभवात् इति।

त्रयीविदामित्थमसङ्ग्रहेण तथा त्रयीबाह्यपरिग्रहेण।
अनन्तरोक्तैरपि हेतुभिस्तत्र *मानवादिसरणैस्समानम्*॥

१८. *एवं सति यान्यपि लोकं व्यामोहयितुं विद्वेषणोच्चाटन*वशीकरणादिक्षुद्रविद्याप्रायमेव बहुलमुपदिशद्भिर्भगवदाराधनादिकतिपयवैदिककर्माणि पाञ्चरात्रिकैर्निर्दिश्यन्ते तान्यनुपयोग्यान्यविस्रम्भणीयानि च श्वदृतिनिक्षिप्तक्षीरवदिति मन्यामहे।

अतो न वेदमूलत्वं पञ्चरात्रस्य युज्यते।
प्रामाण्यं प्रतिपद्येत येन मन्वादिशास्त्रवत्॥

अत्र कश्चिदाह कामं कक्ष्यान्तरितप्रामाण्येषु मन्वादिसरणेषु कारणतया वेदाः परिकल्प्यन्तां, पञ्चरात्रसरणस्य तु किं वेदेन तन्मूलतयाऽवलम्बितेन वेदानामपि यदनुभवनिबन्धनं प्रामाण्यं तदनुभव एव हि पञ्चरात्रसरणस्य विदानं, न खलु तुल्यमूलयोरष्टकाचमनसरणयोर्मिथोमूलमूलिभावः।

परस्परमपेक्षेते तुल्यकक्ष्ये न हि स्मृती।
पञ्चरात्रश्रुती तद्वन्नापेक्षेते परस्परम्॥
वेदमूलत्वहानेन पञ्चरात्रेऽवसीदति।
कुतस्तन्मूलताहानादागमो नावसीदति॥

१९. आह किमेवं वेदा अपि पुरुषानुभवाधीनप्रामाण्याः पौरुषेया एव कस्संशयः, वाक्यत्वं हि पराधीनरचनत्वस्वभावमुपलभ्यमानं कथमपरथाऽवतिष्ठेत वेदनाम्नो ग्रन्थस्यायं महिमा यत्केनचिद् असन्दब्धोऽपि वाक्यत्वेनावतिष्ठत इति चेत्, हन्त तर्हि पर्वतवर्तिनो *धूमस्यायं महिमा यज्ज्वलनमन्तरेणाप्यनुच्छिन्नसन्तानो गगनतलमधि*रोहतीति किमिति न स्यात्।

२०. ननु कथमतिक्रान्तमानान्तरावतारे धर्मे ग्रन्थः सन्दर्भ्यते, मैवं यतस्सहजसंवेदनसाक्षात्कृतधर्माधर्म एव भगवान् जगदनुकम्पया वेदनामानं ग्रन्थमारचयतीति।

२१. किमस्ति धर्माधर्मगोचरमपि प्रत्यक्षं, बाढं कथमन्यथा तनुभुवनादिकार्यमुपजनयति, स हि तत्र कर्ता भवति यो यस्योपादानमुपकरणञ्च साक्षात्कर्तुं प्रभवति धर्माधर्मौ च जगदुपकरणमिति मीमांसकानामपि सम्मतमेव। अतस्तत्साक्षात्कारी कोऽप्याश्रणीयः स च वेदानादौ निरमिमीतेति।

२२. यस्तु ब्रूते गिरिभुवनादयो भावा न कार्या इति प्रतिब्रूयादेनम्।

विवादगोचरा भावाः कार्या विश्वम्भरादयः।
विचित्रसन्निवेशत्वान्नरेन्द्रभवनादिवत्।
तथा सावयवत्वेन विनाशोऽप्यवसीयते॥

विनश्यन्ति च ये भावास्ते तत्साधनवेदिना।
विनाश्यन्ते यथा तज्ज्ञैरस्माभिः करकादयः॥

ये पुनरपरिदृष्टबुद्धिमदधिष्ठानतरुपतनादिशाकलिता भावाः तेऽपि विमत्याक्रान्ता इति नानैकान्तिकत्वमावहन्ति। किंच।

महत्तया सनाथेन स्पन्दमानत्वहेतुना।
उत्पत्तिभङ्गौ भावानामनुमातुमिहोचितौ॥

तदेवमुदीरितन्यायप्रसिद्धे विश्वम्भरादिकार्यत्वे सिध्यत्येव भगवतस्तदुपकरणधर्माधर्मसाक्षात्कारित्वम्। तथा हि।

विवादाध्यासिता भावा येऽमी भूभूधरादयः।
ते यथोक्तावबोधेन कर्त्रा केनापि निर्मिताः॥

उत्पत्तिनाशभागित्वाद्यदुत्पत्तिविनाशवद्।
दृष्टं तत्तादृशा कर्त्रा निर्म्मितं तद्यथा गृहम्॥

२३. न च वाच्यं कर्मणामेव स्वानुष्ठात् पुरुषसमीहितानि सम्पादयतामन्तरा नान्तरीयकं तनुभुवनादिकार्यनिर्माणमिति यतश्चेतनानधिष्ठितानि तानि न कार्याणि जनयितुमुत्सहन्ते अचेतनत्वाद् वासीवत्, न हि चेतनेन तक्ष्णाऽनधिष्ठिता वासी स्वयमेव यूपादीन्यापादयितुमलम्।

न चापूर्वाण्यधिष्ठाय वयं निर्मातुमीश्वराः।
न हि कर्मोदयात् पूर्वं साक्षात्कर्तुं क्षमामहे॥

उक्तं हि उपादानोपकरणसाक्षात्कारिण एव तत्र तत्र कर्तृत्वमिति।

न च कर्मजन्यापूर्वसाक्षात्काराक्षमः क्षेत्रज्ञः कश्चित् प्रज्ञायते प्रतिज्ञायते वा, अतः क्षेत्रज्ञतदुपभोगतत्साधनधर्माधर्मादिनिखिललोकावलोकनचतुरः कोऽपि निरतिशयशक्तिवैचित्र्यः पुरुषोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः तस्य चाप्रतिघज्ञानत्वादयस्सहजाः।

यथाऽऽहुः।

ज्ञानमप्रतिघं तस्य वैराग्यञ्च जगत्पतेः।
ऐश्वर्यञ्चैव धर्मश्च सहसिद्धं चतुष्टयम्॥ इति।

इममेवार्थं मन्त्रार्थवादेतिहासपुराणवादा उपोद्बलयन्ति द्यावापृथिवी जनयन् देव एकः। प्रजापतिर्वेदानसृजत। इत्येवमादयः।

स चायं†मादिकाले भगवान् प्रलीननिखिलकरणकलेवरादिभोगोपकरणचेतने‡तरायमाणजीवजालावलोकनजनितमहानुग्रहः सकलमपि जगदुपजनय्य तदभिलषितसमस्तसांसारिकसम्पत्प्राप्त्युपायप्रकाशनबहुलां त्रयीमेकतो निर्माय पुनरपि विविधदुरितपरम्पराकीर्णभवार्णवनिमग्नानुद्विग्नान् अवलोकयन् परमकरुणतया तप्तमानसः परमनिश्रेयससाधनस्वाराधानावबोधसाधनीभूताः पञ्चरात्रसंहिताः सनत्कुमार-

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† प्रलयकाले।

‡ यथा हि जडास्तथैव चेतना अपि करणकलेवरविकला भोगभाजो नाभूवन्निति ते चेतनेतरायमाणा इत्युच्यन्ते।

नारदादिभ्योऽभ्यधोचदिति मर्यासमानस्यतन्त्रानुभवमूलानि तन्त्राणि कथमिव यादृशतादृशमन्वादिस्मरणगोष्ठीमधितिष्ठन्ति ।

२४. स्यादेयं यदि वेदानां निर्माताऽपि प्रमाणतः ।
कुतश्चिदुपलभ्येत न चासावुपलभ्यते ॥
न च वाक्यत्वलिङ्गेन वेदकारोऽनुमीयते ।
अभिप्रेतविशेषाणां विपर्यासप्रसङ्गतः ।
वाक्यं हि यत् पराधीनरचनं संप्रदृश्यते ॥
शरीरिणैव तत्सर्वमुच्यमानं विलोक्यते ।
पुण्यपापनिमित्तञ्च शरीरं सर्वदेहिनाम् ॥
एवं पुण्येतराधीनसुखदुःखस्य देहिनः ।
अनीश्वरस्य निर्माणं वाक्यत्वमनुमापयेत् ॥
अपि चैवं प्रमाणत्वं वेदानामपि दुर्लभम् ।
न हि मानान्तरापूर्वे धर्मे तस्यास्ति सम्भवः ॥

२५. ननु कथं मानान्तरापूर्वो धर्मः, उक्तं हि साक्षात्करोति धर्माधर्मौ कथमन्यथा तदुपकरणं जगज्जनयति इति,

सत्यमुक्तं दुरुक्तं तद् विश्वस्य जगतो न हि ।
विद्यते कोऽपि निर्माता येनैवमपि कल्प्यते ॥
विचित्रसन्निवेशत्वयुक्तया यदपि साधितम् ।
तत्रोच्यते त्रिधा भावा लौकिकैः परिलोकिताः ॥
प्रत्यक्षदृष्टकर्तारः केचिदेते घटादयः ।
अविद्यमाननिर्माणास्तथाऽन्ये गगनादयः ॥
सन्दिह्यमाननिर्माणाः केचिद् विश्वम्भरादयः ।

तत्र प्रथमसन्दर्शितराशिद्वयेऽनवकाश एवेश्वरव्यापारः । अद्यवदेव विश्वम्भरादयः क्रमप्राप्तागन्तुकोपचयापचययोर्न युगपदुदयविलयभागिनः । ईदृशोत्पत्तिभङ्गौ मीमांसकानामपि सम्मतावेवेति सिद्धसाधनत्वम् ।

बुद्धिमत्कर्तृता याऽपि प्रयासेन समर्थिता ।
साध्यते साऽपि सिद्धैव ; बुद्धिमन्तो हि चेतनाः ॥
यागादिभिः स्वभोगाय तत्तदुत्पादयन्ति नः ॥
युक्तश्चोभयसिद्धानां तत्राधिष्ठानकल्पनम् ।
वयञ्च यागदानादि साक्षात्कर्तुं क्षमा यतः ॥
कर्मणः शक्तिरूपं यदपूर्वादिपदास्पदम् ।
मा भूत् प्रत्यक्षता तस्य किं तेनाध्यक्षितेन नः ॥

२६. *न खलु कुलालादयः कुम्भादिकार्यमारिप्समानाः तदुपादानोपकरणभूतमृद्दण्डचक्रादिकार्योत्पादनशक्तिं साक्षात्कृत्य तत्तदारभन्ते ।*

यदि परं शक्तिमविदुषामभिलषितसाधनाय तदुपादानादिव्यवहारोऽनुपपन्नः इह तु नित्यागमजन्मना प्रत्ययेन संप्रत्याकलितयागादितत्तदुत्पादनपाटवाः पुरुषास्तैरेव विश्वम्भरादिभावनाविर्भावयन्ति,

तथा च प्रत्यक्षप्रकृतिकरणः कर्मकरण प्रवीणो नैवान्यः क्षम इति च नास्त्यत्र नियमः ।

अपश्यन्नेवायं प्रकृतिकरणे स्वात्ममनसि ।
ननु ज्ञाने कर्त्ता भवति पुरुषस्तत्कथमिव ॥

२७. विनाशीदं विश्वं जगदवयवित्वादिति च यत् ।
बलीयःप्रत्यक्षप्रतिहतमुखत्वेन तदसत् ॥
स एवायं मेरुर्दिवसकरबिम्बञ्च तदिदम् ।
धरित्री सैवेति स्फुटमिह यतो धीरुदयते ॥

शक्नोति हि प्रत्यभिज्ञैव समस्तकालसम्बन्धमेषामवगमयितुं सन्ति हि पूर्वापरकालयोरपि तादृशाः पुरुषाः प्रादुःषन्ति येषामीदृशप्रत्ययाः, प्रयोगश्च भवति ।

महीशैलपतङ्गादिप्रत्यभिज्ञानगह्वरः ।
अतीतकालः कालत्वादिदानीन्तनकालवत् ॥

तानप्यविशेषेणोपस्थापयतीति। न च तावतातिप्रसङ्गः। प्रमाणान्तरगोचरे हि लिङ्गिनि लिङ्गबलादापततो विपरीतविशेषाँस्तत्प्रमाणमेव प्रतिरुणद्धि। अत्र पुनरतिपतितमानान्तरकर्मभावे भगवति सिषाधयिषिते, यावन्तोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकावधारिताविनाभावभाजो धर्मास्तानप्यविशेषेणोपस्थापयतीति। तथा च प्राङ्गणनिकटवर्तिदूर्वाङ्कुरादिष्वनवसितपुरुषव्यापारजन्मस्वनैकान्तः, तत्राप्यतीन्द्रियपुरुषाधिष्ठानकल्पना कल्पनामात्रमेव।

३०. क्व वा देशे तिष्ठन्ननवरततृप्तः किमिति वा
कदा वा निश्शेषञ्जनयति तदेतद्विमृशतु॥

क्वचित्तिष्ठन्निष्टं किमपि फलमुद्दिश्य करणैः
कदाचिद्यत्किञ्चिज्जनयति कुलालादिरखिलः॥

कृतार्थत्वात्क्रीडा न च भवति हेतुर्यदि खलु
स्वभावः स्वातन्त्र्यं प्रकटितमहो सम्प्रति विभोः॥

अभिप्रेतं किञ्चिद्यदयमसमीक्ष्यैव कुरुते।
जगज्जन्मस्थेमप्रविलयमहायासमवशः॥

अनुकम्पाप्रयुक्तेन सृज्यमानाश्च जन्तवः।
सुखिनः किन्न सृज्यन्ते। तत्कर्मापेक्षया यदि॥

ततः स्वतन्त्रताहानिः। किञ्च तैरेव हेतुभिः।
उपपन्नेऽपि वैचित्र्ये किं तत्कल्पनयाऽनया॥

अतो नास्ति तादृशः पुरुषः यस्समस्तजगन्निर्माणक्षमः साक्षात्कृतधर्माधर्मो वेदानारचयति।

३१. अपि च यदि वेदाः केनचिदसृज्यन्त ततस्तेनामी विरचिता इति तत्कर्ता स्मर्येत। न च जीर्णकूपादाविवास्मरणं युक्तं, युज्यते हि तत्र प्रयोजनाभावात् कर्तुरस्मरणं, वेदे त्वनेकद्रव्यत्यागात्मकबहुतरायाससाध्यानि कर्माणि प्रत्ययिततरनिर्मातृस्मरणमन्तरेण के वा श्रद्दधीरन्,

तथा हि नित्या वेदाः अस्मर्यमाणस्मरणार्हकर्तृकत्वाद् ये यथोक्तसाध्या न भवन्ति ते यथोक्तसाधना अपि न भवन्ति यथा भारतादयः, अमी तु यथोक्तसाधना इति यथोक्तसाध्या एव, तस्मादपौरुषेया वेदा इति, स्वसिद्धान्ताभिनिवेशव्यामुग्धबुद्धिभिरभिहितमिदं यदनुभवनिबन्धनं वेदप्रामाण्यं तदनुभवनिबन्धनं पञ्चरात्रप्रामाण्यमिति ।

३२. ननु च किमिदमपौरुषेयत्वं वेदानां, यदि नित्यवर्णारब्धत्वं समानमिदं पञ्चरात्रतन्त्राणाम् । अथ पदानां नित्यता, सापि समानैव, न चानुपूर्वीनित्यता, न हि नित्यानामानुपूर्वी स्वभाव उपपद्यते, उच्चारणानुपूर्व्यादानुपूर्वी वर्णानामिति चेत् सा तर्हि तदनित्यत्वादेव अनित्येति कः खलु विशेषः पञ्चरात्रश्रुत्योः ।

अयमेव विशेषो यदेकत्र स्वतन्त्र एव पुरुषस्तां तामानुपूर्वीं रचयति इतरत्र परतन्त्रो नियमेन पूर्वाध्येतृसिद्धामेव विवक्षति, क्रमावान्तरजातिश्च प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलप्रतिष्ठिता नापलापमर्हतीत्यलं प्रविस्तरेण ।

३३. सिद्धमिदं न विलक्षणपुरुषानुभवनिबन्धनप्रामाण्यवर्णनं साधीय इति ।

यतो न साक्षात्कृतपुण्यपापः पुमान् प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नसत्त्वः ।
अतो जगन्मोहयितुं प्रणीतं नरेण केनापि हि तन्त्रमेतत् ॥

३४. ननु च केवलतर्कबलादयं यदि सिषाधयिषापदमीश्वरः ।
भवतु नाम तथा सति दूषणं श्रुतिशिरःप्रमितो हि महेश्वरः ॥

यदा तु सकलभुवननिर्माणक्षमसर्वज्ञसर्वेश्वरपरमपुरुषप्रतिपादकानि नित्यागमवचनान्येव बहुलमुपलभ्यन्ते कथं तदा तदनुभवमूलस्मरणप्रामाण्यानङ्गीकरणम् ।

३५. न च परिनिष्ठितवस्तुगोचरतया तानि प्रमाणमर्यादामतिपतन्ति तादृशामपि प्रमाणान्तरसंभेदातिदूरगोचराणां पौरुषेयवचसां स्वरससमासादितप्रामाण्यवारणायोगात् ।

न च सिद्धे वस्तुनि साधकबाधकयोरन्यतरोपनिपातसम्भवप्रसक्तेर्भावितानुवादविपर्ययपर्यालोचनया तद्गोचरवचसः प्रामाण्यप्रच्युतिः—कार्यनिष्ठस्यापि तत्प्रसङ्गात्, कार्यमपि हि मानान्तरवेद्यमेव लौकिकं समिदाहरणादि, तच्च मानान्तरेणापि वेद्यमोदनपाकवदित्यभ्युपगमात्। अथ विलक्षणाग्निहोत्रादिविषयकार्यस्यासम्भावितमानान्तरतया तत्प्रतिपादयद्वचः प्रमाणं, हन्त तर्हि निरतिशयावबोधैश्वर्यमहानन्दसन्दोहवपुषि भगवति न मानान्तरगन्धसम्बन्ध इति सर्वं समानमन्यत्राभिनिवेशात्। अपि च प्रवृत्तप्रमाणान्तरमपि स्वगोचरं तद्गोचरतया नावभासयतीति परमपि प्रमाणमेव कुतस्तदुपनिपातसम्भावनयाऽनुवादत्वम्। कथं वा प्रत्यस्तमितसमस्तपुरुषाशयदोषसंस्पर्शनित्यागमभुवः †प्रत्ययस्य पूर्वोपमर्दकतयोन्नीयमानस्य सम्भाव्यमानविविधविप्लवैः प्रमाणान्तरैरपवादापादनमिति यत्किञ्चिदेतत्।

इत्थञ्च श्रुतिशतसमधिगतविविधबोधैश्वर्यादिवैभवे भगवति सामान्यदर्शनावसितासार्वज्ञ्यविग्रहवत्त्वादयो दोषा नावकाशमश्नुवते हुतभुजीव शैत्यादयः।

ततश्च।

श्रुतिमूर्ध्नि प्रसिद्धेन सर्वज्ञेनैव निर्मितम्।
तन्त्रं मिथ्येति वक्तुं नः कथं जिह्वा प्रवर्तते॥
अहो मन्दस्य मीमांसाभ्रमहानिर्विजृम्भते।
मीमांसामांसलं चेतः कथमित्थं प्रमाद्यति॥
कार्ये मानान्तरापूर्वे समस्तं वैदिकं वचः।
प्रमाणमिति हि प्राज्ञाः मन्यन्ते मान्यबुद्धयः॥
पदानां तत्परत्वेन व्युत्पत्तेरवधारणात्।
न खल्वन्यपरे शब्दे व्युत्पत्तेरस्ति सम्भवः॥

तथा हि वृद्धयोर्व्यवहरतोरेकतरवृद्धप्रयुक्तशब्दश्रवणसमनन्तरजनितान्यतरवृद्धसमवेतचेष्टां दृष्ट्वा अन्यथानुपपत्त्योन्नीयमाना शब्द-

† ईश्वरविषयस्य।

शक्तिस्तदुपपादककार्यपर्यवसायिन्येवावसीयते, प्रतीता हि स्वकार्यसन्ताने कार्यसंविदेव तत्तद्विशिष्टचेष्टाहेतुतया। तदयमिहापि तादृशीं प्रवृत्तिं पश्यन्नेवमाकलयति नूनमितस्सकाशादस्य कार्यसंविदाविरासीत् यदय-मेतदनन्तरं प्रयतत इति, एवं च समस्तव्यवहारानुगतप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तकार्य-प्रतिपादनपरतया व्युत्पन्ने शब्दे यत्पदावापोद्धारानुयायिनो येऽर्थभागास्ते प्रथमावगतप्रधानभूतकार्यानुगुणतया तैस्तैरभिधीयन्ते इत्यध्यवस्यति, तत्र च लिङादयोऽव्यभिचरितकार्यसंविदः कार्यशरीरमेव साक्षा-त्समर्पयन्ति तिङादयस्तु तदपेक्षिताधिकाराद्यनुबन्धप्रतिपादनमुखेन तत्समन्वयमनुभवन्तीति।

३७. न च पुत्रजननादिस्वरूपावेदनपर्यवसायिनः पदनिचयस्या-विरलपुलकोदयवदनविकासादिभिरभिमतसुतजन्मादिप्रतिपादनशक्तिनि-श्चयः; अजातातिवृत्तप्रत्युत्पन्नविविधहर्षहेतूपनिपातेऽयममुनेति निर्धृत्य प्रतिपत्तुमशक्यत्वात्।

एतेन व्युत्पन्नेतरपदसमभिव्याहृतवर्तमाननिर्देशोऽपि कार्यदर्पर्य-विरहितपदशक्तिनिश्चयप्रतिविधिरनुसंधातव्यः।

३८. पदान्तराणि यादृक्षि व्युत्पद्यन्ते च तादृशम्।
इदञ्च पदमित्येव तत्र व्युत्पद्यते नरः॥
तानि कार्यान्वितस्वार्थबोधकानीति साधितम्।
अथ तद्बुद्धिहेतुत्वात् प्रामाण्यं भूतगोचरम्॥
इष्यते तदनेकान्तं पदेष्विति न शोभते।
अथ तत्परता हेतुस्ततश्च स्यादसिद्धता॥

न ह्यकार्यरूपे वस्तुनि क्वचिदपि शाब्दी बुद्धिः पर्यवस्यति।

याः पुनर्लौकिकशब्दश्रवणसमनन्तरभाविन्योऽन्वयावगतयस्ता आनुमानिक्योऽभिहिताः न शाब्द्य इत्युपपद्यत एव तासामतत्पर्यव-सानम्।

३९. यदि तत्परताग्राहः शब्दानां नैव विद्यते ।
अग्निहोत्रं जुहोतीति विधिः कस्मादुपेयते ॥

अथ तत्र प्रमाणत्वे संवृत्तेऽपि च तावता ।
पुरुषार्थत्वलाभाय विधिरभ्युपगम्यते ॥

तदसत्त्व प्रमाणानां प्रयोजनवशानुगा ।
प्रवृत्तिः किन्तु तन्मूलः प्रयोजनपरिग्रहः ॥

न खलु कनकमभिलषतः शिलावलोकनमनभिमतमिति कनकावलोकनताऽऽश्रयितुमुचिता ।

तात्पर्यमेव शब्दानां यावत्कार्ये न कल्पितम् ।
न तावद्वर्तमानादि निर्देशे विधिकल्पनम् ॥

४०. एवञ्चोपनिषदामपि तत्तदाम्नायमानज्ञानोपासनादिविधिशेषतयाऽर्थो व्याकरणीयः, तदयमर्थः सर्वज्ञमानन्दमात्मानं जानीयात् इति ।

न च तावता स्वरूपमपि सिध्यतीत्यध्यवसेयम् असत्येव रूपे तादृशि तथा विधानोपपत्तेः । यथैतदपितर्येव पितरं जानीयादिति तथा चानुद्गीथ ओङ्कार उद्गीथविधानमिति । (छा. १-५)

यानि पुनरात्मसत्यत्वनित्यत्ववादीनि वाक्यानि तान्यविशेषितकालकर्मविधानाक्षिप्यमाणामुष्मिकफलभोगोचितचेतनकर्तृप्रतिपादनपराणि अतो न किञ्चिदपि वचो भूतेऽर्थे प्रमाणम् ।

अतः *सर्वार्थवादानामपि परिनिष्ठितरुद्ररोदनादिप्रतिपादनपरतावारणोपपादनेन विदूरतरवर्तिविधिपदान्वयस्तावकतयाऽपि प्रदर्शितः ।

४१. तस्मादपर्यालोचितपूर्वापरपदतात्पर्याणामापातायातश्रद्धाविरचितविग्रहोऽयमुद्ग्राहितः पुरुष इत्यलमतिविस्तरेण ।

४२. सिद्धमिदं न श्रुतितोऽप्यभिमतपुरुषातिशयः सिध्यतीति ।

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* अत एवार्थवादानाममीति पा. ।

अपि च भवतु भूतमपि वस्तु शास्त्रस्य विषयः, अथ च कथमिव चोदनाजनितधियमवधीर्य धर्माधर्मौ विजानाति कश्चिदित्यभ्युपेयते। सर्वज्ञता हि प्रसिद्धैरेव प्रमाणैः यथायथमर्थानवगच्छतोऽपि संगच्छते, न हि तदस्ति वचनं यदस्य प्रसिद्धबुद्ध्युत्पादनहेतुहानमुखेन सार्वज्ञ्यं ज्ञापयति।

यद्यपि किञ्चिदभविष्यत्, तथाऽपि परस्परान्वयाऽनुचितपदार्थतयाऽर्थवादतयैव समर्थनीयम्। प्रमाणान्तरावगतयोग्यतादिपुरस्सरी पदेभ्यो वाक्यार्थबुद्धिरुपजायमाना प्रथमतरनिपतितापेक्षितप्रमाणान्तरविरोधे कथमिव जनिमनुभवतीति सम्भावयामः।

> प्रत्यक्षादिप्रतिक्षिप्तगोचरं वचनं यदि।
> प्रमाणं को नु तादात्म्यं विहन्यादित्ययूपयोः॥
> अपि चास्ति नरः कश्चित् तादृशातिशयाश्रयः।
> सिषाधयिषितग्रन्थप्रामाण्यस्य किमागतम्॥

४३. ननु च तादृशपुरुषेण विरचितमिदमिति पञ्चरात्रगोत्रानुसारिणः स्मरन्ति। पाशुपता वा किन्न स्मरन्ति? तेऽपि स्वदर्शनादर्शकमखिलजगदध्यक्षमाचक्षते। तथाऽन्येऽपि।

न च सर्वेऽमी सर्वज्ञा विरुद्धार्थोपदेशानुपपत्तेः।

य एव च वादिनामेकस्य वादिनः सर्वज्ञसिद्धौ हेतुर्भवति स सर्वेषां साधारणः तदिह बहुषु परस्परविरुद्धमर्थमहमहमिकयोपदिशत्सु कतमं सर्वज्ञमध्यवसामः।

यथाऽऽह।

> सर्वज्ञेषु च भूयस्सु विरुद्धार्थोपदेशिषु।
> तुल्यहेतुषु सर्वेषु को नामैको निरूप्यताम्॥

इति,।

> स्वतन्त्राधिगमाधीनं सर्वज्ञपरिकल्पनम्।
> परस्परप्रतीघातात्सर्वाप्रामाण्यमावहेत्॥

४४. ननु, श्रुतिस्मृतिप्रसिद्धेन वासुदेवेन भाषितम् ।
'कथं तन्त्रान्तरैरेतत् तुल्यकक्ष्यां निवेक्ष्यते ॥
तथा हि पौरुषे सूक्ते श्रूयते तस्य वैभवम् ।
पद्भ्यां भूमिर्दिशश्श्रोत्रादित्यादीदं तथा परम् ॥
सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत् इति, ।
तथा स ब्रह्मा स शिव इति, तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम् ।

न तस्य कश्चित् पतिरस्ति लोके
न चेशिता तस्य च नैव लिङ्गम् ।
इतीरयन्ति श्रुतयोऽस्य भूतिं
जगज्जनिस्थेमपिधानचिन्हाम् ॥

विष्णोस्सकाशादुद्भूतं जगत्तत्रैव च स्थितम् ।
स्थितिसंयमकर्ताऽसावित्याह स पराशरः ॥
इत्थं तमेव सर्वेशं मनुरप्याह तद्यथा ।
"नारायणः परोऽव्यक्तादण्डमव्यक्तसम्भवम् ।" इति,

इत्थं नानाश्रुतिमुनिवचस्संततस्तूयमान-
ज्ञानैश्वर्यः परमपुरुषः पञ्चरात्रं व्यधत्त ।
तच्चेदेतच्छ्रुतिपथपरिभ्रष्टतन्त्रैः समानं
पातृत्वेन प्रसजति† तदा सोमपस्ते सुरापैः ॥

नैतज्ज्यायः किमङ्ग श्रुतिषु भगवतो न प्रसिद्धा विशुद्ध-
ज्ञानैश्वर्यादिधर्मास्त्रिपुरविजयिनस्तेन यत्किञ्चिदेतत् ।
यद्वा देवस्स एव त्रिभुवनभवनत्राणविध्वंसहेतुः ।
वेदान्तैकप्रमाणः कथयति स कथं वेदगोष्ठीबहिःष्ठम् ॥

४५. तथा हि भगवतः पशुपतेरपि सार्वज्ञ्यसर्वैश्वर्यविदिकाः श्रुतयो बहुलमुपलभ्यन्ते यस्सर्वज्ञस्स सर्ववित् । तमीश्वराणां परमं महेश्वरम् इत्याद्याः ।

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† समान इति विपरिणम्यानुषङ्गः ।

सर्वेश्वरशब्दौ च नर्ते देवात्पिनाकिनः ।
उत्पत्तिशक्त्या वर्तेते सत्यप्यन्यत्र †तद्वति ॥
किञ्च सर्वज्ञशब्देन सर्वेशे प्रतिपादिते ।
पौनरुक्त्यं प्रसज्येत सर्वविद्ग्रहणस्य वः ॥
अतः सर्वज्ञशब्दोऽयं महादेवैकगोचरः ।
तथा च स्कन्दलिङ्गादिपुराणानि पिनाकिनः ॥
उपक्षीणानि सार्वज्ञ्यसर्वैश्वर्योपपादने ।
ततश्च तत्प्रणीतत्वात् प्रामाण्यमनया दिशा ॥
प्राप्तं पाशुपतं तन्त्रं तत्रान्योन्यविरोधतः ।
सर्वतन्त्रप्रमाणत्वविपर्यासः प्रसज्यते ॥

४६. अपि च भवतु भगवान् वासुदेव एवौपनिषदः पुरुषः, अथ च स कथमिव श्रुतिपरिपन्थितन्त्रमेतत्प्रणयेतेत्युत्प्रेक्ष्येत य एवमाह "श्रुतिस्मृती ममैवाज्ञे" इति ततश्च ।

वासुदेवाभिधानेन केनचिद् विप्रलिप्सुना ।
प्रणीतं प्रस्तुतं तन्त्रमिति निश्चिनुमो वयम् ॥

अस्तु वा समस्तजगदध्यक्षो वासुदेव एवास्य तन्त्रस्य प्रणेता तथाऽपि ।

मायामोहनविग्रहेण हरिणा देवद्रुहां संहतिम् ।
हन्तुं मोहयताऽहितान्यभिहितान्याहुर्हितच्छद्मना ॥
एवं किन्नु नयन्नयन्निजमहामायागुहागह्वरम् ।
व्याजह्रे, किमिदं न वेति विशये जाते कथं निर्णयः ॥

प्रत्युत भ्रमयन्नेव व्याजहारेति गम्यते ।
वैदिकैरगृहीतत्वात् तथाऽर्हतमतं यथा ॥

वैदिकापरिग्रहश्च प्रागेव प्रपञ्चित इति, तस्मान्न स्वतन्त्रानुभवमूलतया प्रमाणम् ।

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† सर्वज्ञादिनामवत्यपि ।

४७. नापि मन्वादिस्मरणवदित्यनुपपन्नं पञ्चरात्रस्मरणम् ।

यदि मन्वादिवद्देवः शुश्रूषापरितोषितात् ।
आचार्याल्लब्धवेदार्थस्तन्त्रमेतदचीक्लृपत् ॥
स्वातन्त्र्यकल्पनाऽमुष्य व्यर्था मिथ्या तथा सति ।
अनधीतोऽपि वेदोऽस्य प्रतिभातीत्यलौकिकम् ॥
अत्र वार्त्तिककारेण ये दोषास्तसमुदीरिताः ।
ते च सर्वेऽनुसंधेयाः पुरुषातिशयादयः ॥

४८. किञ्च ।

शैवं पाशुपतञ्चैव बौद्धमप्यार्हतं तथा ।
कापालं पञ्चरात्रञ्चेत्येवं पाषण्डतास्मृतेः ॥
वैदिकं तान्त्रिकं चेति विभागकरणादपि ।
गम्यते पञ्चरात्रस्य वेदबाह्यत्वनिश्चयः ॥
शैवं पाशुपतं सौम्यं लागुडञ्च चतुर्विधम् ।
तन्त्रभेदः समुद्दिष्टः सङ्करं न समाचरेत् ॥ इति, ।

तथा ।

भाक्तं भागवतं चैव सात्वतं च त्रिधा मतम् ।
इत्येवं तन्त्रभेदोक्तिः पञ्चरात्रेऽपि दृश्यते ॥

४९. किञ्च ।

श्रुतिस्मृतिप्रतिक्षिप्तजीवजन्मादिगोचरम् ।
न्यायहीनं वचस्तथ्यमिति हास्यमिदं महत् ॥

तथा च श्रुतिः अविनाशी वा अरेऽयमात्मा अनुच्छित्तिधर्मा मात्रासंसर्गस्तस्य भवति इति तथा जीवापेतं वाव किलेदम्म्रियते न जीवो म्रियते इति ।

स्यादेतत् उच्छेदाभावमात्रप्रतिपादकमेतद्वचनं न जन्माभावमवगमयतीति ।

न, अनुच्छेदाभिधानेन जन्माभावोऽवसीयते ।
न ह्यस्ति संभवो भावो जातो नैव क्षरेदिति ॥

ननु च,

सदेव सौम्येदमिति सदेकत्वावधारणात् ।
प्राक्सृष्टिकालाज्जीवानामभावोऽध्यवसीयते ॥

यदि जीवाः पृथग्भूताः प्राक् सृष्टेः स्युः परात्मवत् ।
कथमेतत्सदेवेति तदेकत्वावधारणम् ॥

अत्रोच्यते सदेवेति यदेकत्वावधारणम् ।
तत्सिसृक्षितवाय्वम्बुवियत्प्रभृतिगोचरम् ॥

पर्युदासिष्यताऽनेन वचसा चेतनो यदि ।
गगनादेरिवास्यापि जननं निरदेक्ष्यत ॥

न च निर्दिश्यते तेन न जीवो जनिमृच्छति ।
तत्तेजोऽसृजतेत्यादौ जीवसर्गो हि न श्रुतः ॥

ननु च यतो वा इमानि भूतानि इत्यत्र जीवानामेव जननजीवन-प्रायणाभिसंवेशनानि प्रतीयन्ते ।

तथा हि भूतशब्दोऽयं जीवानामभिधायकः ।
भ्रामयन् सर्वभूतानीत्येवमादिषु दर्शनात् ॥

जीवन्तीति हि शब्दोऽयं जीवेष्वेवावकल्पते ।
तेन जायन्त इत्येतज् ज्ञायते जीवगोचरम् ॥

तदिदमनुपपन्नं भूतशब्दो विहायः-
पवनहुतभुगम्भोमेदिनीषु प्रसिद्धः ।
पदमिदमितरस्मिल्लक्षणावृत्ति तेषां
बहुविधपरिणामो गीयते जीवनं च ॥

प्रथममधिगता ये खादयो भूतशब्दा-
स्तदनुगुणतयाऽर्थं वक्ति जीवन्तिशब्दः ।
यदि च भवति जीवे भूतशब्दस्तदानी-
मपि वदति तदीयं जन्म देहानुबन्धि ॥

अतो जीवपरत्वेऽपि भूतशब्दस्य युज्यते ।
जायन्त इति शब्दोऽयं गौर्जातो गच्छतीतिवत् ॥
तथाजो ह्येक इत्याद्याः श्रुतयोऽन्याश्च सन्ति नः ।
जीवानुत्पत्तिवादिन्यस्तथा भगवतो वचः ॥

प्रकृतिं पुरुषं चैव विद्ध्यनादी उभावपि । अजो नित्यश्शाश्वतोऽयं पुराणः । न जायते म्रियते वा कदाचित् । इत्यादि ।

५०. न्यायश्च ।

विवादाध्यासितो जीवो न जातु जनिमृच्छति ।
द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्त्तत्वाच्चिद्रूपत्वात्परात्मवत् ॥
पश्यन्तः पौरुषेयत्वे दूषणान्युक्तया दिशा ।
अनन्यगतयः केचित् तन्त्रं नित्यमतिष्ठिपन् ॥

तदेतत् स्वहृदयनिहितविशदतरकर्तृस्मरणप्रतिहतमभिधीयत इत्युपेक्षणीयम् ।

५१. किञ्च ।

इत्थं पाशुपतादीनां न्यायः किं दण्डवारितः ।
तथाऽस्त्विति यदि ब्रूयाद् व्याघातस्स्यात् परस्परम् ॥
सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धा च वासुदेवप्रणीतता ।
न हातुं शक्यते यद्वद्वेदस्यापौरुषेयता ॥

अथो कश्चिद् ब्रूयादनुदयविपर्यासविशयैस्त्रिरूपेऽप्रामाण्ये कतरदिह जोघुष्यत इति । स वक्तव्यः किन्नु त्वदभिलषितं लागुडमते, तदेवेति ज्ञात्वा नियमितमदश्शाम्यतु भवान् ।

५२. तदेवमुदीरितन्यायश्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणन्यायविरुद्धाभिधानेन, समस्तशिष्टजनपरिग्रहविरहेण च, स्वर्गापवर्गसाधनोपदेशव्याजेन केनापि जगद्वञ्चयितुं विरचितानि पञ्चरात्रतन्त्राणीति मन्यामहे ।

ईदृशापस्मृतिविषयमेव तद्वचः ।

या वेदबाह्याः स्मृतयो याश्च काश्च कुदृष्टयः ।
सर्वास्ता निष्फलाः प्रेत्य तमोनिष्ठा हि ताः स्मृताः ॥ इति ।

ईदृशदुर्मार्गानुगामिन एव तेऽपि एषां वाङ्मात्रेणापि अर्चनं निषिध्यते, उक्तञ्च ।

एत एव च ते येषां वाङ्मात्रेणापि नार्चनम् ।
पाषण्डिनो विकर्मस्थान् वैडालव्रतिकाञ्छठान् ॥
हैतुकान् बकवृत्तींश्च वाङ्मात्रेणापि नार्चयेत् । इति ।

५३. इत्युपन्यस्तया नीत्या पञ्चरात्रमशेषतः ।
अप्रमाणमिति प्राप्तमेवं प्राप्तेऽभिधीयते ॥
विवादाध्यासितं तन्त्रं प्रमाणमिति गृह्यताम् ।
निर्दोषज्ञानजन्मत्वाज्ज्योतिष्टोमादिवाक्यवत् ॥

५४. न तावदनुमानेऽस्मिन् न्यायशास्त्रपरीक्षिताः ।
दोषा मृगयितुं शक्यास्तत्र पक्षः परीक्ष्यताम् ॥
पक्षो नाम प्रतिज्ञाऽर्थः स च सिद्धेन केनचित् ।
स्वयं सिद्धो विशिष्टस्सन् यः साधयितुमीप्सितः ॥

तत्र न तावदप्रसिद्धविशेषणः पक्षः, प्रामाण्यनाम्नः पदार्थस्य उभयवादिसिद्धत्वात् प्रत्यक्षादौ, नाप्यप्रसिद्धविशेष्यः पञ्चरात्रशास्त्रस्य सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धत्वात्, नापि सिद्धसाधनः, प्रस्तुतशास्त्रप्रामाण्यस्य प्रतिवादिनोऽसिद्धत्वात्, न च प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धः अप्रामाण्यस्यातीन्द्रियत्वात्, नाप्यनुमानविरुद्धः, अनुपलम्भनात् ।

५५. ननूपलभ्यत एवानुमानम्—पञ्चरात्रशास्त्रमप्रमाणं वेदबाह्यत्वात् बौद्धागमवत् ।

अत्र ब्रूमः; कतरदिहाप्रामाण्यं सिषाधयिषितं यदि ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिलक्षणं ततः प्रत्यक्षविरोधः, प्रत्यक्षं हि विदितपदतदर्थसङ्गतेः श्रोतुः पञ्चरात्रशास्त्रवाक्यश्रवणसमनन्तरमुपजायमानं तदर्थविषयं ज्ञानम् ।

नापि संशयलक्षणं तत एव विरोधात् न खलु "पद्ममध्ये चतुर्बाहुं पूजयेत्पुरुषोत्तमम्" इतीदं वचनं पूजयेन्न वेति संशयितं प्रत्ययमुत्पादयति, नापि विपर्ययलक्षणं योग्यानुपलम्भाभावात्, अनागतविपर्ययोत्प्रेक्षायाः प्रत्यक्षविरोधात् अशेषव्यवहारोच्छेदहेतुत्वाच्च, प्रपञ्चयिष्यते चैत-दुपरिष्टात्।

५६. आगमविरुद्धश्च।

पञ्चरात्रागमे स्वार्थस्तथैवेत्यवबोधनात्।
अथ तस्याप्रमाणत्वे तद्विरोधो न दूषणम्॥

हन्त एवं सति तदप्रामाण्येऽनुमानप्रामाण्यं अनुमानप्रामाण्ये तदप्रामाण्य-मित्यन्योन्याश्रयणम्।

५७. अपि च किमिदं वेदबाह्यत्वं यदि वेदान्यत्वं ततः प्रत्यक्षादि-भिरनैकान्तः। अथ शब्दत्वे सतीति हेतुर्विशेष्यते ततो निग्रहस्थानं, यथाऽऽहुः निर्विशेषहेतुप्रयोगे पुनर्विशेषणोपादानं निग्रहः, इति, अनैकान्तिकश्च मन्वादिवाक्यैः।

अथैतद्दोषहानाय वेदबाह्यत्वशब्दतः।
अवेदमूलतां मन्द मन्यसे किन्नु तार्किक?॥

तेनायमर्थः शब्दत्वे सत्यवेदमूलत्वादिति, ततो वेदैरनैकान्त्यम्, अथवा अवेदत्वे सति शब्दत्वे सति अवेदमूलत्वादिति हेतुः, तथापि।

सन्ति नद्यास्तटे वृक्षा इत्याद्याप्तोपदेशनैः।
अवेदमूलैर्दुर्वारमनैकान्त्यं प्रसज्यते॥

अथ अवेदत्वे सति शब्दत्वे सति कार्यविषयत्वे सति अवेदमूलत्वं हेतुः, अत्रापि—अजीर्णे मन्दमश्नीयादित्यादौ व्यभिचारिता।

अथोक्तविशेषणविशिष्टत्वे धर्माधर्मविषयत्वेऽपि सत्यवेदमूल-त्वादिति हेतुः, ततो भागासिद्धो हेतुः, न हि पञ्चरात्रशास्त्रं कृत्स्नं धर्माधर्मविषयम्। ब्रह्मविषयाणामेव वचसां बाहुल्यात्।

अथ प्रमाणान्तरायोग्यार्थत्वे सतीति विशेषः तथापि सैवासिद्धिः, भगवत्प्रत्यक्षस्य धर्माधर्मादिसमस्तवस्तुगोचरस्य श्रुतिशतप्रसिद्धत्वात् तच्चैतदनन्तरमेव वक्ष्यामः, तदलमनेनाशिक्षिताक्षपादमतानामप्रतिष्ठित-प्रतिभाविजृम्भितेन।

संभाव्यमानान्यप्यनुमानान्तराणि परस्तादुपन्यस्य निरस्यन्ते अतो नानुमानविरुद्धः पक्षः।

५८. नाप्यागमविरुद्धः पञ्चरात्रशास्त्रप्रामाण्यप्रतिपादकस्य इदम्म-होपनिषदम् इत्याद्यागमशतस्य प्रदर्शयिष्यमाणत्वात्।

स्ववचन — स्वाभ्युपगम — सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धिविरोधाश्शब्दविरोध-प्रकारास्त्वनाशङ्कनीया एव, तथा हि न तावत् स्ववचनविरोधः, स हि त्रेधा उक्तिमात्रविरोधः, धर्मोक्तिविरोधः, धर्म्युक्तिविरोधश्चेति, तत्र न तावदुक्तिमात्रविरुद्धोऽयं पक्षः, न हि पञ्चरात्रशास्त्रं प्रमाण-मिति प्रतिज्ञावचनं स्वार्थं व्याहन्ति यथा यावज्जीवमहं मौनी इति, नापि धर्मोक्तिविरोधः, न हि प्रामाण्यं पञ्चरात्रोद्देशेन विधीयमानं पक्षं प्रतिक्षिपति सर्ववाक्यानामिव मिथ्यात्ववचनम्, नापि धर्म्युक्ति-विरोधः, सत्यपि धर्मिणि धर्मान्वयस्याऽविरुद्धत्वात्, न हि जननीत्व-मिव वन्ध्यात्वेन पञ्चरात्रशास्त्रत्वं प्रामाण्येन विरुद्धम्, न हि विवादा-ध्यासितस्य प्रामाण्यप्रतिज्ञाने तत्र श्रुत्युक्तधर्मिविशेषविरोधः।

विहितहिंसानामिवाधर्मत्वप्रतिज्ञाने विवादाध्यासस्योपलक्षणत्वात्, अतो नागमविरोधः, तदेवं प्रतिपन्नः पक्षः।

५९ नापि हेतोरनैकान्तिकत्वादयो दोषाः। तथा हि न तावदनै-कान्तिकः, स हि द्वेधा साधारणासाधारणभेदात् यथा पृथिवीनित्यत्व-साधने प्रमेयत्वं साधारणः, असाधारणस्तत्रैव गन्धवत्त्वं, तत्र न ताव-न्निर्दोषज्ञानकारणत्वं प्रमाणाप्रमाणसाधारणं येन साधारणानैकान्तिकं स्यात्, न हि निर्दोषज्ञानकारणत्वमप्रमाणभूतविप्रलम्भकवचनादिषु विपक्षेषु दृष्टचरम्।

माप्यसाधारणः ज्योतिष्टोमादिवाक्यदृष्टान्ताभिधानेनैव सपक्षान्वयस्य प्रदर्शितत्वात्।

नापि विरुद्धः, विपरीतव्याप्त्यभावात्, न हि निर्दोषज्ञानकारणत्वमप्रामाण्येन व्याप्तम्।

न च कालात्ययापदिष्टः, प्रत्यक्षविरोधाभावात् आगमानुगुण्याच्च।

न चासिद्धत्वम्, असिद्धिर्हि आश्रयतः स्वरूपतो वा न तावदाश्रयासिद्धिः, पञ्चरात्रशास्त्रस्याश्रयत्वात्, नापि स्वरूपासिद्धः, सोऽपि त्रेधा अज्ञान-सन्देह-विपर्ययभेदात्, न तावदज्ञानासिद्धिः, तत्प्रतिपादकशब्दोच्चारणात्, नापि संदिग्धासिद्धः, निर्दोषत्वस्य वादिनः स्वयं सिद्धत्वात्, प्रतिवादिनोऽपि दोषानुपलम्भादेवानायाससिद्धत्वात्, विपर्ययासिद्धिस्तु दूरोत्सारितैव।

६० ननु कथं पौरुषेयत्वसामान्यादापतन्ती दोषसंभावना अपनीयते पञ्चरात्रतन्त्राणाम्। कथं वाक्यत्वसामान्यादापतन्ती वेदेषु सा वार्यते॥ अपौरुषेयत्वादिति चेत्तदिहापि सर्वज्ञाप्तकामपरमपुरुषप्रणीततयेत्यवगम्य शाम्यतु भवान्।

एतदुक्तं भवति।

नैव शब्दे स्वतो दोषाः प्रामाण्यपरिपन्थिनः।
सन्ति किन्तु स्वतस्तस्य प्रमाणत्वमिति स्थितिः॥
वक्त्राशयदोषेण केषुचित्तद्बाध्यते।
अङ्गुल्यग्रेऽस्ति मातङ्गयूथमित्येवमादिषु॥
प्रस्तुतग्रन्थसंदर्भे वक्त्राशयगामिनीम्।
दोषशङ्कां त्रयीमूर्द्धध्वनिरेवापमार्ष्टि नः॥
वदन्ति खलु वेदान्ताः सर्वज्ञं जगतः पतिम्।
महाकारुणिकं तस्मिन् विप्रलम्भादयः कथम्॥

६१. ननु च।

सिद्धे वस्तुनि शब्दानां प्रामाण्यं नेत्यवादिषम्।
तत्परेषु प्रयोगेषु व्युत्पत्त्यग्रहणादिति॥

तद्वत्सिद्धमप्यर्थमाचक्षाणाः प्रयोगतः ।
लौकिकाः प्रतिपद्यन्ते शक्तिं कार्यपरादिव ॥

तद्यथा पुत्रस्ते जात इति वचनश्रवणानन्तरजनितविशिष्टवदनविकासावसानसमनन्तरं हृष्टोऽयमिति प्रतिपद्य हर्षोऽयं प्रियार्थावगमनिबन्धन इति स्वात्मन्याकलयन् मध्यमवृद्धस्यापि तन्निबन्धनमेव हर्षमनुमिमानस्तद्भावभावितया शब्दस्यैव प्रियार्थावबोधकतामध्यवस्यति ।

तत्राप्यतीतानागतादिभेदभिन्नेषु हर्षहेतुषूपप्लवमानेषु कस्य वक्ताऽयमिति विचिकित्सोदये सति—

तदनन्तरसंजातजातकर्मावबोधतः ।
तद्धेतुभूतः कोऽपीति निश्चिन्वन्नात्मनः पुरा ॥
कर्तव्यं जातकर्मेति प्रतीतेः किन्नु कारणम् ।
प्रतीतं प्रियमित्येवं विमृशन्नवगच्छति ॥
पुत्रजन्मैव नैवान्यदिति व्युत्पित्सुरर्भकः ।

तत्र च ।

आवापोद्धारभेदेन पदानां शक्तिनिश्चयः ।
उपपद्यत इत्येवं सिद्धासिद्धार्थयाचिता ॥

६२. ननु न तद्भावभावितामात्रेण कार्यकारणभावः, अतिप्रसङ्गात् । न च जातकर्मकर्तव्यतावगतिर्नियमेन प्रियार्थावगमपुरस्सरी, दृश्यते हि कुटुम्बभरणायासविदूयमानमनसोऽप्रीतिपूर्विकापि तत्कर्तव्यतावगतिः॥ कार्यावगतिः किं शब्दकारणिका दृष्टा येन गामानयेत्यादौ गवानयनादिकर्तव्यतावगतिः शब्दकारणिकाऽभ्युपेयते ।

अथ आकस्मिकत्वानुपपत्तेः सन्निहितशब्द एव तदवगमहेतुरिति चेत् समानोऽयं विधिरितरत्रापि ।

याऽपि प्रवृत्तिहेत्वर्थप्रतिपादकता क्वचित् ।
लिङादिप्रत्ययावापहेतुकी साऽवसीयते ॥

यच्च कार्यपरतामेवाखिलपदानामातिष्ठते, तेनाप्यावापोद्धारविनिर्धारितासंसृष्टशरीराणामेव गवाश्वादीनां तत्पदार्थता समर्थनीया, समर्थ्यमानाऽपि कार्यान्वयिन्येव समर्थ्यत इति चेत् अलं व्यसनेन अन्यान्विताभिधानेनापि व्यवहारोपपत्तेः।

६३. अवश्याश्रयणीयेयमन्विर्तार्थाभिधायिता।
कार्यान्विताभिधायित्वमन्यथा दुर्वचं यतः॥

अव्याप्तं चैतत् कार्यान्वितमेव सर्वत्र पदाभिधेयमिति लिङादिषु व्यभिचारात्, लिङादयो हि परिनिष्ठिताधिकाराद्यनुबन्धसंबन्धिनमेव स्वार्थमभिदधति।

अथ तेष्वन्विताभिधानमितरत्र कार्यान्विताभिधानमिति चेत् तदर्धजरतीयं, ततो वरं सर्वत्रान्विताभिधानमेवाश्रीयताम्।

६४. *तस्मादाकाङ्क्षितासन्नयोग्यार्थान्तरसङ्गते।*
स्वार्थे पदानां व्युत्पत्तिरास्थेया सर्ववादिभिः॥

यद्यपि प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तिसमधिगमनीयैव शब्दशक्तिस्तथाऽपि।

तटस्थोपायतामात्रं शब्दशक्तिविनिश्चये।
कार्यस्याश्रयितुं युक्तं प्रयोक्त्राकारदेशवत्॥
अनन्यलभ्यश्शब्दार्थ इति न्यायविदस्स्थिताः।
तस्मान्नोपायभूतस्य कार्यस्यास्ति समन्वयः॥
व्युत्पन्नव्यवहारेषु पयःप्रतरणादिवत्।

यथैव हि ब्रह्मजातीयादियज्ञविशेषावधारणोपयोगिनोऽपि पयःप्रतरणादेरवधृततत्त्वस्य *न व्यवहारदशायामुपयोगः*, एवं व्युत्पत्तिग्रहणसमयसमुपयुक्तस्यापि कार्यस्य न व्युत्पन्नदशायामुपयोगः।

६५. यदि च कार्यान्वितमेवार्थं शब्दाः प्रतिपादयन्ति कथं तेभ्यः परिनिष्ठितनदीतीरफलादिसंसर्गावगमः, नायं मुख्यो लाक्षणिक इति चेत् क्व वा शब्दानां मुख्यप्रयोगः।

तदसच्च हि साध्येन स्वर्गेणार्थे विशेष्यते ।
स्वर्गं कामयमानो हि पुरुषोऽत्र नियुज्यते ॥

न हि स्वर्गोऽधिकारिविशेषणं साध्यत्वात् ।

सिद्धमेव हि सर्वस्य नियोज्यस्य विशेषणम् ।
जीवनादि तथैवेह कामनैव विशेषणम् ॥

६८. अपि च नियोज्यविशेषणतामनुभवतः स्वर्गादेः कीदृशं साध्यत्वम् ।

यदि साधनसंबन्धयोग्यत्वं नैव तावता ।
स्वर्गेण सिध्यता भाव्यं यावद्योगमजन्मतः ॥
सिद्धिपर्यन्तता तस्य नियोगैकप्रमाणिका ।
नियोगस्तत्प्रमाणश्चेत्यन्योन्याश्रयणं ध्रुवम् ॥
यदि स्वर्गस्य साध्यत्वं न नियोगस्य साध्यता ।
साध्यद्वयञ्च नैकस्मिन् वाक्ये सम्बन्धमर्हति ॥

६९. स्वतन्त्रं हि साध्यद्वयमेकवाक्यतां निरुणद्धि नानुगुणम्, अनुगुणञ्चैतत्साध्यद्वयं नियोगसिद्धिनान्तरीयकत्वात् स्वर्गसिद्धेः, यदाह, 'नियोगसिद्धौ सर्वं तदनुगुणम्' इति, 'केन नेष्यते नियोगसिध्यर्था फलसिद्धि'रिति च, तस्मादविरोध इति चेत्तन्न ।

स्वर्गसिद्धिं विना किन्तु नियोगस्य न सिध्यति ।
नाधिकारो न विषयो न चान्यद्विध्यपेक्षितम् ॥

७०. न हि नित्याधिकारेषु नियोगस्तामपेक्षते ।
न चान्यदिच्छतोऽन्यत्र नियुक्तिर्नोपपद्यते ॥
नियोगस्यैव माहात्म्यात् नित्येष्विव नियुज्यते ।

नियोगो हि प्रधानतयाऽधिगम्यमानः स्वर्गमभिलषन्तमप्यात्मन्याकर्षति यथा अनिच्छन्तमपि नित्ये कर्मणि निष्फले प्रवर्तयति ॥

किञ्च।

स्वर्गं कामयमानो हि निमिषत्युन्मिषत्यपि।
न च ते स्वर्गसिद्ध्यर्था यागः किन्नैवमिष्यते॥

७१. तत्साधनतया नैके गृह्यन्त इति चेन्मतम्।
यागादयः किं तद्बुद्धिग्राह्या विधिबहिष्कृताः॥

तत्र च।

साध्यसाधनसंबन्धप्रतिपादनतत्पराः।
यावन्न विधयस्तावन्नैष्फल्यं सर्वकर्मणाम्॥

तस्माल्लिङादिभ्यः प्रथममिष्टसाधनताऽवगमः, ततोरागतः प्रवृत्तिरित्येव युक्तम्, तदपूर्वकार्याभिधान एव मुख्या शक्तिः इतरत्र लाक्षणिकीत्यनुपपन्नम्, अत एव यथायथं लौकिकशब्देभ्यस्तत्सिद्धार्थगोचरा बुद्धयो जायन्ते।

७२. ननु न ताः शब्दमहिमभुवः आनुमानिक्यो हि ताः, तथा हि व्युत्पत्तिसमयसंविदितार्थप्रतिपादनसामर्थ्यान्यपि पदानि क्वचिद् व्यभिचारदर्शनजनितसंशयप्रतिबद्धानि न श्रुतमात्राण्यर्थं निश्चाययन्ति न चानिश्चितोऽर्थो ज्ञातो भवति अनिश्चयात्मनो ज्ञानस्याभावात्।

तत्राज्ञातेऽपि वाक्यार्थे श्रोतैवं विचिकित्सते।
ब्रवीत्यन्योन्यसंबन्धयोग्यार्थानि पदान्ययम्॥
न चाविज्ञातसंबन्धान् शब्दानाप्ताः प्रयुञ्जते।
तेनेदृशान्वयज्ञानमस्यास्तीत्यवगच्छति॥

एवमन्वयज्ञाने अनुमिते तदुपदर्शितोऽर्थो न शब्दमाकाङ्क्षति अतो लौकिकस्य वचसो वक्त्रनुभवपरतन्त्रतया तत्रैव पर्यवसानमिति।

७३. तदसत्, न हि स्वभावतोऽर्थमवगमयन् शब्दः क्वचिद्वक्त्राशयदोषवशीकाराद्वितथ इत्यन्यत्रापि तत्संभावनया स्वारसिकीयमर्थावबोधकलामुज्झितुमर्हति, न हि मन्त्रप्रतिहत‡दशायां हुतवहो न दहती-

‡ अत्र मन्त्रप्रतिहतिदशायामिति युक्तः पाठोऽथवा हतशब्दे भावे क्तप्रत्यय इत्यनुसंधेयम्।

स्यन्यथापि तादृशदशाशङ्कया न दहति, नापि शुक्तिरजतधियमर्थ-व्यभिचारिणीमिन्द्रियं दोषवशादुपजनयदुपलब्धमिति घटादिकमपि नावगमयति, अतो विदितपदपदार्थसङ्गतेः श्रोतुस्सहसैव शब्दोऽर्थमव-बोधयति। मूलज्ञानं न प्रतीक्षते।

मूलज्ञानपरिज्ञानादर्वागर्थेऽत्ववोधिते।
कथमेवमयं वेदेत्यनुमानं प्रवर्तते॥
किमज्ञासीदयं वक्ता किञ्चिदित्यनुमित्ससे।
विशिष्टार्थान्वयज्ञानमनुमातुमथेच्छसि॥
न तावदयमज्ञासीद् वक्ता किञ्चिदितीयता।
व्याहारव्यवहारौ वा स्यातां वाक्यार्थगोचरौ॥

विशिष्टार्थान्वयगोचरश्चेतोऽनुमानन्तु प्रथमतरमवृत्ततद्विषयशेमुषी-मन्तरेणानुपपन्नमिति प्रागेव शब्दार्थोऽवगन्तव्यः, न ह्यनासादितविषय-विशेषसंसर्गाः संविदः परस्परतो व्यतिभिद्यन्ते।

न च तथाऽनुमिताभिरर्थविशेषः सिध्यति। यादृशान्वयप्रति-पादनयोग्या पदरचना सा तदन्वयज्ञानमापादयतीति चेत्, अवगतस्तर्हि प्रागेवार्थानामन्वयः, न हि बुद्ध्यावनारोपित एवान्वयः प्रयोगं व्यवच्छिनत्ति,

७४. तस्मादस्ति नदीतीरे फलमित्येवमादिषु।
या सिद्धविषया बुद्धिः सा शाब्दी नानुमानिकी॥
ततश्च अपूर्वकार्यगोचर एव शब्दः प्रमाणमिति।
स्वसिद्धान्तचिराभ्यासव्या†मुग्धवलबुद्धिभिः॥
उक्तमुक्तेन मार्गेण युक्ताऽन्यत्रापि शक्तता॥

ततश्च यान्येतानि विलक्षणपुरुषप्रतिपादकानि वेदान्तवचांसि, "स एष सर्वाधिपतिः सर्वस्येशानः सर्वमिदं प्रशास्ति। तस्याध्यक्षमिदं सर्वम्" इत्यादीनि, तान्यपि तत्र प्रमाणं तद्विषयासंदिग्धाविपर्ययज्ञान-हेतुत्वात्।

† व्यामुग्धावलबुद्धिभिरिति पाठस्तु न युक्त इति मन्यामहे।

७५. न च परिनिष्ठितवस्तुनि साधकबाधकयोरन्यतरोपनिपातसंभावनाभावितानुवादविपर्ययपर्यालोचनया तद्गोचरवचसां प्रामाण्यप्रच्युतिः, कार्यगोचराणामपि तत्प्रसङ्गात्, कार्यमपि मानान्तरवेद्यमेव समिदाहरणादि, "तच्च मानान्तरेणापि वेद्यमोदनपाकव"दित्यभ्युपगमात् ।

अथ विलक्षणाग्निहोत्रादिविषयकार्यस्यासंभावितमानान्तरतया तत्प्रतिपादयद्वचः प्रमाणं, हन्त तर्हि निरतिशयावबोधैश्वर्यमहानन्दसंदोहवपुपि भगवति न मानान्तरसंबन्धगन्ध इति सर्वं समानमन्यत्राभिनिवेशात् ।

अपि च ।

प्रमाणान्तरदृष्टार्थविषयिण्यपि शेमुपी ।
प्रमाणमेव, तत्पूर्वं न चेत्स्वार्थं विगाहते ॥
तस्य संभावनामात्रादप्रामाण्यमलौकिकम् ।

तस्मात्परिनिष्ठितानुष्ठेयादिभेदशून्यमसन्दिग्धाविपर्यस्तविज्ञानं प्रमाणमेष्टव्यम् । अत इदमपास्तम् ।

७६. प्रसिद्धैः करणैरेव सार्वज्ञ्यं नान्यथेति यत् । यतः श्रुतिरेव तत्र परिपन्थिनी, पश्यत्यचक्षुस्स शृणोत्यकर्णः यश्चक्षुषा न पश्यति यश्चक्षूंषि पश्यति । न तस्य कार्यं करणं च विद्यते । स्वभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च इत्यादिका ।

न चासां गुणवादत्वं प्रमाणाभावात् ।

अलब्धमुख्यवृत्तीनां गुणवादसमाश्रयः ।
लभ्यते चेह मुख्योऽर्थ इति तत्कल्पना मृषा ॥

७७. नन्विहापि मुख्यार्थभङ्गकारणमस्ति प्रमाणान्तरविरोधः ।

कुतः प्रमाणान्तरात्, न तावत्प्रत्यक्षात्, न हि प्रत्यक्षमुदीरितपुरुषाभावावभासकमुदीयमानं दृष्टं, योग्यानुपलम्भादभावनिश्चय इति

चेन्न प्रमाणगोष्ठीज्येष्ठेन शास्त्रेणैवोपलम्भनात्, नाप्यनुमानात् तद्धि दीप्रजन्मागमिकप्रत्ययप्रक्षिप्तप्रतिबन्धं कथमिव मन्थरप्रवृत्ति प्रादुर्भवति।

किञ्चैवं सति यागादेः स्वर्गापूर्वादिसङ्गतिः।
क्रियात्वेन विरुध्येत, शास्त्रं चेत्तन्न बाधते॥
यूपादित्यादितादात्म्यं प्रत्यक्षेणैव बाधितम्।
विस्पष्टदृष्टभेदत्वात् काष्ठसावित्रबिम्बयोः॥

अपि च तत्र सन्निहितयूपाञ्जनविध्येकवाक्यतया अर्थवादत्वाद्युक्तं गुणवादत्वाश्रयणं, न चेह तथा विध्यन्तरमस्ति यच्छेषतया अर्थवादः स्यात्।

अथ विध्यन्वयाभावे पुरुषार्थत्वहानतः।
अभ्याहृत्य विधिं तत्र शेषत्वं परिकल्प्यते॥

७८. यदाहुः।

यावत् खलु प्रमातॄणां प्रवर्तननिवर्तने।
शब्दा न कुर्वते तावन्न निराकाङ्क्षबोधनम्॥ इति, तन्न
ऋतेऽपि विधिसंबन्धाद् दृष्टैव हि पुमर्थता।
पुत्रस्ते जात इत्यादौ तथेहापि भविष्यति॥

न च तत्र विध्यभ्याहारः, अन्तरेणापि विधिं पुत्रजननावगमादेव हर्षोत्पत्तेः।

तथा का क्रिया पाक इत्यादिप्रश्नोत्तरव्यवहारेषु प्रष्टृजनजिज्ञासितक्रियाविशेषप्रतिपादनमात्रनिराकाङ्क्षशब्दो न विध्यभ्याहारमपेक्षते।

इह तु ब्रह्मविज्ञानं महानन्दफलं श्रुतम्।
ब्रह्मविद् ब्रह्म भवति प्राप्नोति ब्रह्मवित् परम्॥
अश्नुते ब्रह्मणा सार्धं सर्वान् कामान् स सामगः॥
इदमादित्रयीवाक्यैर्व्यक्ता तस्य पुमर्थता।

तदेवमुदीरितश्रुतिशतसमधिगतावितथसहजसर्वसाक्षात्कारकारुण्यादिकल्याणगुणैकराशौ भगवति सिध्यति, सिध्यत्येव तदनुभवमूलतया तन्त्रप्रामाण्यम्।

७९. ननु विरचितनीत्या कश्चिदाम्नायमूर्द्ध-
प्रमितसहजसर्वज्ञानवानस्तु नाम।
स च हरिरिति यावन्नावगम्येत सम्यक्
न खलु भवति तावत्पञ्चरात्रं प्रमाणम्॥

अत्यल्पमेतत्। न ह्यत्र त्रयीविदो विवदन्ते यद्वासुदेवः परमात्मा अखिलजगत्कारणमिति।

श्रूयते हि स वेदान्ते "एवात्मा नारायणः परः।"
"सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं च" "तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम्॥"
"परा प्रकृतिरध्यक्षो वासुदेवस्तथा परः।"

"एकः परस्ताद्य इदं बभूव", "यस्मात् परं नापरमस्ति किञ्चित्।"
इत्युक्तवाक्यानुगुणं "यतो वा इमानि भूतानि" "सदेव सौम्य॥"
इत्यादिवाक्यं च ततस्स विष्णुस्त्रयीशिरःसिद्धविशुद्धबोधः।

न चान्यस्माज्जगज्जन्मस्थितिध्वंसाश्श्रुतौ श्रुताः।
यतश्चैते स सर्वज्ञः परमात्मेति संमतम्॥

अमुमेव परमात्मानं द्वैपायन-पराशर-नारदप्रभृतिमहर्षिवचनेभ्यः प्रतिपद्यामहे, तथा हि।

विष्णौ जगत्स्थितं सर्वमिति विद्धि परन्तप।
सृजत्येष महाविष्णुर्भूतग्रामं चराचरम्॥
एष चाक्षिपते काले काले विसृजते पुनः।
अस्मिन् गच्छन्ति विलयमस्माच्च प्रभवन्त्युत॥
अनादिनिधनः श्रीमान् मुनिर्नारायणः प्रभुः।
स वै सृजति भूतानि स्थावराणि चराणि च।
स ब्रह्म परमं चेति तथाऽन्यत्रापि पठ्यते॥
केशवो भरतश्रेष्ठ! भगवानीश्वरः परः।
पुरुषः सर्वमित्येतच्छ्रूयते बहुधा श्रुतौ॥ इति,
तत्त्वं जिज्ञासमानानां हेतुभिः सर्वतोमुखैः।
तत्त्वमेको महायोगी हरिर्नारायणः प्रभुः॥ इति,

तथा दानधर्मे।

परमात्मा परः शान्तः पद्मनाभः परायणः।
इति वेदरहस्यं तु किं न वेत्सि पुरन्दर ॥
तत्प्रसादाद्वयं सर्वे लोकानां स्थितिहेतवः।
आप्ताश्चामरमुख्याश्च देवाश्च स्थानिनो मताः ॥
यदि विष्णुरुदासीनो नास्माकं विद्यते शुभम्।
इति रुद्रस्य वचनं तथा भारतमात्स्ययोः ॥
तत्र यः परमात्मा हि स नित्यो निर्गुणश्शुभः।
स वै नारायणो ज्ञेयः सर्वात्मा पुरुषो हि सः ॥ इति,

तथा वाराहे।

यस्य देवस्य चरितं व्रतं समभवद्भुवि।
कोऽन्यस्तस्मादभ्यधिको मुक्त्वा नारायणं प्रभुम् ॥ इति,
नारायणात्परो देवो न भूतो न भविष्यति।
एतद्रहस्यं वेदानां पुराणानां च सत्तमाः ॥ इति।

तथा लैङ्गे।

स एकः पुरुषः श्रेष्ठः परमात्मा जनार्दनः।
यस्माद् ब्रह्मा ततो रुद्रः ततश्चैवाखिलं जगत् ॥

तथा।

विष्णोस्सकाशादुद्भूतं जगत्तत्रैव च स्थितम्।
स्थितिसंयमकर्त्ताऽसाविति पाराशरं वचः ॥

तथा मानवे।

नारायणः परोऽव्यक्तादण्डमव्यक्तसंभवम्।
अण्डस्यान्तस्त्विमे लोकाः सप्तद्वीपा च मेदिनी ॥

तस्मादीदृशश्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणपर्यालोचनया अखिलजगत्कारणं परमात्मा वासुदेव इति निश्चीयते।

८०. न चैव परमात्मत्वं रुद्रादेः श्रुतिसूदितम्।
प्रत्युतोत्पत्तिमेवाहुस्तस्यैकायनशाखिनः ॥

तथा लैङ्गे ।

न हि विष्णुमृते काचिद् गतिरन्या विधीयते ।
इत्येवं सततं वेदा गायन्ते नात्र संशयः ॥ इति,

तथा वायवीये ।

सहस्रबाहुः परमः प्रजापतिः ।
त्रयीपथे यः पुरुषो निरुच्यते ॥ इति,

तथा भविष्यति ।

वेदसिद्धान्तमार्गेषु विष्णुरेव परः स्मृतः ।
विष्णुरेव नरश्रेष्ठो महिष्ठः पुरुषोत्तमः ॥

इति; सर्वं चैतत्पुरुष†निर्णये निपुणतरमुपपादितमिति नेह प्रपञ्च्यते ।

ततश्च ।

श्रुतिमूर्ध्नि प्रसिद्धेन वासुदेवेन भाषितम् ।
तन्त्रं मिथ्येति वक्तुं नः कथं जिह्वा प्रवर्तते ॥

८२. न हि सहजसंवेदनसाक्षात्कृतदीक्षाराधनादिधर्मः स्वर्गपुत्रादिवैषयिकसुखमनेकदुःखसंभिन्नं, न चातिचिरमनुवर्तत इति तदपि दुःखपक्ष एव निक्षिप्य मोक्षाय गृहेभ्यः प्रव्रजद्भ्यः शाण्डिल्यनारदादिपरमर्षिभ्यस्तदभिलषितनिरतिशयनिश्रेयसैकसाधनस्वावगमाराधनावबोधिनीं पञ्चरात्रसंहितां निरमिमीतेति निश्चीयते ।

८३. न च तन्त्रान्तरेष्वेष न्यायः प्रसरमर्हति ।
यतस्तत्तन्नियन्तॄणां विभ्रमाद्यपि संभवि ॥
प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणानां न हि मूलत्वसंभवः ।
तन्त्रान्तरेषु, शास्त्रं तु मूलं तैरेव नेष्यते ॥

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† पुरुषनिर्णयनामा भगवन्महिमप्रतिपादनपुरःसरो देवतान्तरव्यापर्वनमुखेन विष्णुपरतत्त्वत्वप्रतिपादनपरो ग्रन्थः परमाचार्यप्रणीतः ।

अन्यच्च वेदसिद्धान्तविरुद्धार्थाभिधानतः ।
प्रत्यक्षश्रुतिमूलत्वकल्पना तेषु बाध्यते ॥
यथा माहेश्वरे तन्त्रे विरुद्धं बहुजल्पितम् ।
चतुर्विधा हि तत्सिद्धचर्यामार्गानुसारिणः ॥
यथा कापालिकाः कालमुखाः पाशुपतास्तथा ।
शैवास्तत्र च कापालं मतमेवं प्रचक्षते ॥
मुद्रिकाषट्कविज्ञानात् पुनस्तस्यैव धारणात् ।
अपवर्गफलप्राप्तिर्न ब्रह्मावगमादिति ॥

तथाऽऽहुः ।

मुद्रिकाषट्कतत्त्वज्ञः परमुद्राविशारदः ।
भगासनस्थमात्मानं ध्यात्वा निर्वाणमृच्छति ॥

तथा ।

कर्णिका रुचकञ्चैव कुण्डलञ्च शिखामणिम् ।
भस्म यज्ञोपवीतञ्च मुद्राषट्कं प्रचक्षते ॥
कपालमथ खट्वाङ्गमुपमुद्रे प्रकीर्तिते† ।
आभिर्मुद्रितदेहस्तु न भूय इह जायते ॥

न चेदृशमुद्रिकाषट्कपरिज्ञान-तद्धारण-निन्दितभगासनस्थदेहध्यानस्यापवर्गसाधनत्वं श्रुतयो मृष्यन्ति, ता ह्यैहिकामुष्मिकसकलविषयाभिलाषविमुखस्य अखिलजगत्कारणवासुदेवात्मभावनैकलभ्यं मोक्षमाचक्षते । तमेव विदित्वा अतिमृत्युमेति, नान्यः पन्था अयनाय विद्यते इत्याद्याः, एवं कालमुखा अपि समस्तशास्त्रप्रतिषिद्धकपालपात्रभोजन-शवभस्मस्नान तत्प्राशन-लगुडधारण सुराकुम्भस्थापन-तत्स्थदेवतार्चनादिरेव दृष्टादृष्टाभीष्टसिद्धिमभिदधानाः श्रुतिबहिष्कृता एव ।

८४. यदपि पाशुपतशैवाभ्यां विरुद्धाविरुद्धसममुग्धं किञ्चिदभिहितं तदपि श्रुतिबहिष्कृतमेव ।

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† खट्वाधारस्थूणा शिवायुधम् ।

तत्रैषा पाशुपतप्रक्रिया ।

जीवाः पशव उच्यन्ते तेषामधिपतिश्शिवः ।
स तेषामुपकाराय पञ्चाध्यायीमचीक्लृपत् ॥
तत्र पञ्च पदार्थास्तु व्याख्याताः कारणादयः ।
कारणं कार्यं विधिर्योगो दुःखान्तः इति,
उपादानं निमित्तञ्च व्याख्यातं कारणं द्विधा ।
निमित्तकारणं रुद्रस्तत्कला कारणान्तरम् ॥
महदन्तं महदादिकार्यमुदितं तद्वद्विधिर्गीयते
गूढाचारमुखश्मशानभसितस्नानावसानः परः ।
योगो धारणमुच्यते हृदि धियामोङ्कारपूर्वं तथा
दुःखान्तो हि मतोऽपवर्ग इति ते पञ्चापि संकीर्तिताः ॥

आत्यन्तिकी दुःखनिवृत्तिर्दुःखान्तशब्देनोक्ता तामेव निश्शेष-वैशेषिकात्मगुणोच्छेदलक्षणां मुक्तिं मन्यते इयमेव चेश्वरकल्पना शैवानामन्येषां च ।

सेयं सर्वा श्रुतिविरुद्धा कल्पना यतः ।
जगन्निमित्तोपादानं परं ब्रह्म श्रुतौ श्रुतम् ॥
महानन्दात्मको मोक्षस्तत्रतत्रासकृच्छ्रुतः ॥
परस्परविरोधेन व्याहतैषां प्रमाणता ।
त्रयीदण्डप्रतिक्षेपं किञ्चिन्नैव प्रतीक्षते ॥

८५. किञ्च शैवादयो वेदसिद्धवर्णाश्रमाद्बहिः ।
कल्पयन्त्याश्रमादीनि ततोऽपि श्रुतिबाह्यता ॥

यदाहुः ।

दीक्षाप्रवेशमात्रेण ब्राह्मणो भवति क्षणात् ।
कापालं व्रतमास्थाय यतिर्भवति मानवः ॥ इति ।

८६. न च वाच्यम् अप्रमाणभूतमियन्तं ग्रन्थराशिं कथं प्रत्ययिततरो रुद्रः प्रणयतीति । न च समाननामनिर्मातृस्मरणनियन्धनमिति युक्तम् अतिप्रसङ्गादिति—यतः—

नामैकत्वकृतभ्रान्तिकल्पनाऽप्युपपद्यते ।
वेदबाधाद्म चान्यत्र तावताऽतिप्रसज्यते ॥
प्रमादोऽपि च नात्यन्तं रुद्रादिषु न सम्भवी ।

यद्वा रुद्रस्य मोहशास्त्रप्रणेतृतयाऽवगतत्वाद् व्यामोहयितुमेव ईदृशशास्त्रप्रणयनमुपपद्यत इति नावश्यं प्रमाद एवाश्रयितव्यः, तथा च वाराहे ।

त्वं हि रुद्र ! महाबाहो ! मोहशास्त्राणि कारय ।
कुहकादीन्द्रजालानि विरुद्धाचरणानि च ॥
दर्शयित्वाऽल्पमायासं फलं शीघ्रं प्रदर्शय ।
दर्शयित्वा जनं सर्वं मोहयाशु महेश्वर ! ॥ इति ।

तथा तत्रैव भगवान् रुद्रः प्रस्तुतशैवाद्यागमानां स्वयमेव वेदबाह्यत्वं वेदमार्गपरिभ्रष्टजनाधिकारित्वं तद्व्यामोहैकप्रयोजनतां च दर्शयति ।

ये वेदमार्गनिर्मुक्तास्तेषां मोहार्थमेव च ।
नयसिद्धान्तमार्गेण मया शास्त्रं प्रदर्शितम् ॥
तस्मादारभ्य कालात्तु मत्प्रणीतेषु सत्तमाः ।
शास्त्रेष्वभिरतो लोको न वेदान् बहु मन्यते ।
तथा पाशुपतादीनि प्रवर्तन्ते कलौ युगे ॥

तथा च भगवत्परिवारत्वव्यतिरेकेण स्वप्रधानपूजां पाशुपतादितन्त्र-सिद्धां वेदबाह्यां दर्शयति ।

तद्वेदबाह्यं कर्मोक्तं मामुद्दिश्योपसेव्यते ।
तद्धि पाशुपतं नाम कनिष्ठं मोहनं नृणाम् ॥
मां विष्णुव्यतिरेकेण पूजयन्ति नराधमाः ।
इत्यादिवाक्यजातानि न लिख्यन्तेऽतिगौरवात् ॥
व्यक्तश्च वेदबाह्यत्वमेतच्छास्त्रानुगामिनाम् ।

यथा तत्रैव ।

शशाप तांजटाभस्मकपालव्रतधारिणः ।
भविष्यथ त्रयीबाह्या वेदकर्मबहिष्कृताः ॥

कलौ तद्रूपिणस्सर्वे जटालगुडधारिणः।
स्वच्छन्दव्रतवेषाश्च मिथ्यालिङ्गधरास्तथा।
ब्रह्मशापाग्निनिर्दग्धा रुद्रभक्ता जटाधराः॥ इति,

प्रसिद्धश्चैतच्छैवागमेषु।

रुद्राक्षं कङ्कणं हस्ते जटा चैका च मस्तके।
कपालं भस्मना स्नानम् इत्यादि।

तथा चैतेषामादित्यपुराणेऽपि भगवत्त्यागेन समं वेदत्यागं कथयति।

अन्ये भस्मजटोपेता यथोक्ता गौतमात् पुरा।
शापात्सन्त्याजिता वेदं देवं नारायणं तथा॥ इति।
किञ्चैते वासुदेवस्य मन्दा निन्दां वितन्वते।
ते च पापण्डिनो ज्ञेया यथा लैङ्गे समीरितम्॥
ये तु सामान्यभावेन मन्यन्ते पुरुषोत्तमम्।
ते वै पापण्डिनो ज्ञेया वेदमार्गबहिष्कृताः॥ इति,

ततश्च।

एत एव च ते येषां वाङ्मात्रेणापि नार्चनम्।
पापण्डिनो विकर्मस्थानित्यादिस्मृतिपूदितम्॥
या वेदबाह्या इत्येतदपि चेदृशगोचरम्।
तस्मान्न वेदमूलत्वं नापि प्रत्यक्षमूलता॥
तन्त्रान्तराणां युक्तेति कल्प्यते कारणान्तरम्।

८७. ननु मूलान्तरापेक्षा यदि स्यादस्तु दूषणम्॥
स्वतःप्रमाणं विज्ञानं भवतां ननु दर्शने।
सत्यं तदेव विज्ञानप्रामाण्यमपनीयते॥
बाधकारणदोषाभ्यां तावपि द्वाविह स्फुटौ।
एवं श्रुतिविरुद्धस्य स्फुटमूलान्तरस्य यत्॥
पञ्चरात्रेण साधर्म्यं तन्त्रत्वेनाभिधित्सितम्।
क्रियात्वेन तु साधर्म्यं ब्रह्महत्याऽश्वमेधयोः॥
श्रुतिप्रत्यक्षयोस्तत्र यतोमूलत्वनिश्चयः।

८८. ननु च श्रुतिमूलत्वे वेदादेवार्थसिद्धितः ॥
तत्प्रणेतुस्स्वतन्त्रत्वकल्पना नेत्यचूचुदम् ।
नैवं न कल्प्यते पुंसि स्वातन्त्र्यं श्रूयते हि तत् ॥
तस्याध्यक्षमिदं सर्वं मायाऽस्मादिदमादिषु ।

८९. ननु वेदमूला एव चेदेताः पञ्चरात्रस्मृतयः किं तर्हि तदर्थ-स्मरणवत्तन्मूलभूतवेदवाक्यस्मरणं नानुवर्तते पाञ्चरात्रिकाणाम् । न चार्थस्मरणस्य प्रयोजनवत्त्वात् तस्य विफलत्वात् तदनादरणीयमिति युक्तं, न हि यतः प्रामाण्यं तदेव विस्मर्तुं युक्तम् ।

अथ विस्मरणोपपत्तये प्रलीननित्यानुमेयशाखामूलता आश्रीयते तदा यदेव येन प्रमाणतया परिगृहीतं स तत्प्रलीनशाखामस्तके निक्षिप्य प्रमाणीकुर्यात् । नित्यानुमेयप्रलीनशाखयोस्तु स्वरूपसिद्धि-रेव दुर्लभा ।

अथ विद्यमानशाखामूला एव ताः स्मृतयः तदा तत्प्रणेतृवदन्येऽपि तत एवोपलभेरन् इति ग्रन्थप्रणयनप्रयासवैयर्थ्यम् ।

अत्रोच्यते स खलु भगवान् अमोघसहजसंवेदनसाक्षाद्भवदखिल-वेदराशिर्विप्रकीर्णविविधविध्यर्थवादमन्त्रात्मकानेकशाखाध्ययनधारणा-दिष्वधीरधियो भक्तानवलोक्य तदनुकम्पया लघुनोपायेन तदर्थं संक्षिप्यो-पदिदेशेति न किञ्चिदनुपपन्नम् ।

यथाऽऽहुः ।

वेदान्तेषु यथासारं सङ्गृह्य भगवान् हरिः ।
भक्तानुकम्पया विद्वान् सञ्चिक्षेप यथासुखम् ॥

इति, एते च मन्वादिसमस्तस्मरणसाधारणाः पर्यनुयोगास्तत्त्र-टीकाकृतपरिश्रमाणामनायासपरिहार्या इति नेह प्रपञ्च्यते ।

९०. ननु चेदं वेदमूलत्वं पञ्चरात्रतन्त्राणामनुपपन्नं वेदनिन्दा-दर्शनात्, उक्तं हि चतुर्षु पुरुषार्थमलभमानः शाण्डिल्य इदं शास्त्र-मधीतवान् इति, अनवगतवचनव्यक्तेरयं पर्यनुयोगः, न हि निन्दा

निन्द्यं निन्दितुं प्रवर्तते। अपि तु निन्दितादितरत्प्रशंसितुम्। यथैतरेयक-ब्राह्मणे प्रातः प्रातरनृतं ते वदन्ति इत्यनुदितहोमनिन्दा उदितहोम-प्रशंसार्थेति गम्यते यथा मानवे।

ऋग्वेदो देवदैवत्यो यजुर्वेदस्तु मानुषः।
सामवेदस्तु पित्र्यः स्यात् तस्मात्तस्याशुचिर्ध्वनिः॥

इति सामवेदनिन्दा इतरवेदप्रशंसार्था, यथा वा भारते।

चत्वार एकतो वेदा भारतं चैकमेकतः।
समागतैस्तु ऋषिभिस्तुलयाऽरोपितं पुरा॥
महत्त्वे च गुरुत्वे च ध्रियमाणं यतोऽधिकम्।
महत्त्वाच्च गुरुत्वाच्च महाभारतमुच्यते॥

इति महाभारतप्रशंसार्थेति गृह्यते न वेदनिन्देति। एवं पञ्चरात्र-प्रशंसेति गम्यते।

अथानुदितहोमादेरन्यत्र स्तुतिदर्शनात्।
अतत्परत्वं निन्दायास्तथात्रापि भविष्यति॥
वेदप्रशंसा बहुशः पञ्चरात्रेऽपि दृश्यते।
न हि तेभ्यः परं किञ्चिद् वाङ्मयं कमलासन।
वेदान्तैरिदमेवोक्तं तत्त्वज्ञानोपपादकैः॥ इत्यादौ।

९१. अपि च चतुर्षु वेदेषु इति नायमर्थः वेदेषु पुरुषार्थो नास्तीति किन्तु यस्तेषु पुरुषार्थस्तमलभमान इति।

ननु पुरुषार्थं वेदेषु लभमान इत्यन्वयो न वेदेषु पुरुषार्थमिति, मैवं व्यावर्त्याभावात्, न हि वेदेष्वेवायं पुरुषार्थो न लभ्यते अतो वेदेषु यः पुरुषार्थस्तमलभमानः तदभिलाषी पञ्चरात्रशास्त्रमधीतवानिति पञ्चरात्र-श्रुत्योरैकार्थ्यमेव प्रतीयते।

९२. यत्पुनरुक्तमुपनयनादिसंस्कृतानां भगवदाराधनार्थतया दीक्षालक्षणसंस्कारविधानादवैदिकत्वमिति तदयुक्तं न ह्युपनयनादि-

संस्कृतानां ज्योतिष्टोमादिकर्माङ्गतया दीक्षादिसंस्कारविधायकम् आग्नावैष्णवम् इत्यादिवाक्यमवैदिकं भवति।

अथ वैदिकसंस्कारात् संस्कारान्तरविधानं हेतुः, तदनुपपन्नं सिद्धे हि पञ्चरात्रशास्त्रस्य अवैदिकत्वे तस्य संस्कारान्तरत्वसिद्धिः तत्सिद्धौ च तस्यावैदिकत्वसिद्धिरित्यन्योन्याश्रयणात्।

किञ्च समस्तवैदिकसंस्कारेभ्यः संस्कारान्तरत्वं वा हेतुः, उत कतिपयेभ्यः संस्कारेभ्यः, न तावदनन्तरः कल्पः उपनयनादिसंस्कारस्यापि चौलादिसंस्कारात् संस्कारान्तरत्वेनावैदिकत्वप्रसङ्गात्, न चान्यः कल्पः, उक्तदोषानतिवृत्तेः, न ह्युपनयनं समस्तवैदिकसंस्कारेभ्यः संस्कारान्तरम्। असिद्धश्च समस्तवैदिकसंस्कारव्यतिरेकः पञ्चरात्रशास्त्रस्यापि वैदिकत्वादित्युक्तमेव।

९३. यदपि धर्मप्रमाणत्वाभिमतचतुर्दशविद्यास्थानेष्वपरिगणितत्वात् पाशुपतादितन्त्रवत् त्रयीबाह्यत्वमिति—तदपि द्वैपायन-वाल्मीकिप्रणीतभारतरामायणादिग्रन्थैरनैकान्तिकम्।

९४. यत्तु भगवता बादरायणेन निरस्तत्वादिति तदसत्, कथं हि भगवान् द्वैपायनः सकललोकादर्शभूतपरमभागवतो भागवतं शास्त्रं निरस्यतीत्युत्प्रेक्ष्येत।

य एवमाह।

इदं शतसहस्राद्धि भारताख्यानविस्तरात्।
आविध्य मतिमन्थानं दध्नो घृतमिवोद्धृतम्॥
नवनीतं यथा दध्नो द्विपदां ब्राह्मणो यथा।
आरण्यकं च वेदेभ्य ओषधीभ्यो यथाऽमृतम्॥
इदं महोपनिषदं चतुर्वेदसमन्वितम्।
साङ्ख्ययोगकृतान्तेन पञ्चरात्रानुशब्दितम्॥
इदं श्रेय इदं ब्रह्म इदं हितमनुत्तमम्।
ऋग्यजुस्सामभिर्जुष्टमथर्वाङ्गिरसैस्तथा॥
भविष्यति प्रमाणं वै एतदेवानुशासनम्। इति,

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भीष्मपर्वण्यपि ।

ब्राह्मणैः क्षत्रियैर्वैश्यैः शूद्रैश्च कृतलक्षणैः ।
अर्चनीयश्च सेव्यश्च पूजनीयश्च माधवः ॥
सात्वतं विधिमास्थाय गीतस्संकर्षणेन यः ।
द्वापरस्य युगस्यान्ते आदौ कलियुगस्य च ॥ इति ।

तथा शान्तिपर्वण्यपि ।

अवश्यं वैष्णवो दीक्षां प्रविशेत् सर्वयत्नतः ।
दीक्षिताय विशेषेण प्रसीदेन्नान्यथा हरिः ॥
वसन्ते दीक्षयेद्विप्रं ग्रीष्मे राजन्यमेव च ।
शरदः समये वैश्यं हेमन्ते शूद्रमेव च ॥
स्त्रियं च वर्षाकाले तु पञ्चरात्रविधानतः ॥

तथा ।

वेदैश्चतुर्भिस्स†मितं कृतं मेरौ महागिरौ ।
एवमादिवचोभङ्गीशतैस्सादरमीरितैः ॥
वेदान्तसारसर्वस्वमात्मीयं परमं मतम् ।
पञ्चरात्रं निराकुर्यात् कथं द्वैपायनः स्वयम् ॥

९५. कथं तर्हीदं सूत्रम् उत्पत्त्यसंभवात् इति । किं वाऽस्य सूत्रस्य हृदयम् । इदमस्य सूत्रस्य, भागवतशास्त्रे जीवोत्पत्तेः प्रतिपाद्यमानत्वात् तस्याश्च श्रुतिन्यायविरोधेनासम्भवादसमीचीनं शास्त्रमिति । यद्येष सूत्रार्थस्तर्हि पञ्चरात्रशास्त्रनिराकरणपरं सूत्रं, न हि पञ्चरात्रशास्त्रेषु जीवोत्पत्तिरङ्गीकृता येनैवमुच्यते ।

नन्वस्तीदं वचनं वासुदेवः परा प्रकृतिः परमात्मा ततस्संकर्षणो नाम जीवो जायते सङ्कर्षणात् प्रद्युम्नसंज्ञं मनो जायते ततोऽनिरुद्धनामा अहङ्कारो जायते । इति,

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† सम–शब्दात्तादितेन इतच्प्रत्ययेन व्युत्पन्नः समितशब्दो भवति तुल्यार्थं । समंकृतम् अथवा समन्वितमित्येव अनुलापात् ।

† अपि तु व्यूहरूपेण व्यक्तिर्देवस्य कीर्त्यते ।
तत्र संव्यवहारार्थं जीव-शब्दः प्रयुज्यते ॥
वर्णानामानुलोम्येन पूज्यभेदप्रसिद्धये ।

यथाऽऽहुः ।

वर्णैश्चतुर्भिश्चत्वारः पूजनीया यथाक्रमम् । इति, अपि च जीव-मनोऽहङ्कारशब्दा न तन्मात्रवचना अपि तु तत्तदधिष्ठानाधिकृतविलक्षण-विग्रहवत्पुरुषाभिधाना इति,

विचित्रदेहसंपत्तिर्जन्मेति व्यपदिश्यते ।
तोयेन जीवान्नित्येतद्यजुर्मूर्ध्नि यथा वचः ॥

अपि च जीवोत्पत्तिप्रलयादिगोचराः श्रुतिस्मृतिलोकवादाः चराचरव्यपाश्रयस्तु स्यात् तद्व्यपदेशो भाक्तस्तद्भावभावित्यादित्यत्रैव सूत्रकारेण कृतनिर्वाहाः ॥

किञ्च नात्मा श्रुतेर्नित्यत्वाच्च ताभ्यः इत्यत्रैव ब्रह्मणो जीवोत्पत्तिः श्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायविरोधेन निरस्ता सती न पुनरुपन्यासं प्रयोजयतीति अनधिकरणीयमधि‡करणमापद्येत ।

९६. एतेन न च कर्तुः करणम् इति सूत्रं व्याख्यातं, न ह्यत्र कर्तुः सङ्कर्षणात् करणस्य मनस उत्पत्तिरुच्यते, उक्तं हि विलक्षण-पुरुषवचना एते शब्दा इति,

किमिति वा कर्तुः करणन्नोत्पद्यते देवदत्तादेः कर्तुः परशुप्रभृति-करणोत्पत्त्यदर्शनादिति चेत्, हन्त हतस्तर्हि अपगतसकलकरणकलाप-स्वमहिमप्रतिष्ठब्रह्मणः प्राणमनःप्रभृतिनिखिलकरणोत्पत्त्यभ्युपगमः, एत-स्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च इति,

अथ श्रुतिप्रसिद्धत्वात्तत्तथैवाभ्युपेयते ।
पञ्चरात्रप्रसिद्धत्वादिदं किन्नाभ्युपैषि भोः ॥

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† सत्यमस्ति, नानेनवचनेनेह जीवजन्माभिधीयते ।

‡ चराचराधिकरणमित्यर्थः ।

न हि स्मृतिप्रसिद्धार्थपरित्यागोऽतिशोभनः ।
निर्दोषज्ञानजन्मत्वात् प्रामाण्यं हि समं द्वयोः ॥

९७. यत्तु चत्वारः एते किं समानैश्वर्यभागिनः ।
स्वतन्त्राः किमुतैकस्य स्वेच्छामूर्तिचतुष्टयी ॥

इति विकल्प्य ।

समानैश्वर्यभागित्वे तुल्यत्वान्नैव कार्यता ।
एकस्य मूर्तिभेदश्चेत् किं भेदेन प्रयोजनम् ॥

इति दूषयतीति व्याख्यातं विज्ञानादिभावे वा तदप्रतिषेध इति ।

तदयुक्तम् असम्भावनीयत्वाद्विकल्पस्य, न हि केनचिदीश्वरवादिना अनेकेश्वरं जगदभ्युपगतं विशेषतश्च पाञ्चरात्रिकैः वासुदेव एवैकः परा प्रकृतिरिति वदद्भिः, किन्तु स एव भगवान् लीलाविरचितचतुर्भेदः सकलमपि जगत्संरक्षतीति ।

न चेदमनुपपन्नं बल-भरतावरजाग्रजादिप्रादुर्भाववदुपपत्तेः, यथैव हि भगवतः स्वलीलाविरचितगगन-पवन-हर-विरिञ्च्यादिमपञ्चस्य अचिन्त्यमहिमलीलैकप्रयोजनस्य राम-लक्ष्मण भरत-शत्रुघ्नादिस्वच्छन्दाविग्रहा न विरोत्स्यन्ते एवं सङ्कर्षणप्रद्युम्नादिभेदा इति ।

९८. यत्परं—विप्रतिषेधात् इति चतुर्षु वेदेषु इति श्रुतिविप्रतिषेधात् तन्त्राणां परस्परविप्रतिषेधाद्वा अप्रमाणमिति—तत्र श्रुतिविप्रतिषेधस्तु प्रागेव प्रत्युक्तः, परस्परविप्रतिषेधस्तु प्रधानगुणसामान्यविशेषादिन्यायसंपादितवचनव्यक्तीनां तन्त्राणां नास्त्येव । न्यायानुग्रहरहितानां तु वचसां न क्वचिदपि परिनिश्चायकत्वं, यथाऽऽह, "न्यायसंपादितव्यक्ति पश्चाद्वाक्यार्थबोधकम्" इति । तस्मात्सूत्रकारेण इदं महोपनिषदम् इत्यादिवचनैर्वेदेभ्यो विशेषेणाभिमततरप्रामाण्येषु पञ्चरात्रतन्त्रेष्वविद्यमानजीवोत्पत्तिप्रतिपादनाध्यारोपेण तन्निराकरणपरतया सूत्रं व्याख्यायमानं व्याख्यातॄणामेवाख्यातिं ख्यापयतीत्यलं प्रयन्धेन ।

९९. तत्रैष सूत्रार्थः। पूर्वं स्वाभिप्रेतसमयपरिपन्थिकपिल-काश्यप†-सुगत-जिन-पशुपतिमतानां श्रुतिन्यायविरोधादसामञ्जस्यं प्रतिपाद्य अधुना स्वाभिप्रेतपञ्चरात्रतन्त्राणामपि इतरसमयसमानपरिगणनाद्बुद्धौ सन्निहितानामितरसमयवदसामञ्जस्यमाशङ्क्य प्रामाण्यं ‡व्युत्पाद्यते।

तत्राद्येन सूत्रद्वयेन पूर्वपक्ष उपक्षिप्यते तथा हि पञ्चरात्रशास्त्रमप्रमाणम् उत्पत्त्यसंभवात् प्रतिपाद्यमानायाः संकर्षणाद्युत्पत्तेरसंभवात्, कथमसंभवः, उभयथाऽप्यनुपपत्तेः तथा हि।

किन्तु चत्वार एवैते समानैश्वर्यभागिनः।
एको वा स्याच्चतुर्भेदे द्वेधाऽप्युत्पत्त्यसंभवः॥
समानैश्वर्यभागित्वे तुल्यत्वान्नैव सृज्यता।
एकात्मत्वेऽभ्युपेतेऽपि तथोत्पत्तेरसंभवः।
स्रष्टृसृज्यविभागो हि नैकस्मिन्नुपकल्पते॥

१००. तथा न च कर्त्तुः करणम्। इतश्च अप्रमाणं कर्त्तुः सङ्कर्षणसंज्ञाज्जीवात् करणस्य प्रद्युम्नसंज्ञस्य मनस उत्पत्त्यसंभवात्, न हि देवदत्तात्परशुरुत्पद्यत इति।

एवं वा। न च कर्त्तुः करणम् इतश्च कर्त्तुः संकर्षणात् न करणमुत्पद्यते ब्रह्मण एव समस्तकरणोत्पत्तिश्रुतेः, एतस्माज्जायते प्राणोमनः-सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च इति।

१०१. विज्ञानादिभावे वा तदप्रतिषेध इति, वा-शब्दात्पक्षो विपरिवर्त्तते।

यदुक्तमुभयथाऽपि संकर्षणाद्युत्पत्तेरसंभवादप्रामाण्यमिति नैतदस्ति तस्यास्सङ्कर्षणाद्युत्पत्तेरप्रतिषेधः।

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† कणादः काश्यपः समौ।

‡ स्थूणानिखननन्यायेनेत्यर्थः यथा हि स्थूणां द्रढयितुमिच्छवस्तां स्वयमेव हस्तेन परिचाल्य परीक्षन्ते।

यदि हि विज्ञानादय एते न भवेयुः स्यादुत्पत्तिप्रतिषेधः ।

विज्ञानं चादि चेति विज्ञानादि ब्रह्म तद्भावे ब्रह्मभावे उत्पत्तेर-प्रतिषेधः ।

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† आदीयते-उपादीयते उपयुज्यते सर्वकार्यार्थमित्यादि सर्वजगन्निदानं ब्रह्म, अत्र यद्यपि उपसर्गे घोः किरिति पाणिनीयेन किप्रत्ययान्तादि-शब्दस्य नित्यपुँस्त्वं प्राप्नोति तथापीह औणादिकप्रत्ययेन साधुभावोऽवगन्तव्यः शिष्टप्रयोगे संज्ञासु धातुरूपाणीत्यादिना तथैवानु-शिष्टत्वेन शिष्टशिष्टैरेव च प्रयोगमूलतया अनौणादिकस्यैव पुँस्त्वकल्पनात् ।

अथवा विज्ञानं चादिश्चेत्येव पाठः । ततश्च विज्ञानं चादिश्च विज्ञानादि इति समाहारद्वन्द्वः, विज्ञानादीतिकृतसमाहारद्वन्द्वके विज्ञानादिपदे निर्विसर्गकपाठावलोकनभ्रान्तित एव प्राचीनकोशेष्वपि विज्ञानं चादिश्चेति विवक्षणीये विज्ञानं चादि चेति विलिलिखुरिति केचिन्मन्यन्ते । इत एवास्वरसेन कल्पान्तरमवलम्बिरे ग्रन्थाचार्याः । एवमेव च विज्ञानादिसूत्रे श्रीभाष्येऽपि शङ्कासमाध्यभ्यूहनमिति कृतं कुसृष्ट्या वाचामिति चापरे । वस्तुतस्तु श्रीभाष्यकोशेषु आगमप्रामाण्यकोशेषु च प्रायशो देशविशेषनैरपेक्ष्येण विज्ञानादिसूत्रे (विज्ञानं चादि च विज्ञानादि-ब्रह्म तद्भावे) इत्येव प्रामाणिकः पाठः इत्यवश्यं तात्पर्यविशेषेण स प्रयोगो वक्तव्यो न तु यथाश्रुतार्थकादि-पदेनाचरमार्थेन अब्रह्मराधारणेन । अत्रैवमाचक्ष्महे आ-समन्तादत्तुं शीलमस्येत्यादिन् *परमं ब्रह्म सुप्यजातौ णिनिस्ताच्छील्ये ।* इति पाणिनीयेन ताच्छील्येऽर्थेणिनिः, आत्ता चासाधारण्यं विवक्ष्यते तच्च अत्ता चराचरग्रहणादित्यधिकरणोक्त-रीत्या ब्रह्मासाधारणं कर्मेति तादृशार्थकादिपदेन निखिलजगददनकर्तृ परं ब्रह्माभिहितं भवति तच्च साङ्ख्याद्युक्तदिशा प्रधानधर्मो माभूदिति विज्ञानपदेन विशेष्यते । एवं च जन्माद्यस्य यत इति सूत्रे आदिपदेन जगत्स्थितिप्रणाशहेतुताया लक्षणत्वेनाभिमततया लक्षणेनेतरभेद-साधने जन्मादित्रितयस्य संदृश्य हेतुतायां व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध्या प्रत्येकमेव हेतुताया वाच्यत्वेन स्वासाधारणरूपेणादिन् पदेन ब्रह्मोपस्थापितं भवतीति । सति चैवं (विज्ञानं चादि च विज्ञानादि ब्रह्म) इति श्रीभाष्याचार्याणां परमाचार्याणां श्रीयामुनमुनीनां चाभिधानमञ्जसा समञ्जसमिति यथाश्रुतार्थग्राहिणां केषाचिदमीषामाचार्यतात्पर्यानवबोधनिबन्धनमेवानुपपत्त्यभि-धानम् । परे तु संपादितत्वात् क्विपं कृत्वा तस्मात्स्वार्थे अण् विधाय आद इति प्रसाध्य ततो मत्वर्थीयेनिना आदिनपदं सिषाधयिषन्ति । तदिदमपि प्रक्रियागौरवपराहतमिति नातितृप्तये विदुषाम् । किं च अच्छब्दस्य संपदादिक्विबन्तस्य नित्यस्त्रीत्वे ततोऽणि जाते अगन्तत्वेन ङीपोऽवश्यं भावेन आदी इति स्यादिति ततोऽपि नेष्टसिद्धिसंभावना । यदपि अदनमाद इति भावे इति सूत्रेण भावे घञं कृत्वा भावघञन्ताच्च मत्वर्थीयेनिना आदिन्पद-प्रसाधनं तदिदं घञपोश्चेति पाणिनीयानुशासनविस्मरणनिबन्धनं घञि घस्लादेशविधानात् ।

एतदुक्तं भवति एकस्यैव परमात्मनो वासुदेवस्यापरिच्छिन्नशक्तेः स्वमायावैभवनात् कार्यकरणभावोपपत्तिरिति ।

यत्तु न सङ्कर्षणात्मनः उत्पद्यते प्रद्युम्न एव उत्पत्तिश्रुतेरिति तदपि तस्य विज्ञानादित्वेन परिहृतम् ।

१०२. †अपि च, न च कर्तुः करणम् इति किमुक्तं भवति किं यस्याः क्रियाया यत्करणं, तत् तत्क्रियाकर्तुर्नोत्पद्यते, उत यद् यत्र क्वापि करणं तत् कुतश्चिदपि कर्तुर्नोत्पद्यत इति वा ।

तत्राद्ये‡ कल्पे सिद्धसाधनतया अनुमानस्य विप्रतिषेधः, न ह्यत्र सङ्कर्षणात्कर्तुरुत्पद्यमानं मनः स्वोत्पादने करणं कर्मत्वात्, नापि स्वोत्पत्तौ कर्तृत्वात् ।

अपरेऽपि कल्पे प्रत्यक्षविप्रतिषेधः उदकाहरणादौ करणभूतानामपि घटादीनां कर्तुः कुलालादेरुत्पत्तिदर्शनात्, तदिदमाह विप्रतिषेधादिति ।

१०३. यद्वा सूत्रद्वयस्यास्य व्याख्यानान्तरमुच्यते ।
विज्ञानादेः प्रमाणत्वहेतोर्भावेन युज्यते ॥
पञ्चरात्रप्रमाणत्वनिषेधोऽतिप्रसङ्गतः ।
तत्रानुवादसंदेहज्ञानानुत्पत्तिलक्षणम् ॥
निरस्तमप्रमाणत्वं विज्ञानग्रहणादिह ।
वक्त्रादावयवाभासमिथ्यार्थांशाऽपह्नुतये ॥
आदिशब्देन तन्त्राणामाप्तोक्तत्वं विवक्षितम् ।

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† विप्रतिषेधाच्चेतिसूत्रार्थं इतः प्रभृति ।

‡ न तु नायमाद्यकल्पप्रतिषेधः सर्वेन्द्रियव्यापारसामान्यकरणस्य मनसः तत्कर्तृत उत्पत्तिर्न भवति, जीवे अदर्शनादिति पूर्वपक्षीति चेन्न भगवतः स्वकार्ये मनोऽपेक्षा नास्ति मन उत्पादनविषय एव कस्यचिदपेक्षा तानवाधिका अकरणत्वात् ।

तथा हि ।

यस्साक्षात् कुरुते सदा सहजया बुद्ध्या समस्तं जगत्
यः पुंसामभिवाञ्छितानि दिशति ध्यानैकसंतर्पितः ।
नित्यावाप्तसमस्तकाम इति यं प्राहुस्त्रयीपारगाः
तस्मिन् विभ्रमविप्रलम्भनमुखा दोषा भवेयुः कथम् ॥

१०४. उत्पत्त्यसम्भवो यश्च पूर्वसूत्रद्वयोदितः ।
संकर्षणादिमूर्तीनां तत्र प्रतिविधीयते ॥

विप्रतिषेधात् इति पञ्चरात्रस्मरणानुमितभगवत्प्रत्यक्षविप्रतिषेधात् तदनुमितश्रुतिविप्रतिषेधाद्वेति ।

१०५. यद्वा सूत्राणां न्यायप्रदर्शनपरत्वात् पञ्चरात्रश्रुत्योरसन्तमपि-विरोधं कृत्वाऽत्र चिन्त्यन्ते तथा हि ।

सति वेदविरुद्धत्वे किन्नु मन्वादिवाक्यवत् ।
अप्रमाणमिदं शास्त्रं प्रमाणं चेति संशये ॥
अप्रमाणं विरुद्धार्थप्रमित्युत्पत्त्यसम्भवात् ।
असम्भवश्च सापेक्षनिरपेक्षत्वहे†तुकः ॥

यावद्धि सापेक्षं पञ्चरात्रस्मरणं न मूलप्रमाणोपस्थापनमुखेन स्वार्थं प्रमातुमुपक्रमते तावन्निरपेक्षापौरुषेयागमभुवा प्रत्ययेन तदर्थ-स्यान्यथा परिच्छेदात्तद्विरुद्धायाः प्रमितेरुत्पत्त्यसम्भवात् ।

तावद्धि पञ्चरात्रस्य मूलश्रुत्यवबोधनम् ।
‡प्रत्यक्षशास्त्रशस्त्रेण यावन्मूलं न लूयते ॥

१०६. ननु कथं वेदा वा निरपेक्षा यावता तेषामपि भगवदनुभव-सापेक्षमेव प्रमाणत्वं तत्कारणत्वात्, यथैव हि पञ्चरात्रस्मृतयः तदनुभवसापेक्षाः एवं वेदा अपीति तत्रोच्यते "न च कर्तुः करणं"

† विचारहेतुकइत्यर्थः ।

‡ यावन्मूलं न छिन्द्यत इति तन्त्रवार्तिकम् ।

न कर्तुरीश्वरस्य करणं वेदाः । क्रियन्त इति करणं, कर्मणि ल्युट् । अपौरुषेया वेदा इति यावत् ।

१०७. विज्ञानादिभावे वा तदप्रतिषेधः, न चैतदस्ति पञ्चरात्रशास्त्रमप्रमाणमिति । किन्तर्हि ? तदप्रतिषेधः प्रमित्युत्पत्तेरप्रतिषेधः, विरुद्धार्थमपि विकल्पेन प्रमाणमित्यर्थः असम्भवद्भ्रमविप्रलम्भभगवदनुभवमूलत्वाद्, विज्ञानादिभावे विज्ञानं-विशिष्टं ज्ञानं असम्भवत्स्खलनमिति यावत्, अन्येषां हि सर्वधर्मशास्त्रनिबन्धृणां सांसारिकत्वेनासार्वज्ञ्यात् अनवाप्तकामत्वाच्च सम्भाव्यमानविविधविप्लवं ज्ञानं, भगवतस्तु स्वाभाविकनिरङ्कुशैश्वर्यस्य श्रुतिशतसमधिगतावितथसहजसमस्तधर्माधर्मादिसाक्षात्कारं ज्ञानमिति विज्ञानमित्युक्तं, तादृशस्य†तस्यादिभावे मूलत्वे सति तदप्रतिषेधः प्रमाणमेवेति ।

१०८. ननु कथं श्रुतिविरुद्धस्य तन्त्रस्य प्रामाण्याभ्युपगमः तत्प्रामाण्ये हि श्रुत्या सह विकल्पः प्राप्नोति, विकल्पश्च अष्टदोषदुष्टः, स च क्वचिदन्यतरपरित्यागकारणाभावादगत्याऽभ्यनुज्ञायते, यथा व्रीहिभिर्यजेत यवैर्यजेत इति, न हि तत्रान्यतरदपहर्तुं शक्यम् उभयोरप्यनपेक्षत्वाविशिष्टत्वात् । न चैवमपि पञ्चरात्रश्रुत्योर्विकल्पेन भवितव्यम् अतुल्यत्वात्, निरपेक्षं हि वैदिकं वचनम् अपौरुषेयत्वात्, सापेक्षं च पञ्चरात्रवचनमिति कथमनयोर्विकल्पः ।

१०९. श्रूयताम् ।

पञ्चरात्रशास्त्रस्यापि निरपेक्षत्वादेव ।
कथन्नु पौरुषेयस्य वचसो निरपेक्षता ।
इति चेदिदमाचष्टां पृष्टस्सन्नेष तार्किकः ॥
किमस्य बोधकत्वाय परापेक्षाऽभ्युपेयते ।
किं वा निश्चायकत्वाय यथार्थज्ञापनाय वा ॥
पुमर्थत्वाय वा तत्र चतुर्णामप्यसम्भवः ।

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† असिद्धार्थे विज्ञानस्यादिभावो विज्ञानादिभाव इति षष्ठीतत्पुरुषो ज्ञेयः ।

न खलु चक्रवर्त्युपचारेण भगवन्तं समर्चयेदितीदं वचनं श्रूयमाणं बोधकत्वाय किञ्चिदपेक्षते अन्यत्र व्युत्पत्तिग्रहणात्, न च तावता सापेक्षत्वेन दौर्बल्यं श्रुतावपि दौर्बल्यप्रसङ्गात् ।

नापि निश्चयजननाय, न हि अर्चयेदित्येतत् अर्चयेन्न वेति संशयितं प्रत्ययमुत्पादयति व्युत्पत्तिप्रतिपत्तिव्याकोपप्रसङ्गात् ।

नापि यथार्थत्वाय, न ह्युत्पन्नं ज्ञानं स्वकारणव्यतिरेकेण यथार्थत्वाय अपरमपेक्षते *गुणतः प्रामाण्यस्यायुक्तत्वात् अनभ्युपगमाच्च ।*

न च पुरुषार्थत्वाय परापेक्षा शास्त्रशरीरपर्यालोचनादेव तत्सिद्धेः, इह हि यथोक्तसंस्कारवतां शास्त्रश्रवणात् तदर्थज्ञानं ततस्तदर्थपाञ्चकालिकानुष्ठानं, ततो निरतिशयसंपत्प्राप्तिरिति शास्त्रादेवावगम्यते ।

११०. *अथोच्येत सत्यपि पञ्चरात्रतन्त्राणां स्वतःप्रामाण्ये* यावत्तद्वक्तुराप्तिनिश्चयपुरस्सरं दोषाभावो नावधार्यते न तावत्प्रामाण्यं निष्पाद्यत इति तदसत्, न हि दोषाभावज्ञानं प्रामाण्यं निष्पादयति निर्दोषज्ञानकारणादेव तदुत्पत्तेः ।

१११. न च निर्दोषत्वायाप्तत्वादिगुणनिश्चयः सत्तामात्रेण तत्सिद्धेः, यथाह वार्त्तिककारः । तदा न व्याप्रियन्ते तु ज्ञायमानतया गुणाः । इति, दोषाभावज्ञानेऽपि गुणानां सत्तयोपयोगो दर्शितः, दोषाभावे तु विज्ञेये सत्तामात्रोपकारिणः, इति । न चोत्पन्नमपि प्रमाणं हानोपादानादिव्यवहारायापरमपेक्षते स्मरणाभिलापाभ्यामेव तत्सिद्धेः, *यथाहुः*, स्मरणादभिलापाच्च व्यवहारः प्रवर्तते इति ।

अपि च स्वतःप्राप्तप्रामाण्यानां वेदानामपि यावत्कर्त्रभावनिश्चयपुरस्सरं दोषाभावो नावधार्यते न तावत्प्रामाण्यं प्रतितिष्ठतीति समानं सापेक्षत्वम् ।

११२. अथ योग्यानुपलम्भादेवानायाससिद्धे वक्तृभावे निराश्रयदोषाणामसम्भवादप्रामाण्यशङ्कैव वेदे नास्ति, यथाहुः

तत्रापवादनिर्मुक्तिर्वेत्तृभावाल्लघीयसी ।
वेदे तेनाप्रमाणत्वं न शङ्कामधिगच्छति ॥

इति चेत् ।

हन्त तर्हि पञ्चरात्रतन्त्रेऽपि सर्वज्ञसर्वेश्वरवक्तृभावादेव अयत्नसिद्धे दोषाभावे अप्रामाण्यशङ्का नावतरतीति समानश्चर्चः ।

एतदुक्तं भवति उभयोरपि स्वतःप्रामाण्ययोरेकत्र दोषाभावनिश्चयः तदाश्रयपुरुषाभावनिश्चयात्, अन्यत्र तद्विरुद्धगुणवक्तृकत्वनिश्चयादिति।

यथा औष्ण्याभावनिश्चयो नभसि तदाधारत्वाभावनिश्चयाज्जले तु तद्विरुद्धशैत्योपलम्भादिति ।

११३. किञ्च ।

सापेक्षनिरपेक्षत्वे न हि बाधस्य कारणम् ।
शुक्तौ रजतबोधस्य निरपेक्षस्य बाधकम् ॥
नेदं रजतविज्ञानं तत्सापेक्षमपीष्यते ।
सेयं ज्वालेति संवित्तेस्तैलवर्तिविनाशजा ॥
अनुमा बाधिका दृष्टा सापेक्षाऽप्यक्षजन्मनः ।
अतो निरवकाशेन सावकाशं निषिध्यते ॥
न चेह सावकाशत्वं भगवच्छास्त्रवेदयोः ।

११४. अथ श्रुतिविरुद्धस्य तन्त्रभागस्य दुश्शकम् ॥
वासुदेवप्रणीतत्वं निश्चेतुमिति मन्यसे ।
पञ्चरात्रविरुद्धस्य वेदभागस्य वा कथम् ॥
अपौरुषेयताज्ञानमाविर्भवति बाधितम् ।
तस्यापि वेदभागत्वात् तथाभावोऽभ्युपेयते ॥
अस्यापि पञ्चरात्रत्वात् तत्प्रणीतत्वमिष्यताम् ।
कर्तुरस्मरणात्तत्र यदि चापौरुषेयता ॥
तत्कर्तृकत्वस्मृत्याऽत्र किन्न स्यात्तत्प्रणीतता ।
अस्ति ह्यास्त्रीकुमारं सा दृढा स्मृतिपरम्परा ॥

पञ्चरात्रस्य निर्माता केशवो भगवानिति ।
तत्प्रणीतत्वविश्वासाद् गजानश्वान् धनं बहु ॥
दक्षिणां विविधां दत्त्वा प्रतिष्ठादीनि कुर्वते ।
'साङ्ख्यस्य कपिलो वक्ता पञ्चरात्रस्य केशवः' ॥
इति स्कन्दपुराणेऽपि पठ्यते भारते तथा ।
'पञ्चरात्रस्य कृत्स्नस्य वक्ता नारायणः स्वयम् ।'
'इदं महोपनिषदं चतुर्वेदसमन्वितम् ।
साङ्ख्ययोगकृतान्तेन पञ्चरात्रानुशब्दितम् ॥
नारायणमुखोद्गीतं नारदोऽश्रावयन्मुनीन् ।
ब्रह्मणस्सदने तात ! यथादृष्टं यथाश्रुतम् ॥'
एवमादिपुराणोक्तिः सहस्रैर्न्यायबृंहितैः ।
वासुदेवप्रणीतत्वं पञ्चरात्रस्य निर्व्यथम् ॥
किन्तु वेदस्य नित्यत्वे विवदन्ते विपश्चितः ।
तेन निर्दोषविज्ञानकारणत्वाद् द्वयोरपि ॥
निर्विशङ्कं प्रमाणत्वं भगवच्छास्त्रवेदयोः ।
ततश्च तुल्यशिष्टत्वाद् विकल्पेन प्रमाणता ॥
इति मत्वैतदाचष्ट सूत्रकारो महामनाः ।
विज्ञानादिभावे वा तदप्रतिषेध इति ॥

११५. ननु च भगवतस्सर्वज्ञत्वेनासंभाव्यमानायामपि भ्रान्तौ सर्वशक्तित्वेन विप्रलब्धमपि भवतीति किमिदमपि शास्त्रं व्यामोहयितुमभिहितम् उत वस्तुतो†ऽवहितबुद्ध्या निबद्धमित्यन्यतरपक्षावलम्बनविक्लवमनसां क इव निर्णयोपायः, प्रत्युत वेदविरोधादेव विप्लवनफलमित्यध्यवस्याम इति ।

तत्रोच्यते विप्रतिषेधात् इति, समस्तश्रुतीतिहासपुराणलोकविप्रतिषेधाद् । यदि विना कारणेन भगवतः सर्वशक्तित्वमात्राद् विप्लावनशङ्का

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† विहितं बुध्वा. पा० श्रुत्यन्तरविहितत्वं ज्ञात्वेत्यर्थः । अथेति न स्यात् ।

हन्त्येवं सर्वशक्तित्वान्नरके धार्मिकानपि ।
पातयेदिति सन्देहान्निश्चेष्टं जगदापतेत् ॥

अपि चायं सर्वशक्तित्वेन विप्रलिप्समानः किमतीन्द्रियासत्यार्थान् वेदानादौ निर्माय स्वनिर्माणस्मरणशक्तिमपि हिरण्यगर्भादेरपहृत्य तत्प्रभृति स्वाध्यायपरम्परामिमां प्रवर्तितवान्न वेति संशयानाः कथं विश्वसिमः । अथास्य सत्यपि सर्वशक्तित्वे यावच्छक्ति करणे प्रमाणाभावात् अनवस्थानाद् भगवतश्च स्वभावावाप्तकामतया विप्रलम्भप्रयोजनविरहाद् वैषम्यनैर्घृण्यादिदोषैर्मात्रयापि चासंस्पृष्टत्वात् सर्वप्राणिजातस्य स्वभावसौहृदेन व्यवस्थानाद् विप्रलब्धुं प्रणीतत्वे च विदुषामद्य यावत् स्वाध्यायाध्ययन-तदर्थानुष्ठानवतां तत्कर्तृदोषविस्मरणानुपपत्तेस्तादृशाशङ्का नास्तीति चेत्तदेतत्सर्वमन्यत्रापि समानम् ।

तथा हि ।

किमस्यावाप्तकामस्य सर्वज्ञस्य दयानिधेः ।
अल्पसत्त्वैरलब्धार्थैर्विप्रलब्धैः प्रयोजनम् ॥
विप्रलब्धुं कृतं तन्त्रं कथं वा परमर्षयः ।
इतस्ततः प्रशंसन्ति तुल्यवच्छ्रुतिमूर्द्धभिः ॥
तथा हि वेदैस्सह निर्विशेषं वाराह-रामायण-भारतादौ ।
अमुष्य तन्त्रस्य रहस्यभावं वदन्ति† सन्तस्तमिमं वदामः ॥
वेदेन पञ्चरात्रेण भक्त्या यज्ञेन च द्विज ।
प्राप्योऽहं नान्यथा प्राप्यो वर्षलक्षशतैरपि ॥
पञ्चरात्रं सहस्राणां यदि कश्चिद् ग्रहीष्यति ।
कर्मक्षये च मद्भक्तो यदि कश्चिद्भविष्यति ॥
तस्य वेदाः पञ्चरात्रं नित्यं हृदि व‡सिष्यति ।
यदिदं पञ्चरात्रं मे शास्त्रं परमदुर्लभम् ॥
तद् भवान् वेत्स्यते सर्वं मत्प्रसादादसंशयम् ।
पुराणैश्चैव वेदैश्च पञ्चरात्रैस्तथैव च ॥

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† पठन्तीति द्रविडपाठः ।   ‡ वत्स्यतीति आप्ते वसिष्यतीत्यार्षम् ।

ध्यायन्ति योगिनो नित्यं क्रतुभिश्च यजन्ति तम् ।
एवमेकं साङ्ख्ययोगं वेदारण्यकमेव च ।
परस्पराङ्गान्येतानि पञ्चरात्रञ्च सत्तम ॥
वेदेन पञ्चरात्रेण यः पश्यति स पश्यति ।
इदम्महोपनिषदं चतुर्वेदसमन्वितम् ॥
वचसामेवमादीनामानन्त्यादुपरम्यते ।
इत्थंभूतस्य तन्त्रस्य विप्लवं यदि शङ्कसे ॥
सर्वत्र स्यादनाश्वास इत्येतदुपदिश्यते ।
विप्रतिषेधात् । इति,

एवञ्च ।

विरोधेऽपि विकल्पः स्याद् भगवच्छास्त्रवेदयोः ।
विरोध एव नास्तीति प्रागेव प्रत्यपादयम् ॥

११६. नन्वत्रभवतां भाष्य†कारा‍णां विरुद्धांशाप्रामाण्याभिधानं, कथमिव ? यद्यपि विरोधः कृत्वाचिन्तया परिहृतस्तदपि गम्भीरन्याय-सागरमवगाढुमपरिवृढानां कोमलमनसां वेदानादरो माभूदित्येवम्परम्, यथैव हि भगवतो जैमिनेः कर्मफलोपन्यासः कर्मश्रद्धासंवर्द्धनायेति ।

११७. वेदबाह्यगृहीतत्त्वादप्रामाण्यमवादि यत् ।
एतद्बाह्यगृहीतत्वाद् वेदानां वा कुतो न तत् ॥

अपि च ।

किं चेदं वेदबाह्यत्वं का वा स्यात्तद्गृहीतता ।
किमङ्ग वेदादन्यत्वं वेदबाह्यत्वमुच्यते ॥
तन्निषिद्धार्थकारित्वमाहो तद्द्वेषशीलता ।

† भाष्यकारपदेनेह द्रमिडाचार्यो, भिधित्सितः । श्रीभाष्यकाराः श्री६रामानुजाचार्यास्तु श्री६यामुनमुनीनां शिष्यशिष्या इति श्रीभाष्यस्य श्री६यामुनमुन्युत्तरकालप्रणीतत्वेन तदिह भाष्यं न विवक्षितुं शक्यम् ।

तथा ।

गृहीतत्वमधीतत्वं ज्ञातत्वं वा विचार्यताम् ।
क्रियमाणार्थता वा स्याद्धेतुः सर्वत्र दुष्यति ॥

तत्र तावद् ।

यदि वेदाद्विभिन्नत्वं बाह्यत्वं साप्यधीतता ।
वेदादन्यैस्त्रिभिर्वर्णैरधीतं वैदिकं वचः ।
प्रमाणमित्यनैकान्त्यं हेतोस्तत्र प्रसज्यते ॥

ज्ञातत्वेऽपि गृहीतत्वे दोषादस्मान्न मुच्यसे ।
पूर्वोक्तं वेदबाह्यत्वं क्रियमाणार्थता यदि ॥

गृहीततापि वेदैः स्यात्तथैव व्यभिचारिता ।
प्रतिषिद्धार्थकर्तृत्वे वेदबाह्यत्वलक्षणे ॥

व्यभिचारस्त्रयीवाक्यैः प्रायश्चित्तविधायकैः ।

प्रायश्चित्तविधायकानि वाक्यानि कूष्माण्डैर्जुहुयात् इत्यादीनि प्रतिषिद्धकारिभिरधीतगृहीतानुष्ठीयमानार्थान्येव प्रमाणानीति तादृशवेदबाह्यगृहीतत्वमनैकान्तिकम् ।

नापि वेदद्वेषिजनपरिगृहीतत्वादप्रामाण्यं पञ्चरात्रतन्त्राणां, हेतोरसिद्धत्वात्, अपि च न वेदद्वेषिजनपरिग्रहः प्रामाण्यं प्रतिहन्ति, यदि हि प्रतिहन्यान्निरर्गलस्तर्हि नास्तिकानां पन्थाः, ते हि वेदप्रामाण्यप्रोत्सादनाय प्रयस्यन्तः

कथञ्चिद्वेदवाक्यानि गृहीत्वा विप्रलम्भनात् ।
अनायासेन मिथ्यार्थान् वेदान् कुर्युर्दिगम्बराः ॥

११८. अथ तत्रातधिकारिणामध्येतॄणामेव न चाभिव्याहरेद् ब्रह्म स्वधानिनयादृते इत्यादिवचनपर्यालोचनया दोषो न निर्दोषवेदवाक्यानामिति चेत्—तत्प्रस्तुततन्त्रेष्वप्यनधिकारिश्रोतृजनानामेव दोषः, न निर्दोषतन्त्राणामिति सर्वं समानमन्यत्राभिनिवेशात् । अथ मतं वेदबाह्यत्वं नाम वैदिककर्मानधिकारित्वं तदनधिकारिभिर्वेदबाह्यैर्गृहीतत्वात्

चैत्यवन्दनवाक्यवत् अप्रमाणमिति तत्रापि किमखिलवैदिककर्मानधिकारिजनपरिगृहीतत्वं हेतुः, उत कतिपयवैदिककर्मानधिकारिगृहीतत्वमिति विविच्य व्याचष्टाम्।

न तावदग्रिमः कल्पः कल्पते हेत्वसिद्धितः।
न हि सोऽस्ति मनुष्येषु यः श्रौते क्वापि कर्मणि॥
नाधिकुर्यादहिंसादौ नृमात्रस्याधिकारतः।

अन्यथा हि ब्राह्मणहनन—तद्धनापहरण—वर्णाङ्गनासंगमवेदाध्ययनादि कुर्वाणाश्चण्डालादयो न दुष्येयुः। तदनधिकारित्वाद्, यस्य हि यन्न कर्तव्यं तस्य हि तत्करणं प्रत्यवायाय, अतः सर्वेषामीदृशवैदिककर्मणि अधिकारो विद्यत एवेत्यसिद्धो हेतुः, साधनविकलश्च दृष्टान्तः।

नापि कतिपयवैदिककर्मानधिकारिभिर्गृहीतत्वादप्रामाण्यम्। समस्तवेदवाक्यानामप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गात्। अस्ति हि सर्वेषां कतिपयवैदिककर्मानधिकारः, ब्राह्मणस्यैव राजसूये, राजन्यस्यैव सोमपाने, अतो व्यवस्थितवर्णाधिकारिगृहीतवेदवचनैरनैकान्तिको हेतुः, अप्रयोजकश्च।

चैत्यवन्दनतः स्वर्गो भवतीतीदृशी मतिः।
न तत्परिग्रहान्मिथ्या किन्तु कारणदोषतः॥

११९. उक्तश्च वैदिकसमस्तास्तिकप्रवरभृगु-भरद्वाज-द्वैपायनप्रभृतिमहर्षिजनपरिग्रहः, अद्यत्वेऽपि हि पञ्चरात्रतन्त्रविहितमार्गेण प्रासादकरण-प्रतिमाप्रतिष्ठापन-प्रणाम-प्रदक्षिणोत्सवादीनि प्रत्यक्षश्रुतिविहिताग्निहोत्रादिवत् श्रेयस्करतरबुद्ध्याऽनुतिष्ठतः शिष्टान् पश्यामः, न चैतदाचरणं निर्म्मूलमिति युक्तं सन्ध्यावन्दनाष्टकाचरणादेरपि निर्मूलत्वप्रसङ्गाद्, उक्तं च शिष्टाचारस्य प्रामाण्यम् अपि वा कारणाग्रहणे *प्रयुक्तानि प्रतीयेरन्निति।*

१२०. अथ भागवतजनपरिगृहीतत्वादिति हेतुः, हन्त तर्हि तत्परिगृहीतत्वाद् वाजसनेयकैकायनशाखावचसां प्रत्यक्षादीनां चाप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गः।

अथ तैरेव परिगृहीतत्वादिति हेतुः तदसाधारणानैकान्तिकम्, असिद्धश्च।

किमिति वा तत्परिग्रहादप्रामाण्यम् अत्रैवर्णिकत्वादिति चेत् किं भोः त्रैवर्णिकेतरसवर्णरथकारनिषादादिपरिगृहीतानुष्ठीयमानार्थानामाथर्वणवचसां रथकार आदधीत एतया निषादस्थपतिं याजयेत् इत्यादिवचसां प्रामाण्यं नास्ति।

अस्तुवाऽत्रैवर्णिकपरिग्रहोऽप्रामाण्यहेतुः, एतेषां तु भगवच्छास्त्रानुगामिनां भागवतानामुत्कृष्टब्राह्मण्यं सर्वप्रमाणसमवगतमिति तत्परिग्रहः प्रामाण्यमेव द्रढयति। आह केन पुनः प्रमाणेनैषां ब्राह्मण्यमवगतं, केन वाऽन्येषाम्।

१२१. ननु चक्षुर्विस्फारणसमनन्तरं शिखा-यज्ञोपवीत-पालाशदण्ड-मौञ्जीयुजो द्विजकुमारकान् पश्यन्तो ब्राह्मणा इत्यवगच्छन्ति इह वा किमहरहरधीयमानवाजसनेयकैकायनशाखान् विलसदुपवीतोत्तरीयशिखाशालिनोऽध्यापयतो याजयतः प्रतिगृह्णतो विदुषः पश्यन्तो ब्राह्मणा इति नावयन्ति।

अथ याजन-प्रवचन-पालाशदण्डादीनां दुष्टशूद्रादिषु व्यभिचारसंभवाद् ब्राह्मण्यसिद्धवत्कारणेन प्रवृत्तेश्च न तेभ्यो ब्राह्मण्यनिर्णयः, तद्भागवतेतरविप्राणामपि समानम्।

अथ सत्यपि तेषां क्वचिद्व्यभिचारे तत्सामान्यादन्यत्र व्यभिचारशङ्कायां शुक्तौ रजतधियो व्यभिचारात् रजते रजतधियां व्यभिचारशङ्कावत् प्रत्यक्षविरोधात् अनवस्थानाच्च अनुपलभ्यमानव्यभिचारोदाहरणेषु तथात्वनिश्चयस्तदन्यत्रापि समानम्।

१२२. अथ मतम् अन्येषां ब्राह्मण्यं तदसाधारणगोत्रस्मरणादिति, तद् भागवतानामपि समानम्, स्मरन्ति हि भागवताः। वयं भारद्वाजाः वयं काश्यपाः वयं गौतमाः वयमौपगवा इति।

न चेदं गोत्रस्मरणं निर्मूलं साम*यिकं वा सर्वगोत्रस्मरणानां तथाभावप्रसङ्गात् ।

संभाव्यमानदोषत्वाद् वंशानां यदि संशयः ।
तद्ब्राह्मण्ये ततो लोकं सर्वं व्याकुलयेदयम् ॥

तथा हि ।

जननीजारसन्देहजातचण्डालसंशयः ।
निर्विशङ्कः कथं वेदमधीषे साधुसत्तम ? ॥

तेन भागवतानामविच्छिन्नपरम्पराप्राप्तविचित्रगोत्रस्मरणपर्यवस्थापितं ब्राह्मण्यमनपोदितमास्ते इति न भागवतानामन्येषाञ्च ब्राह्मण्ये कश्चिद्विशेषः ।

१२३. यदि परं ते परमपुरुषमेवाश्रिता एकान्तिनः, अन्ये क्षुद्रदैवतिका†स्साधारणा इति । किं पुनरेतेषां ब्राह्मण्ये प्रमाणमभिहितम्? यदेवान्येषाम् । केन वा तेषां ब्राह्मण्यमवगतम्? किञ्च एतेन, यदि च कौतूहलम्,

श्रूयतामुभयत्रापि ब्राह्मण्यस्यावधारकम् ।
प्रत्यक्षं वाऽनुमानं वा यद्वाऽर्थापत्तिरेव वा ॥

१२४. ननु कथं प्रत्यक्षं ब्राह्मण्यमवगमयति, न हि प्रथमाक्षसन्निपातसमनन्तरमदृष्टपूर्वविप्रक्षत्रसमानवयोवेषपिण्डद्वयसन्निधावजगजमहिषादिविशेषवदयं ब्राह्मणः अयं क्षत्रिय इति विभागेन प्रतिपद्यामहे ।

न च तत्पित्रादिब्राह्मण्यस्मरणसापेक्षमक्षमेव सन्निहितव्यक्तिवर्ति ब्राह्मण्यमवगमयतीति साम्प्रतं, तत्स्मरणस्यैव पूर्वानुभवविरहेण वन्ध्यासुतस्मरणवदनुपपत्तेः ।

न चानुमानात्; तत्प्रतिबद्धलिङ्गादर्शनात् ।

* आधुनिकम् ।

† तांस्तु भगवानेव सेऽपि मामेव कौन्तेय यजन्त्यविधिपूर्वकमिति विनिनिन्द ।

‡ न केवलं ममैव ब्राह्मण्यनिरूपणभार आवयोरुभयोरेव तस्य निरूपणीयत्वेन समत्वादिति भावः ।

भस्मप्रच्छादितो वह्निः स्पर्शनेनोपलभ्यते ।
अश्वत्थादौ च दूरस्थे निश्चयो जायते ध्वनेः ॥
संस्थानेन घटत्वादि ब्राह्मणत्वादि योनितः ।
क्वचिदाचारतश्चापि सम्यग्राज्ञानुपालितात् ॥ इति ।
यत्समानवयोवेषपिण्डद्वयविलोकने ।
तत्क्षणाद्क्षतो भेदो नावभातीति भाषितम् ॥
नैतावता विभागस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वं निवर्तते ।
सादृश्यदोषात्तत्र स्याद् विभागस्यानवग्रहः ॥
समानरूपसंस्थानशुक्तिकाकलधौतयोः ।
विवेकः सहसा नाभादिति कालान्तरेऽपि किम् ॥
प्रत्यक्षो न भवेदेवं विप्रक्षत्रविशां भिदा ।

यद्वा संततिविशेषप्रभवत्वमेव ब्राह्मण्यं, तच्चान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां यथालोकं कार्यान्तरवदवगन्तव्यमेव । के पुनः सन्ततिविशेषाः ? येषु ब्राह्मणशब्दं प्रयुञ्जते वृद्धाः । केषु वा प्रयुञ्जते ?

उक्तं गोत्रार्षेयादिस्मृतिमत्स्वित्यनेकशः ।
आस्तामप्रस्तुता चिन्ता प्राची प्रस्तूयते कथा ॥
सिद्धं गोत्रादियुक्तत्वाद् विप्रा भागवता इति ।

१२६. वैश्यव्रात्यान्वये जन्म यदेषामुपवर्णितम् ॥
पञ्चमस्सात्वतो नाम विष्णोरायतनानि सः ।
पूजयेदाज्ञया राज्ञः स तु भागवतः स्मृतः ॥
वैश्यात्तु जायते व्रात्यादिति वाक्यद्वयेक्षणात् ।
अत्र ब्रूमः किमेताभ्यां वचनाभ्यां प्रतीयते ॥
अभिधानान्वयो वा स्यान्नियमो वाऽभिधीयताम् ।

न तावत् सात्वत-भागवत-शब्दौ वैश्यव्रात्याभिधायकावेवेति नियन्तुं शक्यौ अप्रतीतेः । अतिप्रसङ्गाच्च । न हि पञ्चमः सात्वत इत्यत्र

सात्वत-भागवत-शब्दयोर्जात्यन्तराभिधानप्रतिषेधः प्रतीयते श्रुतहान्य-श्रुतकल्पनाप्रसङ्गात्। इह हि मात्यवैश्यान्वयजन्मा यः पञ्चमः सात्वत इति तस्य सात्वतसंज्ञान्वयोऽवगम्यते पञ्चमशब्दस्य प्रथमनिर्दिष्ट-त्वेनोद्देशाकत्वात्।

न च पञ्चमस्य सात्वतत्वे सात्वतेनापि वैश्यमात्यपञ्चमेन भवितव्यं, न हि उद्दिश्यमानस्याग्निमत्त्वे उपादीयमानस्याग्नेर्धूमवत्त्वेन भवितव्यं अतो नेदृशस्मृतिपर्यालोचनया सात्वत-भागवत-शब्दितानां मात्यत्वनिश्चयः।

१२७. यदि पुनरनयोर्जात्यन्तरेऽपि प्रयोगो दृष्ट इति एतावता तच्छब्दाभिधेयतया भगवच्छास्त्रानुगामिनामपि विप्राणां तज्जातीयत्व-निश्चयः, ततस्तत्रैव सहपठिताचार्यशब्दस्यापि निकृष्टमात्यापत्ये प्रयोग-दर्शनात् साङ्गरहस्यवेददातुर्द्विजवरस्यापि मात्यत्वं स्यात्।

अथ तस्य मात्यवाचकाचार्य-शब्दाभिधेयत्वेऽपि प्रमाणान्तरेणा-विप्लुतब्राह्मण्यनिश्चयात् आचार्य-शब्दस्य आचिनोत्यस्य बुद्धिम् इत्यादि-गुणयोगेनापि वृत्तिसंभवाच्च मात्यत्वशङ्का, तदत्रापि जात्यन्तरवाचक-सात्वत-भागवत-शब्दाभिधेयत्वेऽपि भगवच्छास्त्रानुगामिनाममीषामति-स्पष्टविशिष्टगोत्रार्षेयादिस्मरणदृढावगतत्वाद् ब्राह्मण्यस्य सात्वत–भागवत–शब्दयोश्च सत्त्ववति भगवति भक्तियोगेनैव वृत्तिसम्भवान्न मात्यत्वशङ्कावतारः, एतदुक्तं भवति।

न चैकशब्दवाच्यत्वादेकजातीयता भवेत्।
मा भूदाचार्यशब्दत्वाद् ब्राह्मणस्य निकृष्टता॥
तथा च हरि-शब्दस्य दृष्टा मण्डूकवाचिता।
इति तच्छब्दवाच्यत्वात् सिंहो मण्डूक एव किम्॥
तथा गो-शब्दवाच्यत्वाच्छब्दश्चापि विषाणवान्।

† उद्देश्यसमर्पकत्वादित्यर्थः।

ततश्च।

सुधन्वाचार्य इत्याद्या यथाऽर्थान्तरवाचकाः।
व्रात्यान्वये प्रयुज्यन्ते तथैवैतौ भविष्यतः॥

१२८. यदुक्तं योगरूढिशक्तिद्वयोपनिपाते सात्वत-भागवत-शब्दयो रूढिशक्तिरेवाश्रयितुमुचितेति।

तदयुक्तं क्लृप्तावयवशक्त्यैवाभिधानोपपत्तौ सत्यामक्लृप्ताखण्डशक्ति-कल्पनाऽनुपपत्तेः।

योऽपि हि सात्वत–भागवत–शब्दयोर्वैश्यव्रात्यान्वयजन्मनि रूढि-शक्तिमभ्युपगच्छति, अभ्युपगच्छत्येव असावन्यत्र सत्त्ववद्भगव-च्छब्दयोः प्रकृतिभूतयोस्तदुत्पन्नस्य च तद्धितप्रत्ययस्यार्थान्तराभिधान-सामर्थ्यं, सात्त्वतं विधिमास्थाय, जन्मान्तरकृतैः पुण्यैर्नरो भागवतो भवेदित्यादौ, तदिहापि तद्योगेनैव व्रात्यान्वयजन्मनि वृत्तिसम्भवेन शक्त्यन्तरकल्पनायां प्रमाणं क्रमते, संभवति चैतेषामपि साक्षाद्भगवदा-राधनाभावेऽपि वासुदेवस्यायतनशोधन–बलिनिर्हरण–प्रतिमासंरक्षणा-दिक्रियायोगेनैव सात्वत–भागवत–शब्दाभिधेयत्वं, तस्येदम् इति संबन्धमात्रेऽपि चाण्प्रत्ययस्मरणात्, उक्तश्च वैश्यव्रात्यान्वयजन्मनोऽपि भगवदायतनादिशोधनादिक्रियायोगः, "सात्वतानाञ्च देवायतनशोधनं नैवेद्यभोजनं प्रतिमासंरक्षणम्" इति, तथा विष्णोरायतनानि संपूजयेदिति।

१२९. एतेन इदमप्यपास्तं यदेषामपि वृत्तिसाम्याद् व्रात्यत्वमिति। अन्यदेव हि देवायतनशोधनबलिनिर्हरणप्रतिमासंरक्षणादिकम्, अन्ये चाभिगमनोपादानेज्या-स्वाध्याययोगा भागवतैरहरहरनुष्ठीयमानाः क्रिया-कलापा इति; ज्योतिष्टोमादाविव। यथैव ज्योतिष्टोमे ग्रहचमसजुह्वादि-पात्रकरणतक्षणादिषु तक्ष्णो व्यापारः, ऋत्विजस्तु विशिष्टमन्त्रोच्चारण-देवताभिध्यानाऽभिष्टवप्रभृतिषु न च तावता तेषां तक्ष्णाऽऽैकजातित्व-संशयः, एवमिहापि भगवच्छास्त्रसिद्धपाञ्चकालिकानुष्ठातॄणामन्येषा-मायतनशोधनादि कुर्वतां प्रासादपालकपरनाम्नामन्त्यानां चेति।

१२०. यत्पुनरुक्तं सात्वत-भागवत-शब्दयोर्यौगिकत्वे रथकार आदधीत इत्यत्रापि रथकार-शब्दस्य रथकरणयोगेन त्रैवर्णिकवृत्तिप्रसङ्ग इति तदनुपपन्नम्। युक्तं हि तत्राधानोत्पत्तिवाक्यावगतवसन्तादिकालबाधप्रसङ्गात्, सौधन्वना ऋभवः सूरचक्षस इति मन्त्रवर्णावगतजात्यन्तरवृत्तिबाधप्रसङ्गाच्च। माहिष्येण करिण्यां तु रथकारः प्रजायते। इति स्मृत्यवगतजात्यन्तरत्वेऽपि क्षत्रियवैश्यानुलोमोत्पन्नो रथकारस्तस्येज्याधानोपनयनक्रियाश्चाप्रतिषिद्धा इति शङ्खवचनाद् विद्यासाध्येऽपि कर्मणि अधिकाराविरोधात्, त्रैवर्णिकानाञ्च शिल्पोपजीवित्वस्य प्रतिषिद्धत्वेन तेषु रथकारशब्दस्यानुचितत्वाच्च जात्यन्तरवाचित्वाध्यवसानं, न चेह तथा विरोधोऽस्ति।

अपि च।

> कृत्स्नावयवशक्त्यैव लब्धे स्वार्थावबोधने।
> नष्टावयवमानत्वं प्रत्याचष्ट च सूत्रकृत्॥

प्रोक्षणीष्वर्थसंयोगात् इति।

> ततश्च सत्त्वान् भगवान् भज्यते यैः परः पुमान्।
> ते सात्वता भागवता इत्युच्यन्ते द्विजोत्तमाः॥

स्मृत्यन्तराणि च भागवतानामुत्कृष्टब्राह्मण्यप्रतिपादकानीति परस्तात् प्रदर्शयिष्यन्ते।

१२१. यत् पुनरुक्तं समाने ब्राह्मण्ये किमिति सात्वत–भागवतैकान्तिक–शब्दैरेवैतेषां नियमेन व्यपदेश इति तत्परिव्राजकनिगदादिवदित्यदोषः।

यथैव हि समाने ब्राह्मण्ये यजुष्ट्वे च केचिदेव ब्राह्मणाः कानिचिदेव यजूंषि परिव्राजकनिगदशब्दाभ्यामभिधीयन्ते, तिष्ठन्तु ब्राह्मणाः परिव्राजका आनीयन्तां, यजूंषि वर्तन्ते न निगदाः, निगदा वर्तन्ते न यजूंषि इति च तथेहापि भविष्यति, "निगदाश्चतुर्थं मन्त्रजातम्" "यजूंषि वा तद्रूपत्वात्" इति न्यायाभिधानात्।

† निरवयव नामशब्दत्वं स्फुटं

१३२. वृत्त्यर्थं देवतापूजानैवेद्यप्राशनादिभिः ।
दौर्ब्राह्मण्यं यदप्युक्तं तत्र प्रतिविधीयते ॥
न हि भागवतैस्सर्वैर्वृत्तयेऽभ्यर्चितो हरिः ।
दृष्टा हि बहवस्स्वार्थं पूजयन्तोऽपि सात्वताः ॥
केचिद्यदि परं सन्तः सात्त्वता वृत्तिकर्शिताः ।
याजयन्ति महाभागैर्वैष्णवैर्वृत्तिकारणात् ॥
न तावतेषां ब्राह्मण्यं शक्यं नास्तीति भाषितुम् ।
न खल्वाध्वर्यवं कुर्वन् ज्योतिष्टोमे पतिष्यति ॥
यदि न प्रतिगृह्णीयुः पूजैव विफला भवेत् ।
पूजासाद्गुण्यसिद्ध्यर्थमतस्ते प्रतिगृह्णते ॥
अर्चनान्ते हिरण्यञ्च तस्मै देयं स्वशक्तितः ।
अन्यथा पूजकस्यैव तत्र पूजाफलं भवेत् ॥
हन्त्यल्पदक्षिणो यज्ञ इत्यादिस्मृतिदर्शनात् ।
ऋत्विजा द्रव्यलुब्धेन स्वयं याञ्चयापुरस्सरम् ॥
यदार्त्विज्यं कृतं कर्म तदेव हि निषिध्यते ।

तद्यथा यदाशंसमानमार्त्विज्यं कारयन्ति उत वा मे दद्यात् उत वा मा वृणीत इति तद्ध तत्पराग्वेव यथा जग्धं न हैवतद्यज्यमानं भुनक्ति ।
इति, श्रद्धापूतदक्षिणादानं तूभयोरपि श्रेयस्करमेव ।
योऽर्चितं प्रतिगृह्णाति दद्यादर्चितमेव च ॥
तावुभौ गच्छतः स्वर्गमित्यादिस्मृतिदर्शनात् ।

१३३. यदपि वृत्त्यर्थं देवपूजनाद् देवकोशोपजीवित्वाच्च देवलकत्व-प्राप्तिरिति. तदपि देवतान्तरवृत्त्यर्थाराधन-तत्कोशोपजीवनविषयमिति द्रष्टव्यम् ।

तथा च भगवान् व्यासः ।

भवेद्देवलको यो वै रुद्रकाल्युपजीवकः । इति,

अपि भवति शाण्डिल्यवचनम् ।

वृत्त्यर्थं याजिनस्सर्वे दीक्षाहीनाश्च केवलम् ।
कर्मदेवलका एते स्मृता ह्यत्र पुरा मुने ॥
तांश्च संवत्सरादूर्ध्वं न स्पृशेन्न च संविशेत् ।

तथा ।

कल्पदेवलकाः केचित् कर्मदेवलका अपि ।
अथ त्रिवर्षादूर्ध्वमयोग्या देवकर्मणि ॥
ये कल्पोक्तं प्रकुर्वन्ति दीक्षाहीना द्विजातयः ।
वृत्त्यर्थं वा यशोऽर्थं वा कल्पदेवलकास्तु ते ॥
वृत्तिं कृत्वा तु विप्रेण दीक्षितेन विधानतः ।
अन्येन पूजयेद्देवमशक्तः स्वयमर्चने ॥
यजनं मुख्यमेवैतद् गौणमेवान्यथा भवेत् ।
अन्यथा इति-अदीक्षितेनेत्यर्थः, तदेव स्पष्टयति
अदीक्षितेन विप्रेण येनकेन विधानतः ।
वृत्त्यर्थं यत्कृतं कर्म तज्जघन्यमुदाहृतम् ॥

इत्यादिस्मृतिशतपर्यालोचनात् पञ्चरात्रसिद्धदीक्षासंस्कारविरहितानां ब्राह्मणानां देवकोशोपजीवनवृत्त्यर्थपूजनादिकमुपब्राह्मणत्वदेवलकत्वावहमिति निश्चीयते ।

१२४. यत्पुनः शिष्टविगर्हितनिर्माल्यनिवेद्योपयोगाद् भागवतानामशिष्टत्वमिति ।

तत्र ब्रूमः किमिदं निर्माल्यं निवेद्यं चाभिप्रेतं श्रोत्रियस्य ।

पुष्पौदनादिमात्रं चेत् सर्वलोकाविरुद्धता ।
पुष्पौदनपरित्यागं न हि लोकोऽनुमन्यते ॥
विशिष्टप्रतिषेधोऽपि न युक्तस्तदसिद्धितः ।

न ह्यनिरूपितविशेषणा विशिष्टबुद्धिराविरस्ति, न चेह विशेषणं निरूपयितुं शक्यते ।

किमिति न शक्यते, यावता देवोद्देशेन परित्यागो विशेषणम् । किमिदानीं पञ्चरात्रशास्त्रमपि प्रमाणमङ्गीकृतं भवता येन पञ्चरात्रतन्त्रविहितमन्त्रप्रतिष्ठापितप्रतिमासु देवतामभ्युपेत्य तदुद्देशेन त्यागो

विशेषणमभिलष्यते, कथं हि तत्प्रामाण्यानभ्युपगमे तत्प्रतिपाद्यमानाया देवतात्वं, कथन्तराञ्च तदुद्देशेन त्यक्तस्य निर्माल्यनिवेद्यभावः, न हि काचिज्जात्या देवता नामास्ति, यैव हि हविःप्रतियोगितया प्रमाणभूताच्छब्दादवगम्यते सा तत्र देवता इति हि वः सिद्धान्तः।

अथ पञ्चरात्रिकैर्देवतोद्देशेन परित्यक्तत्वाभ्युपगमान्निर्माल्यनिवेद्यभावः, हन्त तर्हि, तैरेव परमपावनतयाऽपि निर्माल्यनिवेद्योपयोगस्याङ्गीकृतत्वात् तद्वदेव पावनत्वमङ्गीक्रियताम्।

अथापावनमेव तैः पावनबुद्ध्या परिगृहीतमिति न तत्प्राशस्त्यमङ्गीक्रियते, हन्त तर्ह्यदेवतैव देवताबुद्ध्यारोपेण तैः परिगृहीतेति न तदुद्देशेन त्यक्तस्य निर्माल्यनिवेद्यभावोऽङ्गीक्रियताम्।

एतदुक्तं भवति पुष्पौदनादिस्वरूपमात्रत्यागस्यानिष्टत्वात् स्वदर्शनानुसारेण च विशेषणासंभवात् परदर्शनानुसारेण विशेषणनिरूपणे तस्यैव परमपावनत्वापातात् तत्र प्रामाण्यमभ्युपगच्छद्भिरन्यैश्च निर्माल्यनिवेद्योपयोगोऽवश्याङ्गीकरणीय इति।

१३५. आह कथं पुनस्तन्त्रप्रामाण्यमङ्गीकुर्वता निर्माल्यं निवेद्यञ्च न परिहरणीयम्

निषिध्यते हि तन्त्रेषु निर्माल्यप्राशनादिकम्।
यथा सनत्कुमारीयसंहितायामुदीरितम्॥
निवेदितं तु यद्द्रव्यं पुष्पं फलमथापि वा।
तन्निर्माल्यमिति प्रोक्तं तत्प्रयत्नेन वर्जयेत्॥

तथा प्रदेशान्तरे।

निर्माल्यं भक्षयित्वैवमुच्छिष्टमगुरोरपि।
मासं पयोव्रतो भूत्वा जपन्नष्टाक्षरं सदा॥
ब्रह्मकूर्चं ततः पीत्वा पूतो भवति मानवः। इति,

तथेन्द्ररात्रे।

न चोपजीवेद्देवेशं न निर्माल्यानि भक्षयेत्।

तथा ।

न चोपयो†गयोग्यानि निर्माल्यानि कदाचन ।

इति, तथा संहितान्तरे ।

निर्माल्यानि न चाश्नीयान्न जिघ्रेन्न च लङ्घयेत् ।

इति, तदेवमनेकसंहितासमधिगतनिषेधस्य निर्माल्योपभोगस्य कथमिव पावनत्वाङ्गीकारः, ।

अत्राह देवमुद्दिश्य त्यक्तस्यापि च वस्तुनः ।
नाडिकादशकादर्वागुपयोगो न निन्द्यते ॥
तथैन्द्रराञ्च एव ।
दशनाड्यधिकं पूरं स्थापयेत्तु विचक्षणः ।
कालयोगस्समुद्दिष्टो रात्रावहनि चैव हि ॥
कालयोगातिरिक्तं तु निर्माल्यं परिचक्षते ।
ततस्तदप्सु चैवाग्नौ क्षिपेद्भूमौ खनेत्तु वा ॥ इति ॥
उच्यते नात्र निर्माल्यप्राशनादि प्रशस्यते ।
किन्तु पूरणपूजायां विनियुक्तस्य वस्तुनः ॥
नाडिकादशके पूर्णे पश्चात्त्यागो विधीयते ।

सामान्येन निवेदितस्य पुष्पौदनादेः कृतकार्यतया निर्माल्यत्वेनापनये प्राप्ते नाडिकादशकपूरणं पूजाङ्गतया स्थापनं विधीयते दशनाड्यधिकं पूरं स्थापयेदिति ।

ततश्च तन्त्रसिद्धान्तपर्यालोचनयापि वः ।
हरिद्राचूर्ण—नैवेद्य—पादाम्बुस्पर्शनादिकम् ॥
न सिध्येत् तन्त्रसिद्धान्तः क नु यूयं क चाल्पकाः ।
अहो विद्यालवोल्लासिजिह्वाग्रस्तविचेतसः ॥
सितासितं वचो भाति सकलङ्केन्दुबिम्बवत् ।
ये हि युष्मद्विधा मूर्खास्तेषामेव निषेधगीः ॥
सेव्यमानं हि तत्सर्वं वैष्णवैरधिकारिभिः ।
अघौघध्वंसनायालं सोमपानमिवाध्वरे ॥
अन्येषां हि तदस्पृश्यं पुरोडाशः शुनामिव ।

† न चोपभोगयोग्यानीति पा. ।

तथेश्वरसंहितायाम् ।

दुर्लभो भगवद्भक्तो लोकेऽस्मिन् पुरुषः सुत ।
तत्रापि दुर्लभतरो भावो वै यस्य तत्त्वतः ।
पादोदकं प्रति शुभस्सिद्धान्ने* च निवेदिते ।
स्रगादिके चोपभुक्ते ह्युपभोगार्थमेव च ॥
अतश्च भावहीनानामभक्तानां च षण्मुख ।
निषिद्धं भगवन्मन्त्रदत्पूतमखिलं हि यत् ॥ इति,

तथा प्रदेशान्तरे ।

कुङ्कुमं चन्दनञ्चैतत् कर्पूरमनुलेपनम् ।
विष्णुदेहपरामृष्टं तद्वै पावनपावनम् ॥

इति, तथा पद्मोद्भवे ।

विष्णुदेहपरामृष्टं यश्चूर्णं शिरसा वहेत् ।
सोऽश्वमेधफलं प्राप्य विष्णुलोके महीयते ॥

तथेश्वरसंहितायाम् -

उपभुक्तस्य सर्वस्य गन्धपुष्पादिकस्य च ।
स्नानादावुपयुक्तस्य दधिक्षीरादिकस्य च ।
दूषणं न प्रयोक्तव्यं शब्दैरप्रतिपत्तिजैः† ।
निर्माल्यबुद्ध्या देवीयं पावनं दूषयन्ति ये ॥
ते यान्ति नरकं मूढास्तत्प्रभावापलापिनः ॥ इति ॥

यानि पुनर्दीक्षितमेवाधिकृत्य समयानुशासनसमये निर्माल्योपयोगनिषेधपराणि वचनानि तानि पारिषदेशोपयोगोत्तरकालाभिप्रायेण‡ द्रष्टव्यानि ।

यतो भगवदर्थेन त्यक्तं स्रक्चन्दनादिकम् ।
पश्चाद्भोग्यतां याति विष्वक्सेननिवेदनात् ॥

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* श्रीमद्भागवते यथाऽऽह भगवन्तं श्रीकृष्णमुद्धवः—त्वयोच्छिष्टभुजो दासास्तव मायां जयेमहि इति ।

† निन्दाऽसूयाद्याविष्कारकारकैरित्यर्थः ।

‡ भगवत्पारिषदानामीशो विष्वक्सेनस्तदुपयोगानन्तरकाले निषेधपराणि द्रष्टव्यानि ।

अत एव निवेद्यादि ततोऽर्थगेव सात्वतैः ।
सेव्यते तेन तत्सेपामुत्कर्षस्यैव कारणम् ॥

१३६. अपि च ।
देवतान्तरनिर्माल्यं शिष्टैरिष्टं विगर्हितम् ।
इदं तु वैदिकत्वेन सोमपानवदिष्यते ॥
ये नाम भगवच्छास्त्रप्रामाण्यं नानुजानते ।
न निरूपयितुं शक्यं तैर्निर्माल्यमितीरितम् ॥
निरूपणेऽपि भगवन्निर्माल्यमतिपावनम् ।
समस्तवैदिकाचार्यवचनैरवसीयते ॥
शब्दप्रमाणके ह्यर्थे यथाशब्दं व्यवस्थितिः ।
न चात्र शब्दो नास्तीति वक्तव्यं बधिरेतरैः ॥

यथा ब्रह्मपुराणे च पठ्यते ।
विष्णोर्नैवेद्यकं शुद्धं मुनिभिर्भोज्यमुच्यते ।
अन्यन्निवेद्यनिर्माल्यं भुक्त्वा चान्द्रायणञ्चरेत् ॥
विष्णुदेहपरामृष्टं माल्यं पापहरं शुभम् ।
यो नरः शिरसा धत्ते स याति परमां गतिम् ॥

एतेन ।
निर्माल्यञ्च निवेद्यञ्च भुक्त्वा चान्द्रायणञ्चरेत् । इति
स्मरणमपि रुद्रकाल्यादिविषयमित्यावेदितव्यम्, तथा महाभारते ।
हृदि ध्यायन् हरिं तस्मै निवेद्यान्नं समाहितः ।
मध्यमाऽनामिकाङ्गुष्ठैर्गृहीत्वान्नं मितं पुनः ॥
प्राणाय चेत्यपानाय व्यानाय च ततः परम् ।
उदानाय समानाय स्वाहेति जुहुयात् क्रमात् ॥

इति, तथा प्रदेशान्तरे ।
निवेदितन्तु यद्देवे तद्दद्याद् ब्रह्मचारिणे । इति ।

तथा महाभारते ।
पञ्चरात्रविदो मुख्यास्तस्य गेहे महात्मनः ।
प्रापणं भगवद्भुक्तं भुञ्जते चाग्रभोजनम् ॥

इति, तथा च भगवान् शौनकः नैवेद्यं स्वयमश्नीयात् इति ।

इत्यादिस्मृतिशतसिद्धशुद्धि विष्णो-
र्नैवेद्यं भवभयभेदि यो विनिन्देत्।
नास्तिक्यात् स्मृतिवचनान्युपेक्षमाण-
स्तज्जिह्वाविशसनमेव युक्तमत्र।

१३७. ननु प्राणाग्निहोत्रस्य नैवेद्यं साधनं कथम्।
निरिष्टकं न शिष्टानामिष्टं होमादिसाधनम्॥
न च द्रव्यान्तराक्षेपो होमायेत्यवकल्पते।
रागतः प्राप्तमेवान्नं यतस्तेनोपजीव्यते॥
नापि भुक्त्यन्तराक्षेपो नैवेद्यायोपपाद्यते।
"सायं प्रातर्द्विजातीनामशनं श्रुतिचोदितम्॥
नान्तरा भोजनं कुर्या"दिति तत्प्रतिषेधनात्।
नैष दोषो यतः प्राणप्रभृतिर्देवतागणः॥
गुणभूतः श्रुतौ विष्णोर्विष्णुपारिषदेशवत्।

यथैव हि भगवन्निवेदितमपि पुष्पौदनादि विष्वक्सेनाय दीयमानं नानौचित्यमावहति।

यथा वा होतुरुच्छिष्ट एव सोमरसोऽध्वरे।
अध्वर्य्वादेर्विशुद्ध्यै स्यादेवमत्र भविष्यति॥

अपि च।

भोज्याभोज्यव्यवस्थायाः शास्त्रमेव निबन्धनम्।
तच्चेद्भोज्यमिदं ब्रूते किं वयं विदधीमहि॥
यथाऽनुष्ठानतन्त्रत्वं नित्यकाम्याग्निहोत्रयोः।
एवं प्राणाग्निहोत्रेऽपि नैवेद्याशनतन्त्रता॥

१३८. यदप्युक्तं गर्भाधानादिदाहान्तसंस्कारान्तरसेवनाद् भागवतानामब्राह्मण्यमिति तत्राप्यज्ञानमेवापराध्यति, न पुनरायुष्मतो दोषः, यदेते वंशपरम्परया वाजसनेयशाखामधीयानाः कात्यायनादिगृह्योक्तमार्गेण गर्भाधानादिसंस्कारान् कुर्वते।

ये पुनः सावित्र्यनुवचनप्रभृतित्रयीधर्मत्यागेन एकायनश्रुतिविहितानेव चत्वारिंशत् संस्कारान् कुर्वते तेऽपि स्वशाखागृह्योक्तमर्थं यथाय-

दनुति*ष्ठमानाः न शाखान्तरीयकर्माननुष्ठानाद् ब्राह्मण्यात् प्रच्यवन्ते, अन्येषामपि परशाखाविहितकर्माननुष्ठाननिमित्ताब्राह्मण्यप्रसङ्गात् सर्वत्र हि जाति-चरण-गोत्राधिकारादिव्यवस्थिता एव समाचारा उपलभ्यन्ते। यद्यपि सर्वशाखाप्रत्ययमेकं कर्म तथाऽपि न परस्परविलक्षणाधिकारि-संबद्धा धर्माः क्वचित्समुच्चीयन्ते, विलक्षणाश्च त्रयीविहितस्वर्गपुत्रादि-विषयोपभोगसाधनैन्द्राग्नेयादिकर्माधिकारिभ्यो द्विजेभ्यस्त्वेकायन-श्रुतिविहितविज्ञानाभिगमनोपादानेज्याप्रभृतिभगवत्प्राप्त्येकोपायककर्माधि-कारिणो मुमुक्षवो ब्राह्मणा इति नोभयेषामप्यन्योन्यशाखाविहितकर्मा-ननुष्ठानमब्राह्मण्यमापादयति, यथा चैकायनशाखाया अपौरुषेयत्वं तथा काश्मीरा†गमप्रामाण्ये प्रपञ्चितमिति नेह प्रस्तूयते। प्रकृ‡तानां तु

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* यद्यपि अनूपसर्गात्तिष्ठतेर्नात्मनेपदं प्राप्नोतीति अनुतिष्ठन्त इत्येव स्यात्तथापि अनुष्ठानशीला अनुष्ठानपरायणा इत्यर्थस्य प्रतिपिपादयिषितत्वेन ताच्छील्यवयोवचनशक्तिषु चानश् इति पाणिनीयेन चानश्प्रत्ययो न तु शानच्प्रत्यय इत्यवधारयन्तु निपुणाः।

† काश्मीरागमपदेन किं विवक्षितमिति न विशिष्य जानीमः काश्मीरागमप्रामाण्य-निरूपणपरो ग्रन्थोऽपि चास्मद्दृष्टेरगोचर इति न किञ्चिदीश्महे वक्तुम्। यत्नेन तु तत्सर्व-मासाद्य समये प्रकाशयिष्यते।

‡ एतेनैते श्रीसंप्रदाये सर्ववेदरहस्यार्थानुयायिनि केनाप्यज्ञातसुकृतेन समुत्पद्यापि शिष्यसंजिघृक्षया वा, शिष्यान् व्यामोह्यार्थलिप्सया वा, शास्त्रतत्त्वार्थानभिज्ञानेन वा, दुरभिमानगरिम्णा वा, लोकवञ्चनार्थं वा, पूर्वाचार्यवचस्स्वश्रद्धया वा, तदीयचरमतात्पर्य-ज्ञानाशक्ततया वा, कलिकल्मषकलुषतया वा, स्वीयदुरदृष्टाकृष्टतया वा, वादिनिगूढातिप्रौढ-भावार्थानभिज्ञतया वा लोके स्वप्रौढिमख्यापनाय वादिनीमुखैव संनिनंसया वा, अथवा संभूयैतैः सर्वहेतुभिरेव ओंतत्सदिति निर्देशो ब्रह्मणस्त्रिविधः स्मृत इति भगवदुक्तरीत्या ब्रह्मासाधारण—तदादिपदघटिते परब्रह्मासाधारणश्रीरामायणारम्भणरूपे गायत्रीमन्त्रे सर्वै-वाद्यविप्रतिपन्नपरदेवताप्रसादके देवतान्तरार्थकत्वं बलादध्यारोप्य साधारणमन्त्रताप्रसाधनेन तस्य क्षुद्रदेवाराधनपरत्वं वा द्विजानामनावश्यकत्वख्यापनं वा क्षुद्रमन्त्रसाम्यसंभावनं वा कुर्वन्तः परास्ताः। प्रकृतानां भागवतानां तदत्यागबोधनेन त्यजतां च ब्रात्यताबोधनेन पूर्वाचार्याणां गायत्रीमन्त्रे द्विजत्वप्रसाधकतायाः स्पष्टमनुमतत्वेन तन्नित्यत्वे विवदमानाना-माचार्यार्थवैमुख्यस्य बालेनापि सुज्ञानत्वात्। यदपि क्वचित् स्मृतिषु गायत्र्या रविदेवताकत्वं सवितृदेवताकत्वं वा श्रूयते इति न तस्या भगवन्मन्त्रत्वमिति समुत्थानं तत्तु "रविः

भागवतानां सावित्र्यनुवचनादित्रयीधर्मसंबन्धस्य स्फुटतरमुपलब्धेर्न तत्त्यागनिमित्तव्रात्यत्वादिसंदेहं सहते ॥

१३९. तत्तत्कल्पितयुक्तिभिश्शकलशः कृत्वा तदीयं मतम्
यच्छिष्यैरुदमर्दि सात्वतमतस्पर्द्धाचतामुद्धतिः ॥
यश्चैतत्सततं मुकुन्दचरणद्वन्द्वास्पदं वर्तते
जीयान्नाथमुनिस्स्वयोगमहिमप्रत्यक्षतत्त्वत्रयः ॥
आकल्पं विलसन्तु सात्वतमतप्रस्पर्द्धिदुष्पद्धति-
व्यामुग्धोद्धतदुर्विदग्धपरिषद्वैदग्ध्यविध्वंसिनः ।
श्रीमन्नाथमुनीन्द्रवर्द्धितधियो निर्धूतविश्वाशिवाः
सन्तस्सन्ततगद्यपद्यपदवीहृद्यानवद्योक्तयः ॥
इति श्रीयामुनमुनिविरचितमागमप्रामाण्यम् ॥

सुलोचनः सूर्यः सविता रविर्लोचनः " इति श्लोकस्थभगवन्नामानभिज्ञाननिबन्धनमेव । यत्र ब्रह्मासाधारणलिङ्गदर्शनेन भौतिकाकाशादिवाचकाकाशादिपदानामाकाशस्तल्लिङ्गादिति परब्रह्मोपस्थापकत्वमास्थिपताचार्याः किमु तत्र भगवन्नामगणान्तःपातिनो रविसवितृपदयोर्भगवद्वाचकत्वविप्रतिपत्तिसमुत्थानशङ्काऽपि विदुषाम् । न च यानि नामानि गौणानि विख्यातानि महात्मनः । इत्यादिना सहस्रनामाचार्य एव गौणनामतामवोचदिति न तयोर्भगवद्रूढत्वं किन्तु रवि-सवितृपदयोः कोशादिना दिवाकर एव रूढिरिति कथं भगवदसाधारण्यसंभावनापीति वाच्यम् । न ह्यत्र गौणानीत्युक्त्या गुणवृत्त्या भगवदभिनिर्देशकत्वमभिधित्सितं किन्तु अवयवशक्त्या भगवदभिधायकत्वेन डित्थकपित्थादिशब्दानामिव भगवन्नामगणान्तःपातिशब्दानां न यदृच्छाशब्दत्वं, किन्तु लोकवेदयोरतेषां शब्दानां तदर्थे शक्तिभ्रमविधुरैर्लक्षणाग्रहरहितैश्च ऋषिभिर्भृशं परस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि वासुदेवेऽभिहितत्वात्तद्वाचका एव ते शब्दा इत्ययमर्थः । अत एव तु प्रयोगभूयस्त्वाभिधित्सया " विख्यातानी " त्युक्तम् । परिगीतानीत्यत्र परिपदमपि सहस्रनाम्नां रूढत्वमुपोद्बलयति । किंच सर्वधीप्रेरयितृत्वलक्षणान्तर्यामित्वलिङ्गोपलम्भसामर्थ्येनापि तस्य ब्रह्मासाधारण्यसिद्धिः । किंच प्रिय एव हि सर्वथा वरणीयो भवति नाप्रिय इति वरणीयत्वलिङ्गलिङ्गितत्वेनापि निरतिशयप्रियतमत्वेन ब्रह्मासाधारण्यसिद्धिरिति प्रव्यक्तम् । ततश्चर्षीणां लक्षणाग्रहाजन्यभूयःप्रयोगयोगेन नाम्नां रूढत्वसिद्ध्या सवित्रादिदेवताकत्वं परब्रह्मासाधारणदेवताकत्वसाधकमिति सुपुष्कलमवशिष्टं चास्मत्कृत्यैः सुनिरूपितमन्यत्रेति कृतमनभिज्ञनिग्रहसंनहनेन वैदिकमार्गनिष्कण्टकीकरणप्रवृत्तानां सुहृद्वरदासाम् ॥

ĀGAMA PRĀMĀṆYAM

1. Homage to Viṣṇu, the sole cause of the origin, subsistence and annihilation of the world, the sole cause of perfect bliss, for whom everything is as instantly evident[1] as a myrobalan in the hand.

2. Those of my contemporaries who are profoundly dishonest and will condemn a penetrating treatise, however great its merits, because they are envious, (may condemn it.) There are many others who have an excellent judgment of what is essential and what is not—honest students who do not cavil; and they will praise my work.

3. Even erudite scholars may err when their critical acumen is dominated by partisan views; yet, let the sagacious without envy study the Bhāgavata doctrine as I shall present it here.

4. There are certain people whose minds are confused by the noise of multitudes of sophisms and falsehoods which are borrowed from anyone that comes: and claiming superiority for their own studies and learning, and pretending to protect the Way of the Veda,[2] they refuse to accept the authority of Pañcarātra Tantra which, being composed by the Supreme Person Himself, leads to unparalleled beatitude.

And they contend:

> It has been decided that Verbal Testimony[3] is a means of knowledge in two ways: dependent testimony which depends on other authority, and independent testimony.

These two kinds are thus distinguished:

> No verbal assertion can be a means of valid knowledge if it has been formulated by a person;

for a verbal assertion to be authoritative, it must by definition be independent.

That is to say: verbal evidence which originates from a person carries authority *only then when it is* used to corroborate a fact which has already been truly established by other means of knowledge,[4] and which enables the speaker to take this fact for granted. Now, Perception and the other means of knowledge which involve Perception, cannot produce the knowledge that the Pañcarātra Tantra does indeed set forth that the desired heaven, release and other supernatural ends can be attained by means of such ritual acts as Consecration and such devotional acts as worship of the Bhagavān etc., for this relation of means and ends is not of the order of Perception. For if we consider Consecration, worship etc. merely with the aid of Perception, we cannot say that they are means to realize the *summum bonum*.

Not only, therefore, is Perception of an ordinary kind unavailing, but there is also no way to know that there have been recently certain persons of superhuman sensibility who would have had perceptual evidence that such acts really are means of attaining the desired ends; for the sense-organs of such persons, too, cannot surpass the boundaries of sensitiveness as we know it commonly.

5. An objection may be raised here:

However, perception of a superior kind is possible, depending on its percipient. Perception, therefore, may become perfect if the percipient is perfect.

That is to say: a finite thing may be found to become infinite; for instance, extent becomes infinite

in space, which is infinitely extended. Similarly, we find that finite Perception is considerably widened in air-borne creatures, like crows, owls, vultures etc., so that Perception might conceivably become infinite in some being. This indeed is the uppermost limit of knowledge where it encompasses every knowable thing; for we know from experience[5] that knowledges exceed one another as their contents exceed one another.

> That is why the wise can say that there is Someone in Whom such finite qualities as supremacy, dispassionateness, power etc. subsist in an infinite and unequalled condition.

Consequently, this Person whose immediate perception encompasses the entire range of things that are present in the world is hereby explained to be the Bhagavān who has immediate perceptual knowledge that Consecration, worship and so forth are dharma. So what remains unproved? (is improper).

6. This objection is thus refuted:

> The supreme perceptual knowledge which you assume is just a fancy. Perceptual knowledge can never go beyond its own sphere and trespass on another.

For instance:

> A superior kind of visual perception, as well as a superior perceptible object, must necessarily occur in loci where inherent relations of one kind, as between colour and coloured, obtain in one object.

> No knowledge that is received through one of the senses can encompass all that is knowable through all senses. So how can perceptual

knowledge by itself make *all* things known, i.e. also things known only through other means of knowledge?

7. The objector resumes:

However, the sensitivity which we attribute to Perception is directed toward the perceiving of what exists *at present*.

Of course, if Perception did not have this function of perceiving what exists at present as its *natural* function, it would cease to be Perception at all. Therefore, it is not reasonable to say that a superior kind of Perception, defined as encompassing all objects, is *a priori* impossible because it is limited to being Perception!

8. The objection is refuted:

If from finite Perception you conclude to infinite Perception, then I ask you to explain: can a finite quantity ever attain to such expansion that it cannot be further expanded? You insist, as it were, on full maturity in a little boy[6]! 'even as a boy, after attaining the full growth, cannot grow physically further?' There are two possibilities: either the infinite exists in the finite, or the finite gradually becomes infinite.

The former cannot stand, for there is no Perception to support it: we have never seen a bowl or a similar finite object which had the same expansion as space.

And suppose a finite quantity could assume inconceivable infinitude: why, then any single jar or pitcher could fill up the entire space within the Egg of

Brahmā, so that all other things would be pushed out and perish accordingly!

> If you take space itself as the subject, you merely prove the proved.[1] In the alternative you cannot avoid the illogicality we have pointed out: as a matter of fact, never before has anybody seen a finite pillar which was pervaded by an infinite pillar![3] Consequently, there remains the defect of mutual exclusion.

Let us also consider your illustration, namely that in space we have an example of a finite extent becoming infinite. Extent is by definition a limited extension of space, a relative quantity, something that can be entirely circumscribed. Extent in this definition does not subsist in space as such, so how can you adduce it as an example? Besides, if one were to infer extent in space, one would simultaneously infer the possibility that space might be surpassed in extent by another quantity. And so the illustration again falls short of the thesis.

Nor is there any evidence for the thesis that a superior perception reveals that Consecration, worship etc. are actually dharma.

To sum up: For all these reasons it would appear to us that the supposition that some, otherwise unperceived, supreme spiritual being exists with a superior sensibility is very weak; and this being so, we conclude that Perception offers no authority for the postulated relation of means to ends[9]; and since the authority of Pañcarātra is based upon the Perception of this supposed relation, its authority is entirely non-existent.

9. Not only is there no Perception, but there cannot possibly be an Inference to support the thesis in question, for it is wholly suprasensible: and Inference, of course, can only take place after an invariable concomitance has been observed by means of Perception. If no fires have ever been observed before, they cannot prove that smoke is invariably concomitant with them.[10]

10. Nor do we find scriptural evidence which sets forth that the performance of all the rites which are established in the Sātvata[11] doctrine is mandatory; such evidence would have proved that the Pañcarātra Tradition, being based upon this mandate,[12] carried authority.

Nor is it possible, in the absence of *explicit* revelation, to *infer* such evidence from Scripture. For just as the relation of means to certain ends which are their fruits, e.g., heaven, as Pañcarātra maintains Consecration, worship etc. to be, does not allow of being inferred because no such relation can be verified by Perception, just so no scriptural authority to furnish the basis of such a relation can be inferred from Scripture.

Nor is any verbal testimony capable of providing valid knowledge that Scripture is the basis of the Tradition concerned. Verbal testimony is of two kinds, originating from a person or not originating from a person.[13]

Personal speech cannot be proof of it, for persons may lie in order to deceive their hearers. For even today, we find philosophers who pretend to be scriptural and yet expound an interpretation which is wholly unscriptural.

So we have our doubts whether the claim made by the authors of the Pañcarātra texts that their own compositions are founded in the Veda is really the result of an honest conviction that such is indeed the case, or nothing but the self-glorification of authors who write as their fancy takes them !

> This argumentation by itself suffices to disprove the contended authority of Pañcarātra, for there is no eternal Scripture[14] to support the claim.
>
> Nor can Analogy prove that Scripture is its basis, for this criterion cannot be properly applied; for how could the proof we need, which cannot be found by the other means of knowledge, be within the scope of the mere knowledge of similitude ?

Nor can it be argued that, since the Tradition cannot be proved by other means, Implication[15] proves that Scripture is its basis. The argument is as follows, circumstantial Implication must prove the tradition, as it cannot be proved otherwise; the authors of the Pañcarātra, clearly have this tradition that Consecration, worship, etc. are dharma and this tradition is comparable to the tradition of Manu and others that certain non-Vedic rites, as the *aṣṭaka* etc., are dharma; now there can be no tradition of a fact unless that fact has been cognized before; but here we have the tradition of a fact that cannot be proved by Perception, Inference, Verbal Testimony or Analogy; therefore the cognition of the fact can only have originated from Scripture. . .

However, this argument would only prove its point if there were any authority for the assumption

of the three estates do not accept the doctrines of Traditions of this kind.

13. OBJECTION:

Nevertheless, the fact that Bhāgavata Brahmins, who wear the hair-tuft, the sacred thread etc. prescribed in Scripture, perform daily the rites of Pañcarātra should then justify the presumption that these rites likewise ultimately derive from the Veda. On what grounds, then, are we to assume that this same Pañcarātra Tradition really has its origins in error, deceit and the like, the very negation of valid authority ?.

14. REFUTATION:

We reply: Well! So you really argue that the Bhāgavatas, who are hated by the three estates, are exemplary and hence authoritative ?!

Objection:

But they are Brahmins, and Brahmins are considered to be the highest estate: why should they not be exemplary ?

Refutation:

Brahmins? Far from it! We do not regard Brahmins as a distinct species, different from the species man, with specific characteristics which mere sensory perception permits us to recognize as present in some specific bodies and absent in others. Hair-tuft, sacred thread etc. which are prescribed for Brahmins and the other two estates, do not make a man a Brahmin! Nor do they demonstrate that a man is a Brahmin, for we see them worn illegally by blackguards, outcastes and the like. Therefore, the sole criterion by which we can tell whether a man

is indeed a Brahmin is acceptance of undisputed expressions by older persons, which give us irrefutable proof. Nor do ordinary people use without hesitation the term Brahmin to describe Bhāgavatas. There is also a distinct difference in the two appellations: here Brahmins, there Bhāgavatas.

15. OBJECTION:

The people do not use the word 'Brahmin' to refer to Bhāgavatas. The reference is only difference as this much Brahmins and this much Bhāgavatas. Be that as it may, still, the appellations Sātvata, Bhāgavata etc. are also used to name Brahmins, by some sort of transference of properties, just as the word *parivrājaka* is used to designate a Brahmin[20].

REFUTATION: The argument is false.

Persons of certain inferior castes are commonly referred to as Sātvatas; the name is used to denote these castes, and not anything else. The grammarians have the rule that it is improper to use a certain word in its etymological sense if it can also be taken in a customary sense which is more common, e.g., *rathakāra*[21].

If there were no such rule, how could the word *rathakāra* give up its etymological meaning of "chariot-maker" to become the name of a particular caste, even to the extent of cancelling all connotations which we have learnt[22]? Similarly, Sātvata refers to a person who *has* been born *from a vrātya* vaiśya *and belongs to the* lowest castes, and is thus excluded from the sacraments of initiation[23], etc. Manu says: "The issue of a vaiśya vrātya extraction is called Sudhanvā or Bhāruṣa or Nijaṅgha or Maitra or *Sātvata*[24]." It cannot

that cognitions are invariably true. But when certain notions which are produced by the false cognitions of people whose judgement is clouded by hatred, prejudice and obstinacy, cause such "traditions" to be written in accordance with these false cognitions, could these traditions possibly be true?

11. Here an objection may be raised:

However, the same arguments may be advanced against the authority of the traditions of Manu etc. The observation of the aṣṭakā rite does not produce any perceptual knowledge that this rite is indeed a means to realize the postulated end. Nor can it be inferred, because no relation[16] is perceptually given. Nor is there any scriptural evidence for it, for it cannot be found. Nor again can such evidence be inferred from Scripture where it is not found explicitly, because no relation is perceptually given. Nor can it be proved through Analogy, as there is no apparent analogue. Nor through circumstantial Implication, because of the reasons given above against the argument that it is otherwise unprovable. Now, if it is legitimate in one case to presume scriptural authority in support of it because there happens to be a well-established tradition about it among Vedic experts,—well, in Pañcarātra, too, great sages are traditionally known as the founders of the sacred transmission, sages like Nārada, Śāṇḍilya and others. The same objections and the same justifications can be advanced about both the tradition of Manu etc. and the tradition of Pañcarātra. Either both are authoritative or neither is. There are no grounds to show that the two traditions differ in some essential respect. Either we must reject the authority

of Manu's tradition as well, or we must indeed show in which respect the Pañcarātra tradition is different from Manu's.

12. This objection is refuted:

> The author of the Sūtras, by making the Sūtra: "Tradition is also valid, because it has the same agent as Scripture[17]", has clearly indicated that in his opinion no essential difference exists between Scriptural and Traditional validity.

Accordingly, we find that those who are qualified for the three Vedas perform equally for purposes of higher benefits both the ritual acts which are enjoined by Scripture (e.g., *agnihōtra*, *pūrṇadarśamāsa*, *jyotiṣṭoma*[18], etc.) and the ritual acts enjoined by Tradition (e.g., *aṣṭakā*, *ācamana*, *saṃdhyā* worship[19], etc.), because they have been instructed in both varieties of acts by their fathers or preceptors. The firmness with which so highly qualified exemplary persons have adopted these traditional rites as incumbent upon the three higher estates goes to show that the knowledge that rites of this kind, *aṣṭakā* etc., obviously found to exist, are mandatory ultimately derives from Scripture itself. On the other hand, we find that those who observe the scriptural rites of *agnihōtra* etc. do not observe the Tāntric customs in the same manner as they observe such traditional customs as *ācamana* investiture with the sacred thread etc. On the contrary, the Vedic experts condemn those who do. It follows that the validity which we attribute to different Traditions "because", as the Sūtra says, "they have the same agent as Scripture", cannot well apply to heterodox Traditions as the Pañcarātra; for exemplary exponents

be disputed that Bhāgavata is another name for Sātvata; Smṛti has it that "the fifth, called Sātvata, worships the temples and sanctuaries of Viṣṇu by royal decree; he is also called Bhāgavata."[25]

The Smṛti thus describes which profession the descendants of the said *vrātya* vaiśya pursue—and with our own eyes we indeed see them pursue this profession. Thus Uśanas: "They all live by the plough and the sword, the Ācāryas and the Sātvatas live on the worship of the Deity."[26] Similarly, in the Brahma Purāṇa—"He worships the sanctuaries of Viṣṇu by royal decree." Elsewhere the same is stated thus: "The profession of the Sātvatas is to clean up the sanctuaries of the Deity and the eatables offered to the idol, as well as to guard it."[27] And, to dispel the last doubt about the sort of people they are, Manu declares: "Whether disguised or not, they can be known by their deeds."

16. Their conduct, moreover, *proves that they cannot be Brahmins. For a living they perform pūjā* to the Deity, undergo their Consecration, eat themselves the food which is offered to the idols[28], observe deviating sacraments—from the prenatal *garbhādhāna* rite to the funerary rituals—, omit to perform the *śrauta* ritual and avoid contact with Brahmins. These and other habits show conclusively that they cannot be Brahmins.

Smṛtis declare that the reason of their disqualification for Vedic rites is this that they perform pūjā to the Deity in order to earn a living: "Those who from generation to generation have worshipped the Deity professionally are disqualified for the study of the Veda,

for participation in the sacrifices and for officiating in sacrifices."[30] Their own Parama Saṃhitā states the same prohibition: "Whether in disaster or emergency, in terror or in straits, one must never worship the God of gods for a living."[31] Such habits as wearing the garlands that are offered to the God and eating the food that is presented to the idol and other practices of that kind, which are condemned by all right-thinking people, shows plainly that they are not Brahmins.

Furthermore, we wonder how it can be presumed that the authority of these people proves that Scripture is the basis of their way of life: at the mere sight of them all respectable men perform expiatory rites such as *cāndrāyana*! Smṛti declares that if one sets eyes on a *devalaka*, it is necessary to perform an expiation. A *devalaka* is someone who lives on temple treasure and worships the idol for a livelihood. Thus Devala: "One who lives on temple treasure is called a *devalaka*."[31] Likewise: "A Brahmin who has worshipped the deity for three years in order to make a living is called a *devalaka* and he is held to be unworthy to partake in any ritual."[32] Those who have been known to worship the God as a hereditary profession are automatically regarded as *devalakas*. The rite of expiation is set forth in the precept: "A Brahmin who is taking his meal should not look at ordure, a pig, a eunuch, a sacrificial pole, a *devalaka* or a corpse; if he does he must observe the *cāndrāyana*."[33] Atri, too, very explicitly declares that they are not Brahmins: "The Avālukas, Devalakas, Kalpadevalakas, Gaṇabhogadevalakas and fourthly those of the Bhāgavata profession are corrupt Brahmins."[34] Also the venerable Vyāsa:

"The Āhvāyakas, Devalakas, Nakṣatragrāmayājakas and Mahāpathikas are outcaste Brahmins."[35]

Therefore, the fact that Pañcarātra recognizes the authority of the Bhāgavatas who by birth and by deeds have deviated from the Way of the Veda is sufficient ground to deny authority to the Pañcarātra Scriptures.

17. Furthermore, the class of texts with which we are here concerned are not valid means of knowing which acts are good and which are evil inasmuch as they are accepted by heretics, and thus are of the same kind as the Buddhist statements on *stūpa* worship.

Besides, their own texts relate that the instruction in all their dharmas presupposes the abandoning of the Way of the Veda; "having failed to find the supreme good in the four Vedas, Śāṇḍilya learnt this doctrine...."[36]. But how can we presume that a certain text can teach that a certain object, which is known from the four Vedas, is man's supreme goal in life if he rejects at the outset the very authority of the Vedas as sources of knowledge about the means which lead to bliss? On the contrary, we find that Manu and other authors of Traditions declare that their works which expound as their teaching the means of attaining all kinds of desirable ends derive solely from Scripture: "The Veda in its entirety is the basis of the Law, as well as of the traditions and customs of those who are expert in Law"; "the Law is enjoined by Scripture and Tradition"; "it is entirely expressed in the Veda; for the Veda contains all knowledge."

Further, the assertion that those who have already been consecrated by the sacraments of Investiture etc. and are thereby qualified for all the Vedic rituals,

agnihōtra etc., must yet undergo another sacrament, called Consecration,[37] in order to be qualified for the worship of the Bhagavān, demonstrates that the system is non-Vedic; for if it were Vedic, they would be qualified for Tāntric ritual by the regular sacraments.

Again, another indication of its non-Vedic character is the fact that the system is not included among the fourteen sources of knowledge, which all orthodox people recognize as giving authoritative information on the Law.[38] If it were authoritative, then it would have been recognized as such by tradition; but as it is not so recognized, this proves that the Pañcarātra tradition is non-Vedic. For this reason the venerable Bādarāyaṇa, when he has occasion to refute the heterodox doctrines of Kaṇāda, Akṣapāda, the Buddha etc. as inimical to the Way of the Veda, also refutes the Pañcarātra in his Sūtra: "Because of the impossibility of origin."[39] Therefore, as the Vedic experts regard the Pañcarātra doctrine as non-Vedic since it is not included among the Vedic systems and because of other reasons which will be advanced in the sequel, it cannot be compared with the Tradition of Manu etc.

In view of all this it is our opinion that such infrequent good rites—e.g., the worship of the Bhagavān —which are described by the Pañcarātricas (who teach a good many others, mostly black arts of exciting hatred, haunting a person out of his occupation, envoutement etc.) are merely added to deceive people about their real attentions and do not deserve our faith or consideration: they are like milk that is put in a dog's bladder!

To sum up, *it is not* proper to assume that Pañcarātra is based on the Veda and therefore equally authoritative as the doctrinal works of Manu and others.

DISCURSUS :

18. At this *point someone interjects* :[10] *If you* please, by all means assume that the Vedas constitute the cause of the delegated and indirect authority of the Tradition of Manu etc. But is there any reason why we should have to depend exclusively *on the Veda* as the basis of the Pañcarātra tradition too? The same direct knowledge which is the very foundation of the authority of the Vedas themselves is also the foundation of the authority of the Pañcarātra doctrine; the authority of the latter is not based upon the relation of supporting authority and supported authority which characterizes typical *smārta* injunctions, e.g., *aṣṭakā* and *ācamana* which have their common basis in the Veda.

In fact, the two traditions of the *aṣṭakā* rite and the *ācamana* rite are not interdependent, but they are equally and independently authoritative. Similarly, Pañcarātra and Scripture are not interdependent. If Pañcarātra collapses as soon as it is denied the support of the Veda, why then should the Veda not collapse when the support of Pañcarātra is taken away from it?

19. The Vedas derive their authority from direct knowledge which originates from a person and must therefore naturally derive from a person. Who can doubt it? For we perceive that words, from their very nature, depend for their composition on some entity that is different from themselves. How else

could they exist at all? If it is objected that the significance of the Book called Veda just consists in this that it does in fact exist as Word though nobody has composed it, then we reply; why, if this were true, then the significance of smoke on a mountain consists in this that it whirls irrepressibly sky-high without fire! It is utterly out of the question.[41]

20. OBJECTION. But since the applicability[42] of the dharma cannot be shown by any of the means of knowledge, how can a book on it be composed?

REPLY. Don't argue like that: for the Bhagavān who, of course, has an immediate intuition of *dharma* and *adharma* through the knowledge which is natural to Him has had this Book called Veda composed out of compassion for the world.

21. OBJECTION. But does this intuition or perception also encompass *dharma* and *adharma*?

REPLY. Certainly. How else would the Bhagavān be able to give rise to such effects as body, world etc.? For the maker of such effects must be one who is capable of perceiving their material and instrumental causes. Now, *dharma* and *adharma* are the instrumental causes of the world[43]; this is also the consensus of the Mīmāṁsakas. Consequently we must postulate a certain person who has this perceptual knowledge; and that person must also be the one who created the Veda at the beginning.

22. If one contends that such entities as mountains, earth and the like are not effects, the answer is as follows:

> The entities in question, earth etc., are effects, because they have a complex construction, like a king's palace.[44]

Similarly, from the fact that they are made up of parts we conclude that they are subject to destruction.

Entities that can be destroyed are destroyed by someone who knows the means by which they can be destroyed, just as we can destroy clay vessels etc. when we know by what means to destroy them.

In the case of entities that are shattered, for instance, by a falling tree, that is without perceptible intelligent agency, the cause of their destruction remains dubious: but because of this very dubiety there can also be not positive certainty that the cause of their destruction is entirely occasional.

Motion, when there is mass, is sufficient ground to infer in this world that an entity which has mass and can move is subject to origination and to destruction.

It being thus established that earth etc. are indeed effects, on the grounds adduced above, it follows that the Bhagavān has knowledge of *dharma* and *adharma* which are the instrumental causes of origination and annihilation.[45]

Consequently, the entities here in question, earth, mountains and the like, have been created by a maker who possesses the described knowledge.

Everything that has origin and end is, in our experience, created by such a maker, just because it is subject to origination and annihilation, like a house.

23. Let it not be argued that there is no intermediate production of effects like body, world etc. between acts that bring about the desires of the person who undertakes them,[46] for these acts are unable to

produce anything unless they are used as an instrument by a spiritual being, since they are non-spiritual themselves, like an adze: without the operation of a spiritual being—the carpenter—an adze is incapable of effecting by itself such objects as a sacrificial pole.

And we are not able to create through the instrumentality of *apūrva* factors:[47] for before the actual fruition of the ritual act we cannot know their instrumentality, and it has been said that only a person who has actual knowledge of the material and instrumental causes can be a maker with respect to these causes.[48] And there is no embodied soul which is known, or claimed, to be capable of having the required actual knowledge of the *apūrva* that is to arise from the act.

Therefore we must admit a Person of absolute omnipotence who is able to take in at a glance the entire Universe with *dharma* and *adharma* of all embodied souls, their experiencing of karmic results etc., and in whose nature such properties as unrestricted knowledge etc. subsist. As they say: "The unobstructed knowledge, perfect impartiality, omnipotence of a universal lord and dharma are all four established together."[49]

Mantras, arthavādas,[50] epic and purāṇa corroborate this point; e.g. "The one god, Prajāpati, creating heaven and earth, created the Vedas,"[51] etc. At the moment of inception the great Grace of this Person who is the Bhagavān is evoked by a glance at the aggregate of individual souls who are almost in a state of non-spiritual stupor, their instruments for the experiencing of karmic results—body, senses and other organs—being completely dissolved. His Grace evoked,

he *originates* the entire universe and simultaneously He creates the triple Veda which states pellucidly the means by which the souls in transmigration can realize the objects of their desires. Then again, perceiving *that they are in a pitiable condition*, being immersed in the ocean of existence which is perturbed by wave upon wave of all manner of iniquities, His heart burns with supreme compassion and He promulgates, through Sanatkumāra, Nārada etc., *the* Pañcarātra Saṁhitās which constitute the sources of knowledge about the manner in which He should be propitiated to attain to perfect bliss. Forasmuch as the Tantras are therefore based upon an immediate cognition of the Lord and *are consequently self-sufficient like the Vedas, can* they belong in the company of any Tradition, that of Manu of anyone?

REFUTATION.[62]

24. If this is true, then on what authority is such a creator of the Vedas known to exist? He is not directly perceived.

Nor can we infer from the fact that the Veda is word that it therefore must have an author, for that would entail the total reversion of your special contentions.

For an utterance that is perceived to depend for its composition on the agency of some being is also perceived to be uttered by no one but an embodied being.

Now for all embodied beings the body is the instrument for good and for evil; so the assumption that the Veda is utterance would occasion the inference that it has been created by an embodied being whose

happiness and unhappiness resulted from his good and evil karman, and who therefore cannot be God.

Moreover, in that case it would be impossible to establish the authority of the Vedas themselves; for if *dharma*—the Law—is not independent of other means of knowledge, there is no exclusive authority of the Vedas.[53]

25. OBJECTION. But why should *dharma* be independent of other means of knowledge? For we have asserted that He has actual knowledge of *dharma* and *adharma*: how else could He produce the world of which *dharma* and *adharma* are the instrumental causes?

REPLY. That has indeed been asserted, but the assertion is fallacious: for no creator of the entire universe can be found of whom this can be assumed.

To your argument that the world must be effected because it has a complex construction can be objected that empiricists distinguish three kinds of entities:

Those whose makers are evident to perception, e.g. pots and the like; those which are not found to be made at all;[54] and those whose creation remained doubtful, like the earth etc.

In the two first-mentioned cases there is no room for God's activity. As to the third, the earth etc. are not involved in a total origination or disintegrations, but merely, as now, subject to varying degrees of increase and decrease which are adventitious. To say that the Mīmāṁsakas accept origination and annihilation in this sense is to prove the proved.[55]

In our opinion, too, these intelligent agents bring about various results by means of sacrifices and other acts, in order to enjoy these results themselves; and

the assumption that they are indeed, as is proved for both of us, *instrumental therein is quite correct, for we* can have direct knowledge of these acts, sacrifices, donations and the like. However, the special power described with terms like apūrva can never be open to perception. How then can we have use for a supervising God?[56]

26. Certainly, it is not true that an agent, for instance a potter, *when he wishes to produce a certain* product—pots—must first have direct knowledge of the power of their material cause—clay—and instrumental cause—stick—to produce these products before he can actually *undertake their production. Else people* who are unaware of the power of the requisite causes would never be able to employ these causes in order to produce the results they want. In the case under discussion the persons concerned *do indeed* know which causes are required to bring about the results they want, *for* they know these causes, such as sacrifices etc., through the knowledge they have obtained from eternal Scripture. Thus, aided by these causes, they render manifest such products as earth etc.

Also, there is no invariable rule that only an agent to whom the material and instrumental causes are fully known is capable of undertaking an action and nobody else. A man can still be an agent in the action of *knowing without perceiving in his own* mind the material and instrumental causes *that go into the* making of this action of knowing. Why, then, contend that the causes must be known first?

27. The contention that the entire Universe is subject to annihilation because it has parts is incorrect.

Such a conclusion is cancelled by stronger perceptual evidence against it. For the knowledge that does arise in the world of here and now is plainly this: 'Here is the meru; here is the sun; here is the earth.'

Recognition conveys to us the knowledge that these entities are related to different times; and certainly both in former and later ages there arise similar persons who have the same notion of these entities' present existence. To put it in syllogistic form:

The past has persons who recognize earth, sun and mountain, because the past is time, like the present.

The same syllogism can be constructed with regard to the future. This reasoning does not entail the fallacious conclusion that pots etc. are eternal, for in their case origination and annihilation are directly evident.

It does not follow that, when a certain fact cannot be proved on the strength of a certain ground, since this ground involves a contradiction, this same ground cannot prove the same fact when it does not involve a contradiction.[57]

The other inference that has been given to prove that the world is subject to origination and annihilation, namely on the ground of motion when there is mass, is likewise incorrect; for this ground, too, is cancelled by the greater cogency of recognition. Consequently, inference cannot provide positive proof that the world is subject to origination and annihilation.

28. Further, you contend that there is a God, on the ground that the world is a product; but this ground precludes a specially qualified producer. For a product generally implies on the part of its producer a number

of properties which are natural to him and therefore indispensable for the precise knowledge of the concomitance between him and his product. Properties like being in possession of a body, having something left to desire, being deprived of omnipotence and omniscience, etc. How, then, can the fact that the world is a product convey to us the knowledge that the producer proposed for it possesses the postulated properties, of being bodiless, eternally satisfied, omniscient etc., properties, that is, which are the opposite of what would naturally follow? The production of a product requires the activation of the body, which requires on the producer's part an effort whose inherent cause is his relation with a body and is impossible of any but just such a producer. It follows that under no condition bodiless person can be an agent.

Or if, in order to remove this fault from the argument, it is assumed that the producer indeed possesses a body, then the question arises, Is that body itself subject to origination or not? If it be subject to origination, there is infinite regress. If it be eternal, then your contention that whatever has parts must come to an end is not universally true. The solution of others, namely that God's special properties can be demonstrated by an *ad-hoc* conclusion,[63] does not hold good either. For that rule holds only of a case where a conflict follows from a means of knowledge but does not actually exist. In our case, however, the conflict is plain enough.

29. OBJECTION. But if even a well-considered invariable concomitance cannot demonstrate that the cause of the earth etc. is an intelligent being, then all

logical process of deduction is done with. But if deduction can indeed convey true knowledge, that it must also convey that there is a producer capable of creating the entire universe.

REPLY. We do not say that your deduction fails to demonstrate that there is such a producer, but that it also demonstrates without discrimination as many properties in this producer as, at the moment of grasping the concomitance, are known to obtain in any producer.

Nor do we carry our point too far. In a case where the term which we seek to establish through deduction can also be known through another means of knowledge, then this other means of knowledge may exclude from our term certain contrary properties which would have applied on the strength of our inferential mark alone. In the present instance, however, we are seeking to demonstrate God whose agency falls completely outside the scope of other means of knowledge; in his case therefore all the properties that participate in an invariable concomitance elicited through positive and negative consideration are indiscriminately established by the deduction.

A similarly occasional relationship between producer and product occurs, for instance, with grass that has grown just outside a house-garden. We cannot be positive that this grass has sprung from a person's action. In this instance, too, the assumption that a person, beyond the ken of our senses, has in fact been instrumental to the creation etc. of the world must remain entirely conjectural.

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30. Another question to be considered is from what point in space, at what point in time, and to what purpose a person who is satisfied in all eternity would produce the universe. Every agent, e.g., a potter, produces a product by means of certain instruments, while *occupying a certain space at a certain time* and aiming at a certain result which he wants. If the production of the world is purely sport and without ulterior motivation, since God does not want anything, beware, for *this states clearly that the Lord is by nature* independent from anything beside Himself. Yet willy-nilly, without regard for anything He might wish, He shoulders the vast task of creating, sustaining and destroying the world. Is He in creating the *creatures* prompted by His compassion? But why, then, does He not create them happy? If you reply, because God takes *karman* into account, then you deny his complete independence. Besides, if *their karman* provides sufficient causes for these creatures' variety, why assume God at all?

Therefore, there cannot be such a person who is capable of creating the universe, of perceiving immediately *dharma* and *adharma*, and of composing the Vedas.

31. Moreover, if the Vedas were created by *someone, this creator would be remembered: 'He is the one who has composed them.' It is not proper to* assume that he has been forgotten, just as the digger of an exhausted well is forgotten. The latter is justifiable because the well no longer serves a purpose. But in the case of the Vedas, who, without remembering that

the author was reliable, would give credence to all the Vedic rites which are to be performed at the expense of *great trouble involving the loss of various properties?* Consequently, if it cannot be proved of the Vedas that they have been composed by a person, because this person, however worthy of remembrance, is not remembered, they can no more prove that God was their author than the Mahābhārata and similar books can. Therefore the Vedas do not originate from a person. In consequence, the contention that the validity of Pañcarātra is based upon the same immediate cognition which is the basis of the validity of the Veda itself is the contention of those whose discrimination has been warped by their bias in favour of their own conclusions.

32. OBJECTION. But in what does this 'preter-personal' character of the Veda consist? If it consists in this that the Vedas are composed of eternal words, the same holds true of the Pañcarātra Tantra.[59] Or if it is the eternity of the words that constitute it, again the same is true. It could not be the eternity of the word-sequence, for sequence cannot be natural to eternal entities.[60] If it is said that it is the sequence of the sounds in so far as these sounds are pronounced in one particular sequence, then we reply that since a sequence of pronunciation is non-eternal, the sequence of the sounds pronounced cannot be eternal. So where does the difference lie between Pañcarātra and Vedic revelation?

REPLY. The difference lies herein that in the case of the Pañcarātra the sequence is created by an

independent person, whereas in the case of the Veda, a dependent person invariably wishes to repeat the exact sequence which had been laid down before him by students who preceded him. A category of a different degree[61] which is established on the strength of recognition should not be denied. And with this we conclude our lengthy disquisition.

33. The preceding has proved that the proposition that the Pañcarātra is authoritative because it is based upon an immediate cognition of a person categorically different from other persons, is not viable at all. Since there is no means of knowledge by which the existence of a person who has immediate knowledge of good and evil can be proved, it follows that this Tantra must have been promulgated by some human being with the purpose of deceiving the world.

34. OBJECTION.[62] This would be true if proof of the existence of the Lord could only be sought on the strength of logical argumentation. As it is, this is a fallacy, for the great Lord is known on the authority of the upaniṣads. When we hear the multitudinous statements of the eternal Scriptures which set forth the existence of an omniscient and omnipotent supreme Personality who is capable of creating the entire universe, how then can we refuse to accept the authority of a tradition which derives from His immediate cognition?

35. To continue this topic,[63] these scriptural statements do not exceed the bounds of their authority just because they are concerned with facts; for similar

statements made by persons concerning facts that are extremely remote from a connection with other means of knowledge cannot be denied the authority which is afforded them naturally.

Nor do statements concerning a fact lack authority because of the consideration that since either a proving or disproving factor may unexpectedly turn up there remains the possibility that this fact is thus repeated or reversed[64]; for the same may equally well happen to a statement concerning, not a fact, but a *kārya*. A *kārya*, too, may be known from other means of knowledge, for it must be admitted that ordinary *kāryas*, like 'fetch firewood' are also known through other means of knowledge, as in the case of the cooking of the *odana*.[65]

Or if it be claimed that, inasmuch as a *kārya* concerning a categorically different thing like the *agnihotra* etc. cannot conceivably find any other authority, therefore the verbal testimony which sets forth such a thing must needs be its authority,—well, then we may say that there is not a ghost of another authority for the Bhagavān whose form consists in unsurpassed knowledge, supremacy and beatitude; so that it should follow that everything is entirely the same in both cases, depending on one's particular partisan views.

Moreover, the theory is that since another means of knowledge can apply to a fact, a verbal statement concerning this fact cannot validly prove it: but why should not this *other* means of knowledge itself be the repetitious one since verbal testimony concerning its fact may conceivably turn up?[66] or, why should other means of knowledge which themselves are liable to

various deficiencies entail the negation of a notion that arises from eternal Scripture untouched by all defects inherent in persons, merely because it is deduced that its validity is cancelled by a prior means of knowledge? This is absurd.

Thus, therefore, the imperfections that necessarily follow from the induction, e.g. absence of omniscience[67], possession of a body etc., find no room in the Bhagavān whose supernal manifestation of miraculous knowledge, supremacy and so forth is known from hundreds of śruits, just as cold can find no place in fire.

And, in consequence,

How can our tongue endeavour to state that the Tantra is false, while it is composed by the Omniscient One Himself who is known through the Upaniṣads? Alas for the fool's grand exhibition of labour in Mīmāṃsā! How can a mind schooled in Mīmāṃsā be so mistaken?

36. Learned thinkers, whose intellectual powers command respect,[68] maintain that all Vedic testimony carries authority only concerning such *kāryas* as cannot presuppose any other authority. Since words are considered to have their true sense only when they concern such a *kārya*, it is impossible that any statement can be denotative if it concerns something else than a *kārya*. Therefore, when a man has observed that in an exchange between two adult persons a certain inherently related action of one of them takes place immediately upon his hearing a sentence uttered by the other, he concludes with certainty that the denoting

power of the sentence as inferred by means of circum-stantial-implication terminates completely in the *kārya* that has been conveyed by that sentence.[69] The very awareness of *kārya* is known to relate to one's own *kārya*;[70] so the onlooker, observing the same process in the present case, realizes that the one person's action has been caused by the other person's variously differentiated behaviour: "Surely this person has been made aware by the other of this *kārya* that he proceed to his action immediately upon become aware of what he has to do." This leads the observer to the conclusion that if therefore the verbal statement is truly denotative in so far as it serves to convey a *kārya* whose specific motivation conforms to the entire statement, then whatever bits of meaning come to mind as a result of the addition or omission of words are denoted by these words only in strict accordance to this *kārya*,[71] which thus constitutes the primarily known principal element of the statement. In such a statement the imperative and optative verbal terminations,[72] which unvaryingly give rise to a knowledge of *kārya*, convey by themselves the body of the *kārya*, whereas the indicative etc. terminations are subject to a contextual relation with the *kārya* by describing consequent matters which required by the *kārya*, e.g. a person's qualification to accomplish it etc.[73]

37. Take for example the statement *that a son* has been born to the person spoken to, a purely substantive statement; the aggregate of words which convey nothing more than this bare fact that a son has been born, is not definitely proved to possess the power

of denoting the postulated birth of the son by means of such resultant effects as cheerful looks or joyfully bristling hairs on the part of the father.[74] For, it is impossible to establish definitely that the occurrence of a cause for various joys in future, past and present is really due to the denotative power of the statement. Therefore, also in the case when we have a verb in the present indicative collocated with words that have their proper signification (in that they refer to things that presuppose no other means of knowledge), it must be assumed that in it we have a substitute with a positive (i.e. injunctive) denotation of words without actually having explicit reference to a *kārya*.[75]

38. A person knows that a certain word has a certain denotation, when it is known what is the denotation, of the other words with which it is collocated.[76] It is proved that words have the power of denoting things only in so far as they are contextually connected with a *kārya*; consequently, their validity concerning an established fact is based on this that they give rise to the notion of *kārya*.

It is contended that this denotation of *kārya* is only occasional in words,[77] but this contention is incorrect; the ground for words to be denotative is that they deal with a *kārya*, so that the contention suffers of the vice of being unproved. For a notion that arises from a verbal statement can never terminate in any object whatsoever that is not a *kārya*.

The cognitions of contextual relations which arise immediately upon hearing a profane statement are said to derive, not from Verbal Testimony, but from

Inference.[78] Thus it is right that these cognitions do not terminate in *kāryas.*

39. If it were not accepted that verbal statements always bear on *kāryas*, on what grounds then could an indicative statement like *agnihotraṁ juhoti* "he offers the agnihotra" be accepted as an injunction? Or if it be claimed that in this case, even though the statement as it stands has no complete validity, it is accepted as an injunction in order to ensure that it subserves a purpose, we reply that this claim is incorrect, since the operation of means of knowledge is not dependent on purpose, but rather is the acceptance of purpose dependent on the operation of the means of knowledge. It is not proper to assume that since one does not like to find rocks when one is looking for gold therefore one finds gold! As long as we do not assume that a statement is denotative only when it bears on a *kārya*, we cannot assume that a verb in the present indicative contains an injunction.

40. In the same manner the meaning of the upaniṣads must also be interpreted as being subordinate to such injunctions as "One must know the soul, meditate on it, etc."[79] which are expressed in differnt passages; this meaning, then, is that one must know the omniscient soul which is beatitude, i.e. an injunction. That the soul is the object of an injunction does not by itself however prove that the soul exists as an established fact; for there can also be an injunction that a certain thing be such while actually it is not so; for example the injunction, "Know your father in someone who is not your father," or "Know that the

syllable OM, which is not the udgītha, is the udgītha."[80] All statements that set forth the reality and the eternality of the soul only serve to convey that there is a spiritual agent, who is required in order to experience the otherworldly fruits that are mentioned in ritual injunctions where the time of fruition is not specified.[81]

Therefore, no verbal statement whatever is a means of knowing a thing *as such*. Thus, by denying that the arthavādas, [82] too, can serve to convey knowledge of *facts* like Rudra's weeping, it is shown that they merely serve to give praise in contextual connection with an injunction, which may be comparatively remote.[83]

41. To conclude, it follows that the postulated divine person, whose personality is the product of the baseless beliefs of people that have failed to consider the true denotation of preceding or succeeding statements, is eliminated, with which we conclude our extensive discussion.

42. It is proved now that the pre-eminence of that postulated person cannot be borne out by Scripture. Let us, further, suppose that Scripture can indeed convey knowledge of facts; even so, what possible basis is there for the assumption that there exists a person who knows *dharma* and *adharma*, when we take into account the cognition that arises from injunction? Omniscience[84] is possible only if the omniscient person knows the objects exactly as they are known by means of the different means of knowledge; for there is no statement which declares omniscience by cancelling the normal means of knowledge. Even if there were such a statement, it would have to be explained as an

arthavāda since its word-meanings would not allow of mutual relation. A cognition about a sentence-meaning arises from the individual words and it presupposes in these words such properties as appropriateness etc.[85] which are learnt through other means of knowledge; now we wonder how such a cognition could arise at all, if there were a conflict with these other means of knowledge that are required primarily for the cognition to arise! If a statement concerning an object that is contradicted by perception etc., were authoritative, who could then reject the identity of sun and sacrificial pole?[86] And if there is a person who possesses this peculiar excellency, what happens to the authority of the texts which is sought to be proved?[87]

43. OBJECTION. However, those who follow the Pañcarātra clan have the tradition that this Pañcarātra has been composed by this person.

REFUTATION. But why do the Pāśupatas then not agree with their view? They, too, claim that the sovereign of the universe is the promulgator of their own system, and others have the same claims. Now they cannot all of them be omniscient, because then it would be impossible for them to set forth mutually contradictory teachings. The same ground which allows one among several discussants to prove an omniscient promulgator must hold equally for all of them. But which one among the many omniscient beings who propound mutually conflicting teachings while claiming each for himself the prerogative of omniscience, which one do we conclude is the one and only omniscient God? As the text says, "If there are several omniscient beings who propound incompatible

doctrines and if for each of them the arguments are equally valid, then whom can we elicit as the true and only one?"[88] When each omniscient being is assumed on the basis of one's own Tantra doctrine since the various tantric doctrines are mutually in conflict, the *result will be that none of them is authoritative.*

44. OBJECTION. How can the teaching of Vāsudeva himself, who is well-known in Revelation and Tradition, be brought to the same level as other Tantras? For the manifestation of His power has been revealed in the Puruṣa Hymn, "*The earth sprang from* his feet, the quarters of the sky from his ears;"[89] and again, "The creator created sun and moon as before;"[90] likewise, "He is Brahmā, he is Śiva;"[91] "Viṣṇu's *highest step;*"[92] "*No one is his lord in this world, no* one his commander; he has no sign."[93] In this way, the statements of Revelation describe his manifestation characterized by His origination, maintenance and *annihilation of the world.* Similarly, *the Tradition:* "From Viṣṇu arose the world, in him does it subsist; he is the one who causes it to exist and to perish," said Parāśara[94]; Manu, too, declared that He is the lord: "Nārāyaṇa is above the unmanifest, and the World-egg is produced by the unmanifest."[95]

This Supreme Person who is continually praised for His knowledge and supremacy in the statements of Revelation and of the sages has created Pañcarātra. If this Tantra is then on a level with Tantras that are apostate from the path of Revelation, then one might as well reason that a *soma-drinker is on* a level with a wine-drinker, just because he is a drinker! *Is this*

Tantra not superior? Wherefore, then, are the qualities of immaculate knowledge, supremacy etc. of the Bhagavān not currently attributed also to the Destroyer of the Three Cities in the texts of Revelation? Therefore, it is absurd to hold the equality of the Tantras promulgated by both. Or, since He is the God who is the cause of the origination, protection and destruction of the universe and for whom the entire Vedānta furnishes evidence to the exclusion of anyone else, how could He promulgate a doctrine that is outside the pales of the Veda?

45. OBJECTION. Nevertheless,[96] a fair number of śrutis are found which ascribe omniscience and omnipotence to lord Paśupati as well: "He who is all-knowing, omniscient;"[97] "The supreme great sovereign of sovereigns."[98]

REPLY. By secondary denotation these two words "omniscient" and "sovereign" apply not only to the one who actually is omniscient and sovereign, but also to others, not excepting God Siva, who are *as it were* all-knowing and supreme. Besides, if in the above quotation *yaḥ sarvajñaḥ śarvavit* the word *sarvajña* were indeed used to describe the omniscient one, there would be tautology of *sarvavit*.

Consequently, the word *sarvajña* refers only to Mahādeva; and so the Skanda-Purāṇa, Linga-Purāṇa and other Purāṇas exhaust themselves in describing this all knowing and sovereign character of Siva. Therefore, since the Pāśupata Tantra has been promulgated by this Pāśupati, it acquires authority in this way; but

the reversion of the authority of all Tantras in consequence of their mutual contradictions applies to this Pāśupata Tantra too.

46. Further, granted that the Lord Vāsudeva is the Person known in the upaniṣads, *how then can the theory be held of him that he has promulgated the Pañcarātra Tantra which conflicts with Revelation—of* him who said, "Revelation and Tradition are my commands?"[99] Thus we conclude that there has been a deceiver who assumed the name of Vāsudeva and under that name composed the Tantra under discussion.

Or else, suppose that Vāsudeva Himself, ruler of the entire universe, was the promulgator of this Tantra; they still say that Hari, whose personal manifestations are *deceptive because of his power of illusion, has* promulgated these unholy texts deceivingly under the guise of holy texts in *order to destroy the whole mass* of enemies of the gods. Now, has he indeed composed this Tantra, leading the faithful into the mysterious abyss of his grand power of illusion, or not? This is the question that now arises. How are we to resolve it? *Or are we rather to understand that he composed* this Tantra while he himself was in error, since it is not accepted by the followers of the Veda, just as the doctrine of the Jainas is not *accepted? That the* followers of the Veda do not accept it has been set forth at length above.[100] Consequently, then, Pañcarātra Tantra *is not authoritative* because it derives from the cognition of an independent Person.

47. Nor is it proper to argue the validity of the Pañcarātra Tradition "like the *Manu Tradition etc.*"[101]

If the God has composed the Tantra after having, like manu etc., learnt the meaning of the Veda from a teacher who was satisfied with his pupil's obedience, then the assumption that He was independent is purposeless and false. It is not borne out by human experience that the Veda was immediately manifest to him, even though he never learnt it. The defects which the Author of the Vārttika enumerates, those of personal superiority and inferiority etc.,[102] are all to be presumed in the case of Pañcarātra.

48. Moreover, the Saivite, Pāśupata, Buddhist, Jainist, Kāpālika and Pañcarātra teachings are traditionally known as heretical. On the basis of the distinction between Vedic and Tantric we arrive at the conclusion that Pañcarātra is outside the Veda. "Tantra is of four kinds: Saiva, Pāśupata, Saumya and Lāguḍa; thus are described the divisions of Tantra; one should not confuse them." Likewise: "There are three distinct doctrines, the Bhākta, the Bhāgavata and the Sātvata;" this description of the divisions of Tantra is also found in Pañcarātra.

49. Furthermore, that a doctrine destitute of all logic and embracing the view that the soul knows birth, which is rejected by Revelation and Tradition, should be Truth is a highly ludicrous contention. Thus we find the śruti, "Verily, this soul is unperishing, essentially indestructible; it is not conjoined with size;"[103] and, "This dies without the soul; the soul does not die."[104]

OBJECTION. This is all very well, but all that this statement says is that the soul is not destroyed, not that it is not born.

REFUTATION. No, by stating that it cannot be destroyed, it also decides that it cannot be born; it is impossible that an entity that has been born does not perish.

OBJECTION. Nonetheless, from the emphasis which in the statement "only sat was here ..."[105] is laid on the uniqueness of sat, it follows that there were no souls before the time of creation. Had the individual soul existed before why then this emphasis of "*only sat*" on sat's absolute solitariness?

REFUTATION. The reply to this is that here the emphasis on sat's uniqueness is with regard to the elements of wind, water and ether that were about to be created by sat. Were the soul excluded by this statement of sat's solitariness, then the soul's origin would have been described in the sequel, just as the creation of ether is described. This is not done; therefore the soul does not know birth, since in the sequel "That sat created fire, etc."[106] we do not hear of the creation of the individual soul.

OBJECTION. However, in the text *yato vā imāni bhūtāni* etc.[107] we hear that the souls too know origin, continuance and reabsorption. Here the word *bhūta* denotes the *jīva*, the individual soul; for thus we find the word used in the passage *bhrāmayan sarvabhūtāni*.[108] The verb *jīvanti* "they live" in the text can only apply to the souls, the expression *tena jāyante* "by whom they are born" evidently refers to these same souls.

REFUTATION. This is not right. The word *bhūta* commonly denotes only the elements ether, wind, fire, water and earth. If the word is used for something

else, it is used metaphorically. Of these elements, ether etc. which are primarily understood by the word *bhūta*, it is stated that they are variously modified[109] and that they live. The verb "they live" describes a condition of being analogous to living. And if the word *bhūta* be used in the sense of individual soul, then too the statement declares that the soul is born only in the sense that its entrance into a body is a birth. Therefore, when the word *bhūta* refers to the individual soul, it can rightly be said that the souls are born, just as it is said that the cow, once born walks about. There are śrutis to this effect, like "For the soul, unborn, alone—"[110] and we also have other śrutis which declare that the soul is unborn. Similarly, the word of the Lord: "Know that both matter and spirit are without beginning;"[111] "this ancient spirit is unborn, eternal, everlasting;"[112] "it is never born nor does it die"[113] etc. Finally there is the syllogism: the individual soul in question never knows birth; for, while being substantial, it is bodiless, as it consists of spirit, like the Supreme Soul.

50. There are some who notice the logical defects inherent in the view that Scripture of a personal origin, which we have explained above, and having no other course open posit that Tantra too must be eternal. Against this position, we state that it is sublated by the fact that its author, who is patent enough and tacitly remembered, is not forgotten at all; and hence this position does not deserve our notice.

51. Besides, why has the argument about the Pāśupatas etc. been swept aside with a stick? If one

replies, let the argument stand, we shall have the defect of mutual exclusion. And Vāsudeva's authorship of the Tantra, which is *commonly known to* everybody, can no more be rejected than the prefer-personal origin of the Veda. Or else, if someone says that any of the three means of knowledge is in the case of Pāśupata Tantra cancelled by *non*-appearance,[114] reversion and dubiety, the answer is, your own postulation applies equally well to the Lāguḍa doctrine[115], *and once you know this, it is refuted. Your worship* better keep quiet.

52. To sum up. For the reasons set forth above we maintain that the exposure of this Tantra's incompatibility with Revelation, Tradition, Epic and Purāṇa as well as with the conclusions of our logical demonstration, and the inacceptability of this Tantra to all exemplary persons go to show that the Pañcarātra *texts* must have been composed by someone who pretended to teach a path that would lead to heaven and salvation, but actually wished to deceive the world. Concerning its apocryphal character, which we have now exposed, we have the declaration: "The traditional teachings that are outside the Veda and all other false doctrines remain fruitless in the afterworld, for they are considered to derive from *tamas*." Those who follow the Veda are forbidden to speak with those who follow such evil paths: "The following are not to be honoured even with a word: heretics, criminals, impostors, crooks, thieves and hypocrites are not to be honoured even with a word."

53. In the manner[116] presented above the *prima-facie* case can be made that the Pañcarātra in its

entirety has no validity whatever as a means of knowledge. Against this *prima-facie* case we now submit that the Tantra in question must be accepted as valid, because it produces faultless knowledge, like the scriptural statements on the Vedic sacrifices jyotiṣṭoma etc.

54. Now, *such defects as are elicited by the* science of logic cannot be detected in this inference. Let us consider the Object of the Proposition. The Object of the Proposition is, by definition, the content of a certain thesis is proposed; it is a term which itself is established, and of which it is now to be proved that it is particularized by another term, which is also established.[117] In the present case the term which particularizes the object is not unknown, for this term, sc. "validity," is for both parties established with regard to the valid means of knowledge, Perception, Inference, Verbal Testimony etc. Nor is the subject itself unknown, for the Pañcarātra system is known universally. Nor is the Object to be proved already proved, for this Object, "The Pañcarātra is valid," is not proved for the opponent. Nor is this Object incompatible with Perception, since its opposite, sc. non-validity, is beyond perceptual verifiability. Nor is this Object incompatible with Inference, because no inference proving non-validity is found.

55. OBJECTION. *But such an inference is actually* found: Pañcarātra Śāstra is non-authoritative, because it is non-Vedic, like Buddhism.

REFUTATION. We reply, What is this non-authoritativeness which this reasoning seeks to prove?

If it is defined by the fact that the Tantra does not produce knowledge, then this definition militates against Perception; for the knowledge which arises in a student, who is able to comprehend the relation between word and meaning, concerning the meaning of the sentences of Pañcarātra Śāstra he hears is perceptually evident. Nor is the predicate, sc. "non-authoritativeness," defined by dubiety, since then we have the same conflict with Perception; for the statement, "One must worship the four-armed Supreme Person in the centre of the lotus," does not occasion a doubtful cognition: "Must one worship Him *thus* or not?" Nor, in the third place, is the predicate defined by *reversion, since there is no non-apprehension of* what should be there,[118] and since, the presumption of future *reversion* militates against Perception and would put an end to all operations. This point shall be discussed in detail later on.

56. Objection. Still, the proposed validity of Pañcarātra militates against Scripture. Since in Pañcarātra Āgama we have its meaning conveyed exactly as it is, *this conflict* between Scripture and Pañcarātra is not vicious only if Pañcarātra is not authoritative.

Refutation. Why, if that were so, that would mean that if its authority is *disproved by Scripture* it is proved by Inference, and if it is proved by inference it is disproved by Scripture;[119] which is a vicious circle.

57. *Besides, what does this mean,* "*being* non-Vedic, or outside the Veda?" If it means that

Pañcarātra is different from the Veda, we have an occasional application to Perception etc., which are also different from the Veda. If, in order to avoid this defect, the ground is thus specified, 'because, while being language, it is different from the Veda,' we have a *hetvantaram* deadlock, which, as they say, occurs when into a syllogism with an unqualified ground and additional qualification is accepted.[120] Also, we then have an occasional application to the statements of Manu, which also are language and different from the Veda. If then, my slow-witted opponent, in order to remove this defect from your ground you claim that being outside the Veda means "not deriving from the Veda," then what do you, logician, think of it?

Well, by this definition of the ground we get the meaning, "something, namely in case there is question of language-statements, is non-Vedic, because it does not derive from the Veda." But then there is an occasional application to the Veda itself, which does not derive from the Veda! When the ground is redefined as "because it does not derive from the Veda, in case of a language-statement but not a Vedic statement," then again there would inevitably be an occasional application to statements of reliable persons which do not derive from the Veda and yet are valid, like "There are trees on the river-bank." If the reason is further corrected into: "because it does not derive from the Veda, namely, in case of a language-statement —but not a Vedic statement—and this statement concerns an action to be taken," then still we have a vicious applicability to such precepts as "One must eat little when one has indigestion." Again, if the ground is

then reformulated as "because it does not derive from the Veda, in case of a statement specified by all the above specifications and also concerned with *dharma* and *adharma*," then this ground is partly impertinent, because Pañcarātra Śāstra does not deal with *dharma* and *adharma* exclusively, since the great majority of its statements concern Brahman. If then, the specification is added "....when it deals with objects that are outside the scope of other pramāṇas," then again the ground does not fully apply, for hundreds of Śrutis demonstrate that the Perception of God encompasses all things related to *dharma* and *adharma*. We shall discuss this point presently;[121] this suffices for the time being to expose the baseless fancies of those who have not made a study of Akṣapāda's[122] system. Other conceivable inferences will be presented; and refuted, later on.

We conclude therefore, that the proposition "Pañcarātra is authoritative," is not in conflict with Inference.

58. Nor is it in conflict with Scripture, for hundreds of scriptural statements, like idaṃ mahopaniṣadam, will be adduced which set forth that Pañcarātra is authoritative. There are no grounds to suspect in our proposition anyone of the three kinds of contradiction of language-statements; namely, contradiction within the terms of the statement; contradiction with one's own thesis; or contradiction with universally accepted facts.

First, there is no contradiction within the statement. This type of contradiction is of three kinds: of

mere utterance; or utterance of property; and of utterance of substance. Firstly, the proposition is not contradicted by its mere utterance, for the statement of the thesis "Pañcarātra Śāstra is authoritative" does not cancel its own content, as does, for instance, the statement: "During my entire life I have kept silence." Secondly, there is no contradiction through utterance of property, as for example the statement: "All statements are untrue;" for the authoritativeness predicated of Pañcarātra does not cancel the proposition. Thirdly, there is no contradiction through utterance of substance, since in the given substance a connection with the given property is not contradictory: Pañcarātra is not contradicted by its property authoritativeness, as motherhood is contradicted by the property sterility. For upon the assertion of the authoritativeness of the substance in question, it is not contradicted by any particular substance named in Revelation, since the imputation of questionableness is secondary, as in the case of the assertion that certain acts of violence which are enjoined are against the dharma.[123] There is, therefore, no contradiction by language-statement; so that we conclude that the proposition is presentable.

59. Nor is the ground affected by logical defects, like occasional application etc. The ground is not occasionally applicable to other terms. This fallacy of occasionalness is of two kinds, general occasionalness and special occasionalness. An instance of the first kind provides the ground in the argument: "The earth is eternal, because it is knowable."[124] Of the second kind: "The earth is eternal, because it possesses

smell."[125] Our ground, namely, 'Pañcarātra is authoritative, *because it produces faultless knowledge*', does not apply equally whether it is authoritative or not, which would render the ground generally-occasional.[126] For this ground, namely its being a cause of faultless knowledge, has not been found before in the alternative propositions that Pañcarātra is deceptive and hence non-authoritative. Neither does the ground have a specially-occasional application, because the illustration "like statements on Vedic sacrifices such as *jyotiṣṭoma* etc." shows its connection with other instances on the same side of the argument.

Nor is the ground precluded, since there is no concomitance of its opposite; being a cause of faultless knowledge is not invariably accompanied by non-authoritativeness. Nor is the ground cancelled by lapse of time, since there is no conflict with Perception and in this it is analogous with Scripture.

Nor is the ground itself unproved or unestablished. If a ground is unestablished, this is because either its locus or its essence is unestablished. The first does not apply, for its locus is Pañcarātra Sāstra, which is proved to exist. Nor does the second apply: for there are three ways in which a ground may be unestablished as to its essence: through ignorance, through dubiety, or through reversion. Ignorance does not apply, as follows from the fact that the words describing the ground are pronounced.[127] Nor does dubiety apply, for that the ground is correct is undoubted and self-evident to the defender of the proposition, while for the opponent the same is easily proved by the fact that

no defects are apprehended in it. That the ground would be unestablished through reversal is utterly out of the question.

60. OBJECTION. But how can we discard the supposition that the Pañcarātra texts are faulty?[128] This supposition arises instantly since the texts are of personal origin.

REFUTATION. How do you avoid the same supposition in the case of the Vedas? There too it arises instantly, since the Vedas are language-statements. When you reply, it is avoided because the Vedas have no personal author, then you may realize that in our case, too, it is avoided, since the Tantras have been composed by the Supreme Person, who is omniscient and eternally satisfied, and you may keep quiet!

What I mean to say is this. Our position is that in language as such there are no defects that invalidate its authority[129]; as language, language is authoritative. Its authority is in certain cases invalidated by defects in the character of the speaker, for instance in a language statement, "There is a herd of elephants on my finger-tip." The statements in the upaniṣad portion of the Veda remove whatever suspicion we may have about any defects in the character of the speaker in the text collection here under discussion. For the Vedānta texts set forth that the omniscient Lord of the world is supremely compassionate; then how can we suppose Him to be deceitful etc.?

61. OBJECTION. However, I have said that language statements have no authority when they concern established facts, on the ground that when terms are applied to such facts they do not have proper denotative power.

REFUTATION. This view is not correct. Profane language, eliciting a fact by direct application, even though this fact is established, really operates its denoting power as fully as it does by applications which concern kāryas. Consider the illustration that has been given above[130]. When certain manifestations (of joy) in a man's face, which follow on his hearing the statement "A son has been born to you," make it appear that the man spoken-to is happy, one instantly understands that his happiness is the result of his receiving from this statement a knowledge of an agreeable meaning, and one then infers that, for a medium-aged person too, this happiness derives from the statement. Thus one concludes that, since this happiness came to exist upon the existence of the statement, the statement itself has the power to convey an agreeable meaning. If there arises a doubt as to which particular ground of happiness among the many different grounds that may occur according to past, present and future, then consider this. A young boy, who wants to understand the meaning of speech, immediately upon hearing the same statement receives knowledge that a birth ceremony is being held. He thinks to himself, "There must be a reason for this." Then he considers, "Is the agreeable meaning which has been understood from the statement the cause of this knowledge that a birth ceremony is to be held?" and he realizes that this meaning was precisely this that a son had been born.[131]

And on that issue: Definite knowledge of the donation of words in a sentence is had through the words that are included or excluded. This being so,

words denote their meanings, whether these are established things or not.

62. OBJECTION. However, the relation of cause and effect is not just known from the fact that one comes into existence upon the existence of the other, for that would mean over-extension. Nor does the realization that a birth ceremony is to be held follow invariably upon the knowledge of an agreeable meaning; for we find also that the same realization follows upon a feeling of distress, namely when the informed father is vexed by the trouble of maintaining his family.[132]

REFUTATION. Don't we find that the realization of a *kārya* is caused by a verbal statement, so that we can agree that, for example, the realization that a cow is to be fetched following a statement "Fetch the cow" is indeed caused by that statement? When you say that, since this realization cannot occur without a cause therefore the proximate statement must in that case be the cause of the realization, then I maintain that the same holds also in the case of "A son is born."

It has been decided by our opponent that the verbal denotation of a meaning which causes an action to be taken is a result of the inclusion in the statement of a *liṅādi* suffix.[133] He who maintains that all words only bear meaningfully on *kārya*, maintains in effect that *padārthas*[134] exist only in *kārya* statements and that e.g. in the case of cows, horses and the like, which are related to bodies, their being a *padārtha* is ascertained by the inclusion or exclusion of the words denoting them in a statement concerning *kārya*. If he says, indeed, whenever their being a *padārtha* is significantly

construed, it is construed just as connected with *kārya*, we reply, Stop being obstinate; for verbal exchange is also possible through denotation of words that are connected with other things than *kāryas.*

63. It is necessary to accept the position that words are denotative of connected meanings, for otherwise it would be impossible to explain that they are denotative of meanings connected with kāryas. The definition 'the thing meant by a word is always connected with a kārya' fails to cover the defined topic completely; for it does not apply in the case of injunctive suffixes, *since these suffixes denote their own meanings as connected, not with* kārya, *but with consequences of already established facts, such as* proper qualification on the part of the person enjoined etc.[195] *Or if it is said that in their case there is* denotation of connected meanings and in the other case denotation of meanings connected with kārya, we reply that this is a neither old nor young, argument;[196] it is more appropriate simply to accept the view that there is denotation of connected meanings in general.

64. Therefore, the adherents of all schools should accept that words have proper denotation for the meanings they denote because these meanings are connected with other meanings that are required to complete the sense of the statement, are closely collocated and are appropriate. Even if the denoting power of language were to be understood only through its proper signification in kārya statements alone,[197] even so it is correct when we decide the denotation of language to take the standpoint that *kārya* is just one of the inessential factors of denotation, *like the identity*

of the speaker, the extent of space in which a statement can be heard etc. The logicians hold the view that the meaning of a language statement cannot be known except by language statement.[138] Consequently, there exists no inherent relationship with *kārya* as cause of denotation in uses of words that have their proper signification, just as is the case with floating precious stones on water. Just as this floating, however helpful it may be to determine the identity of certain diamonds, e.g. the brahmin diamond, serves no purpose when a stone is being transacted which has already been properly identified, similarly the kārya, however helpful to understand the proper signification of a word, serves no purpose once its proper signification has been identified.

65. Moreover, if words denote their meanings only as connected with kārya, then how can we know from them that, for example, there is a relation between a fruit and a river-bank, is in a statement: "There is a fruit on the river-bank?" If you say that a statement of such a substantive relation does not denote the relation it states through its primary sense, but through secondary sense, then, we may ask, where do statements then have their primary sense? If you answer: in a *kārya* which is not previously known through other means of knowledge, we reply: no, for then no use of words would be possible, since their meaning would not yet have been identified. Naturally there can be no knowledge of the meaning of a word when that word denotes a meaning not previously known through other means of knowledge, and no cognition can arise from words with unknown meanings, for that would entail over-extension.

66. OBJECTION. My position is this. In ordinary language a statement is understood to have its proper signification when it bears on a *kārya* that is to be accomplished with a certain action. In Vedic language a statement enjoys a special power of denotation which transcends the transitory root-sense of the word "sacrificing", and it has this power of denotation because it is the means of realizing a certain fruit and acquires this power on account of the collocation of words describing this fruit; whereas in ordinary language, since there verbal exchange is possible also to the unsophisticated, this determination of the nature of word and meaning is not attended to.

REFUTATION. This position is just wishful thinking; for a language statement, even if understood in your way as bearing meaningfully only on a *kārya* to be accomplished with an action,[139] does not by that token set forth a permanent *kārya*,[140] since that would mean over-extension. If we cannot know the true connection of words even when the usage of our elders, through which the denotations of these words is understood, takes place in accordance with these words, then we can never know their connection! If a language statement has lost its postulated true denoting power because it is impossible, it does not thereby acquire another denoting power. In such cases we surely must assume *lakṣaṇā*.[141] For when certain words are collocated that have incompatible meanings, these words do not therefore denote something else altogether, for then all word meanings would become unreliable.

67. Besides, we do not admit that the fact that a word has the power to communicate a *kārya* that is not

previously known through other means of knowledge proves that there actually exists a relationship between itself and the fruit of the action it enjoins. The only relation proved of it is that with injunction, not with instrumentality. That in a statement there subsists a relation with a *kārya* which transcends the root-sense of the verb cannot be proved except by the relation of kārya with the fruit of the act, and the latter relation cannot be proved without the former. And therefore there is a vicious interdependence that cannot be refuted. If there is no factor which activates the person who, according to the injunction, is specified by the heaven that is to be achieved, the injunction itself cannot be the means of achieving the desired heaven. The root-sense of the words being transitory, the statement itself cannot function as this means.[142] Therefore the assertion that a language statement communicates as its proper meaning a kārya which exceeds this transitory root-sense, cannot be correct. A person is not specified by heaven as the object to be achieved,[143] but it is the person who *desires* heaven who is enjoined upon to accomplish the act. Heaven cannot be the specification of the person's qualification, because heaven is yet to be achieved. Only something that has already been achieved, that actually exists, can specify the person upon whom an act is enjoined, for instance, the real fact of his being alive etc. Consequently only his desire can specify his qualification for the act.

68. Furthermore, precisely how is heaven, which in your opinion functions as the specification of the person enjoined, an object to be realized, a *sādhya*?

If its being a *sādhya* means that it is fit for a relation with a *sādhana*, it is impossible for heaven to be *siddha*, as long as its relatability obtains, since it cannot become *siddha* in the meantime.[144] The only authority that exists for heaven becoming *siddha* in the end is the injunction itself, while the only authority for the injunction is just this that heaven *does* become *siddha*. This is plainly a vicious circle. If heaven is the *sādhya*, the injunction is not the *sādhya*. It is not possible to combine two *sādhyas* in one sentence.

69. OBJECTION. Indeed, the unity of a sentence is broken up[145] when it contains two *sādhyas* that are independent, but not when the two are interdependent. And here the two *sādhyas* are interdependent since the realization of heaven is contained in the realization of the injunction. That is what the Author says: "When the niyoga is realized, everything else in accordance with it is also realized;" and: "Why should the realization of the fruit not be held to be subservient to the realization of the injunction ?"[146] Therefore there is no conflict here.

REFUTATION. No; unless heaven is realized, how can the injunction be realized? Without the realization of heaven neither the qualification, nor the object, nor anything else required by the injunction is realized.

70. OBJECTION. In the case of the qualifications for periodical rites the injunction does not require the realization of any fruit.[147] Nor does an injunction to one act fail to apply to a person who really desires another fruit. The pre-eminence[148] is really the injunction's; a person is enjoined upon by the injunc-

tion to any act in the same way as he is enjoined upon to perform the periodical acts. For the injunction draws unto itself the desirous person who himself thinks that the heaven which he desires is the principal object, in the same way as the injunction to perform the periodical acts activates a person, even though he does not desire anything, to these acts which bear no fruit at all.

Besides, a person who is desirous of heaven also opens and shuts his eyes; for you these actions do not subserve his realization of heaven. Why not consider the sacrificing an action of the same kind? There are some who do not accept that it is a means of realizing heaven.

71. REFUTATION. If that is the view, we ask: Are the sacrifice etc., which are to be grasped by the cognition that they are such means, eliminated from the injunction? On this point: When the injunction does not mean to convey a relation between the object to be realized and the means of realizing it, then all acts are fruitless.

Therefore, it is sound to maintain that from the injunctive suffixes there results first the cognition that they are indeed the means to realize the desired object, and that subsequently the desire for this object prompts a person to undertake the act of realization. But it is improper to maintain that the primary denotation occurs in the expressing of a meaning that was previously unknown, and that the denotation in the expressing of any other meaning is secondary. We conclude that ordinary, non-Vedic statements give rise to cognitions concerning meanings that are just so established by these statements.

72. Objection. But these cognitions do not arise from the denoting power of language, but result from Inference. For these statements, though their denotations in conveying certain meanings are consciously known once their proper meanings have been learnt, do not furnish complete certainty about their meanings merely upon being heard by a listener, when they are accompanied by doubt which is created by the listener's observation that in one case or other statements have deviated from their proper meanings. And, unless there be complete certainty, the meaning will remain unknown; for no knowledge can arise in one's mind from uncertainty.

If the meaning of a statement is not known, the listener wants to discover it: "The speaker uses words whose meanings apparently admit of being connected; and reliable persons do not use words whose connections are unknown;" and the listener realizes that therefore the speaker has knowledge of such a connection. If the knowledge of connection is thus *inferred*, the meaning discovered by the listener does not require the authority of verbal testimony. Consequently, since ordinary language statements are dependent on the speaker's cognition, they terminate in that cognition through Inference alone.

73. Refutation. This view is not correct; for a word conveys its right meaning as its natural function, and the observation that in one case the statement happened to be untrue under the influence of defects in the speaker's character should not give rise to a general suspicion which would cause all statement to give up its natural capacity of conveying its meaning.

The suspicion that a fire may not burn in other cases because in one case, when obstructed by mantras, it fails to burn, does not make fire fail to burn! And the fact that the sense of vision may give rise to a cognition which does not correspond to reality—e.g. that nacre is silver—as the result of some optical error does not signify that the visual sense cannot produce true cognition of the visible presence of a pitcher etc.

Therefore, a statement does indeed instantly convey a certain meaning to the listener if he knows the relation between the words and their meanings. It does not require knowledge of the basis. Before there is complete knowledge on the part of the listener about the basic knowledge of the speaker, and, further, when the meaning has been expressed, the question rises: "*How* does he know this?" and Inference proceeds to resolve that question. You want to infer: "*Did* the speaker know *something*?" or wish to infer his knowledge of the connection of the different meanings. But the mere knowledge that the speaker knew something is not enough for utterance and action concerning a statement—meaning to proceed. Inference of a cognition concerning the connection of different meanings is impossible without a prior cognition of such a connection. This being so, the meaning of the statement must be known first. For cognitions whose particular objects are not connected, are not connected themselves. Nor is a particular meaning established by cognitions that are inferred to be such. If you say that any word combination which is able to convey a certain connection produces knowledge of just this connection, I maintain that the connection of the particular meanings must be

known previously; unless a connection has already reached the level of cognition it cannot give rise to being expressed in a statement.

74. To conclude, the cognition of an established fact in statements like "there is a fruit on the river-bank" is strictly of verbal origin and does not arise from Inference. Therefore the position that statements produce valid knowledge only if they deal with a *previously unknown kārya is taken only by people whose* judgments are stultified by their continuous preoccupation with their own theories. In the manner set forth above it is true that statements may bear meaningfully and informatively on other meanings as well.

Consequently, all the statements of the Upaniṣads which set forth the existence of a categorically different Person (e.g. "*He is the overlord of the Universe, sovereign of all. He commands all the world*",[149] "All this is manifest to Him[150] etc.") are authoritative etc.") are authoritative as to what they state, since they produce indubitable and unreversed knowledge of their contents.

75. Nor do statements concerning established *facts lose their authority simply because of the con*sideration that repetition or reversion might be anticipated on the strength of our assumption that either a corroborating or an invalidating cognition about the same facts could conceivably occur; for the same thing would also apply to statements concerning *kārya*. Besides, a *kārya* can also be known through other means of knowledge, e.g. the *kārya* that firewood is to be fetched; for it has been admitted that that *kārya* can also be known through another means of knowledge as

in the case of the cooking of the *odana*.[151] Or if a statement which sets forth a kārya about a categorically different act like the agnihotra is held to be authoritative because no other authority for it can be conceived to exist,—why, since there is not a ghost of other authority for the existence of the Bhagavān whose personality consists in unsurpassed knowledge, sovereignty and beatitude, it is all the same, depending on what partisan view one takes!

Moreover, if a cognition concerning a content that is also known through another means of knowledge does not recognize its own content as authoritative, since it has already been taken care of by another authority, this non-authoritativenes of its content is beyond experience for it is a mere matter of assumption. Therefore it must be maintained that all indubitable and unreversed knowledge is authoritative, regardless of whether its content is established, or yet to be performed, or anything else. Hence we reject our opponent's position.

76. The objection[152] that omniscience is acquired by means of the regular senses is incorrect,[153] because śruti contradicts it: "He sees without eyes, hears with ears; he who does not see with the eye, who sees the eyes, has neither effect nor instrument;"[154] "knowledge, strength and action are natural to Him,"[155] etc. These śrutis do not speak metaphorically, for there is no authority for this assumption. Metaphorical usage is assumed when the primary meanings of the śrutis make no sense. Since the primary meaning here makes sense, the assumption of metaphorical use is baseless.

77. OBJECTION. But in this case we have in fact reason to cancel the primay meaning, because the primary sense militates against other means of knowledge.

REFUTATION. What other means of knowledge? Not, to start, Perception, for we see no Perception occur which shows that the said Person is non-existent. If you retort that non-existence is decided by the non-apprehension of what should be there, we reply that this does not hold in our case since the object, that is the said Person, is actually apprehended through Scripture itself, which is the highest-ranking among the assembly of the means of knowledge. Nor does it militate against Inference; for how could an Inference which disproves that Person arise at all, slow-moving as it is, when its object is instantly refuted by the rapidly arising scriptural cognition? Moreover, if this were so, the relation of sacrificing etc. to heaven, *apūrva*[156] etc., would logically be contradicted by the fact that sacrificing etc. are actions, when Scripture did not cancel such reasoning. True, the identity of sacrificial pole and sun, which is asserted by Scripture, is cancelled by another means of knowledge, namely Perception alone, because the difference between a piece of wood and the disc of the sun is indeed obvious. Besides, in this case it is legitimate to assume metaphorical usage, for the statement of this identity is an *arthavāda*, since it forms one single statement with the proximate injunction about the unction of the sacrificial pole.[157] There is no other injunction to which it could be accessory as an *arthavāda*. Alternatively, inasmuch as the human importance of a

statement would be lost if there were no injunction to connect it with, an injunction may be supplemented and then the arthavāda is regarded as accessory to that supplemented injunction.

78. The objection[158] that as long as statements fail to prompt the operator of the means of knowledge to being active or to prevent him from being active, they do not communicate self-sufficient information, does not hold good. For, we find that statements have human importance also outside any connection with an injunction; in such a case it will be as in the statement "A son has been born to you," and the like. Nor need an injunction be supplemented in these cases. For without an injunction, too, joy arises from the information that a son has been born. Likewise, a statement which is self-sufficient in merely expressing particular actions which questioners want to know in exchanges of question and answer—e.g. "Which action?" "Cooking!"—do not require the supplementation of an injunction. In the upaniṣadic texts the knowledge of brahman is declared to be rewarded by great bliss: "the brahman-knower becomes brahman"; [159] "the brahman knower attains the supreme"; [160] "the *sāman* cantor attains with brahman all that he desires:"[161] the human importance of statements without injunctions is quite clear from these and other scriptural words.

To sum up, when it is established that the Bhagavân is the treasury solely of beautiful qualities of direct universal cognition, compassionateness etc., qualities which are true and natural to Him, and which we know from hundreds of quoted śrutis, then it

is also established that the Tantra which is based on His universal cognition is authoritative indeed.

79. OBJECTION. Granted that, as you have described it, there exists some Person who is endowed with natural omniscience, as it is known from the upaniṣads, yet, unless it is absolutely certain that this Person is indeed Hari, Pañcarātra will not be authoritative.

REFUTATION. This is a worthless remark; no experts in the Veda dispute that the Supreme Soul, cause of the entire universe, is Vāsudeva. For He is revealed in the upaniṣads as the Supreme Soul: "Truth, knowledge, infinite; that is the supreme step of Viṣṇu. Vāsudeva is the ultimate matter, the ultimate spirit"[162] "He was alone beyond who became this world"; "higher than whom there is nothing at all" in accordance with the subject expressed in these statements there are passages like: "From whom these beings ..." "*Sat* alone, my son .." Therefore Viṣṇu's perfect knowledge is established by the upaniṣads. And it is not declared in śruti that the origination, subsistence and destruction of the world are caused by anyone but Him. Hence there is a consensus that He is the supreme omniscient soul.

That He is the Supreme Soul we learn also from the statements of Dvaipāyana, Parāśara, Nārada and other great seers. Thus: "Know thou, O tormentor of thy foes, that the entire world rests on Viṣṇu. The Great Viṣṇu creates the totality of creatures, moving and unmoving. In him they go to their reabsorption, from Him they originate." "The glorious Sage Nārāyaṇa, without beginning or end, is the sovereign

Lord. He creates the creatures, those that stand still and those that move. That He is the Supreme Brahman is also learnt elsewhere. Keśava, O best of the Bharatas, the Blessed One, is the sovereign, the supreme soul, the entire universe: thus it stands revealed in many places of the Scripture."[163] "For those who seek to know the supreme principle by means of many-sided reasonings Hari alone is the Principle, the great Yogin, Nārāyaṇa the Lord."[164]

Likewise in the Dānadharma,

"Padmanābha is the Supreme Soul, the highest One, the pure One, the Refuge. This is the secret doctrine of the Veda; dost thou not know, sacker of cities? By His grace do we all cause the worlds to exist. And the trusted ones, and the first among the immortals, and the gods are held to be His representatives. If Viṣṇu is indifferent, no good will come to us."

Thus Rudra's word.[165] Similarly, in the Mahābhārata and Matsya Purāṇa,

"He who amongst them is the Supreme Soul, He indeed is the eternal, unqualified, perfect One; He is to be known as Nārāyaṇa, for He is the world-soul, the Spirit."

Likewise in the Varāha Purāṇa,

"Who, excepting the Lord Nārāyaṇa, is superior to the God whose conduct has become the life-order on the earth?"

"There has been no God greater than Nārāyaṇa, nor shall there be; this is the secret doctrine of the Vedas and the Purāṇas, O excellent ones."

Likewise in the Liṅga Purāṇa,

"Janārdana is the sole Spirit, the highest One, the Supreme Soul, from whom Brahmā was born; from Him Rudra and from Him all the world."

Likewise Parāśara's word,

"The world has originated from Viṣṇu and on Him it rests. He is the maker of its subsistence and its destruction."[166]

Likewise in the *Mānavadharmaśāstra*,[167]

"Nārāyaṇa *is higher than the unmanifest; the* World-Egg originates from the unmanifest. *Within the Egg* are *all these worlds as well as the* earth *with* her seven continents."

Therefore, the study of these and similar śrutis, smṛtis, epical texts and purāṇas proves that Vāsudeva is the universal cause, the Supreme Soul.

80. Nor do the śrutis declare that Rudra is the Supreme Soul, or that any other deity is. On the contrary, the followers of the Ekāyana śākhā[168] say that he has an origin, and the same is found in the Veda itself: "Darkness was here....from which Rudra *is* born; that is the greatest in all the worlds, that *indeed* is the oldest in the worlds." *"Similarly, Rudra's position is clearly known to be a result of his karman: "He obtained his greatness by propitiating* Viṣṇu." "From *the forehead sprang a drop;* from that Rudra was born."[169]

These and other śrutis declare that Rudra was born. This being so, the statements that in appearance convey the greatness of Rudra and others really serve as laudatory statements, like the śruti: "the ear is

brahman."[170] Consequently, the passages in the Purāṇas which declare Rudra etc. to be the Supreme Soul have not their primary meaning, because they are in conflict with Perception and Scripture.

81. Concerning the objection that the assertions of the doctrines of the Tantras are to be rejected since their *greatness is set forth only in non-Vedic Tantric* texts, we say that Viṣṇu is stated to be the Supreme One in the texts of the Way of the Vedic doctrine. For example in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa,

"The Supreme Soul, the Basis of all creatures, the Supreme Lord is called by the name of Viṣṇu in Vedas and Upaniṣads."[171]

In the Varāha Purāṇa,

"The Supreme Brahman *is* Viṣṇu; *the* triple division in the pathways of the Vedic doctrine is here set forth; the ignorant do not know this.[172] There has been no god greater than Nārāyaṇa, nor shall there be;[173] this is the secret doctrine of Vedas and Purāṇas, O excellent ones."

Likewise in the Matsya Purāṇa,

"In those aeons where *sattva* prevails, the greatness of Viṣṇu is declared. In aeons predominated by *tamas* the greatness of Fire and Siva is expounded."[174]

Likewise in the Liṅga Purāṇa,

"For there is no other recourse ordained but Viṣṇu; this the Vedas constantly declare, no doubt about it."

Likewise in the Vāyu Purāṇa,

" The Spirit that belongs to the Way of the Veda is explaind to be the thousand-armed supreme lord of creatures."

Likewise in the Bhaviṣyat Purāṇa,

" Viṣṇu is *traditionally known to be the Sepreme* in the pathways of the Vedic doctrine. Viṣṇu is the greatest among persons, the most exalted Supreme Person."[175]

All this has already been explained in great detail in the *Puruṣanirṇaya*[176] and is therefore not further enlarged upon here. Therefore, how can our tongue endeavour to say that the Tantra which is revealed by Viṣṇu *who is known from the Upaniṣads is false?* For He is such that He has an immediate insight into the dharma of Consecration, Propitiation etc., by virtue of the omniscience that is natural to Him.[177]

82. Considering that the sensual pleasure to be had from attainment of heaven, the birth of a son etc. is inseparable from various forms of misery and does not continue for long, the supreme sages Sāṇḍilya, Nārada and *others* have *rejected this pleasure,* which in their view was really misery, and in order to attain the release left their dwellings to become mendicants; and they have decided definitively that *He has created* the Pañcarātra Sāstra which sets forth the knowledge and manner of propitiation of Himself which constitute the sole means of attaining the unparalleled beatitude they sought.

83. This argument cannot be extended to other Tantras, for in the various authors of those Tantras error etc. is possible. It is impossible that Perception

or another means of knowledge forms the basis for the other Tantras, and they themselves do also not claim that Scripture is the basis. Besides, because they communicate a meaning that is incompatible with the conclusions of the upaniṣads the view that these Tantras are based on Perception or Scripture is sublated.

For there are four kinds of followers of the way of life set forth in those Tantras, the Kāpālikas, Kālamukhas, Pāśupatas and Saivas. The Kāpālika doctrine is described as follows: the reward of release is attained by knowing what the six *mudrikās*[178] are and by wearing them, not by knowing Brahman. As they say, "He who knows the identities of the six *mudrikās* and is expert in the supreme Mudrā, and meditates upon the self in the vulva posture, attains nirvāṇa." The six *mudrikās* of the Kāpālikas are stated to be the earring, necklace, pendent, head ornament, ashes and the sacrificial theread: there are two more subsidiary *mudrās* described, namely skull and skull-staff. One whose body is marked by these *mudrās* will not be reborn in the world." Now, the śrutis do not bear out their view that the knowledge of such paraphernalia, the wearing of them and the concentration on the body in the immoral vulva posture are means to attain release, for the śrutis expound that release is attainable only by one who has renounced all sensual desires of this world and the other world and who concentrates on the soul Vāsudeva as the cause of the entire Universe: "knowing Him one goes beyond death; there is no other path to tread etc."[179]

The same is true of the Kālamukhas who teach that certain practices, which are condemned by all the

śāstras, like eating from a skull, bathing in and tasting of ashes of cremated corpses, carrying a laguḍa staff, putting up wine-cups and worshipping the deity in them, will secure all *material and immaterial desires:* these teachings are *outside the* Veda.

84. Also some of the teachings of the Pāśupatas and the Saivas in which compatible and incompatible elements are indiscriminately mixed are likewise outside the Veda. The Pāśupata system is as follows: there are individual souls which are called paśus, cattle, and their overlord is Śiva, the Lord of Cattle. To assist the souls Śiva has composed the Pañcādhyāyi.[180] There the five Categories are explained, namely, Cause, Effect, Injunction, Yoga and the Cessation of Misery. The Cause is of two kinds, material and instrumental. Rudra is the instrumental cause and a sixteenth part of him is the material cause. The Effect comprises the elements from *Mahat*[181] to earth. The Injunction is stated to comprehend principally a number of rites, secret practices, bathing and lying in ashes etc.[182] The Yoga is said to be concentration and the muttering of formula, *OM* etc.[183] The Cessation of Misery is held to be release; thus *the* five Categories are enumerated.—The term "cessation of misery" means total and final cessation of misery. The system holds that this cessation or release is *defined* by the annihilation of *all the qualities of the differential* soul.

This conception of God is held by the Saivas as well as the others. *And this* view of God is entirely incompatible with Scripture, for it is revealed in śruti that the Supreme Brahman is both the material and the

instrumental cause of the Universe. Also, it is repeatedly revealed in the scriptures that release consists in perfect bliss. As the authoritativeness of these Tantras is already vitiated by their mutual contradictions, it is not really necessary for them to be rejected with the stick of the Veda.

85. Moreover, the Śaivas etc. accept stages of life etc. that are outside the *varṇāśrama* system that is proved by the Veda and are consequently outside the Veda. As they say," merely by entering Consecration one becomes instantly a Brahmin. A man becomes an ascetic by accepting the Kāpālika vow."

86. Let it not be said, How could Rudra, who is very trustworthy, promulgate such a vast collection of texts which are not authoritative? Nor is it right to hold that these texts are based upon the recollection of an author of the same name as Śiva, because the ground is overextensive. For the theory that the author was in error and could be in error, because he was not Śiva but some other person with the same name, can only follow if the Veda sublates the system; this latter ground is sufficient to prove the lack of authority of these texts and entails no overextension to other texts. And error is not entirely impossible in the case of such persons as Rudra etc. Or else one may reason that since Rudra may have composed such a system for the purpose of deceiving the world because he is known as a promulgator of deceitful doctrines, it is not even necessary to assume error on his part. For thus it reads in the Varāha Purāṇa,

"For Thou, strong-armed Rudra, must cause deluding doctrines to be expounded, the deceptions of

jugglers and the like as well as *conflicting practices. Having shown that the fruit can be won with little effort, you must delude all these people quickly.*"[184]

Similarly, the venerable Rudra himself shows in the same Purāṇa that the Śaiva and the like scriptures which are there being discussed are apostate from the Veda, that only apostates from the Veda are qualified for these doctrines and that their only purpose is just to deceive them. "I have propounded *this śāstra as though it were correct doctrine in order to deceive those who have deserted the Way of the Veda.*[185] *From that time onward,* O excellent Ones, *the people who* believe in the scriptures promulgated by myself do not respect the Vedas.[186] Thus the Pāśupata and like doctrines are active in the Kali Age."[187]

Likewise he shows that the worship concerning himself as it is propounded in the Pāśupata Tantras and other such Tantras is different and does not form part of the worship of the Bhagavān: "The said act of worship concerning me which is being observed is really outside the Veda. This ritual called Pāśupata is the lowliest and deceives men.[188] Only the lowest people worship me with exclusion of Viṣṇu."[189] The large numbers of statements like the preceding ones will not be written out here, because they are too numerous. It is clear enough that those who follow these scriptures are outside the Veda, as is stated in the same Purāṇa: "He cursed those who kept the observances of hairtuft, ashes and skull, Be you outside the Veda and disqualified for Vedic rites. In the Kali Age all those who assume that appearance, wearing hairtuft and carrying a laguḍa stick, exhibitng arbitrary observances and

carrying false lingas about, all these hair-tuft wearing devotees of Rudra are consumed by the fire of Brahmā's curse."[190] These practices are well-known in the Saiva scriptures: "Rosary, and bracelet in the hand, a hair-tuft on the head, a skull, bathing in ashes etc."

Similarly, he declares in the Āditya Purāṇa that along with relinquishing the Bhagavān they relinquish the Veda: "Others, those that wear ashes and hair-tufts as described have formerly been made to relinquish the Veda as well as God Nārāyaṇa on account of Gautama's curse."[191]

Moreover, those fools who pass censure on Vāsudeva are to be regarded as heretics, for thus it is declared in the Liṅga Purāṇa, "Those who consider the Supreme Person to be equal (to Siva) are to be regarded as heretics who are expelled from the Way of the Veda."[192]

To conclude, it is these followers of other Tantras of whom[193] it is said, in the smṛtis: "Heretics, criminals etc.", that they should not be honoured even with a word; and the declaration "Which are outside the Veda. . ." refers to them. Consequently, since it cannot properly be said of the other Tantras that they are based either on Veda or on Perception, another cause must be assumed for them.

87. OBJECTION. If it is true that for these Tantras another basis must be assumed, let the defect be granted. But is in your own view knowledge not self-proved?

REFUTATION. *Certainly; but this self-validity of knowledge is here negated by these two defects of sublation, namely, sublation through Perception and through Scripture, for both these defects are plain in their case. The equality of Pañcarātra Tantra and those other Tantras which has been postulated on the ground that both happen to be Tantra, while in fact one of the two is incompatible with Scripture and plainly shows a different provenance, would mean that Brahmin Murder and Horse Sacrifice are on the same level because both are actions: For in the case of Pañcarātra Śāstra we have positive certainty that it is based on Scripture and Perception.

88. OBJECTION. I made the objection[194] that if its being based on Scripture follows from its being established by the Veda, then it cannot be assumed that the author was independent.

REFUTATION. No. Surely, we can assume no independence in man, but for God it is revealed in Scripture, e.g., "To Him all the world is manifest. . ." "From fear for Him. . ."

89. OBJECTION. But if the Pañcarātra traditions are really derived from the Veda, then how is it that no recollection of the Vedic words which furnishes this basis has persisted among the Pañcarātrikas, whereas the meaning of these words apparently does persist? It is not right to contend that only the recollection of the meaning is important because that has purpose while the recollection of the actual Vedic statements is to be disregarded because it is purposeless; for it is not proper to forget that from which the meaning's authority derives.

Or if, in order to justify this oblivion, the stand-point is taken that the doctrine is based on a Vedic śākhā which has been lost or which is always deducible, then whatever doctrine a person adopts he can always make authoritative simply by attributing it to a lost śākhā; however, it is hard to prove what a lost or deducible śākhā actually contain.

Or if these traditions are based on an extant śākhā, then others would know it as well as the author, and hence his taking the trouble of promulgating these texts would be purposeless.

REFUTATION. The reply to this is as follows: The Bhagavān, who has an immediate presentation of the entire collection of the Veda by virtue of the perfect knowledge that is natural to Him, observed that his devotees were not firm enough in their minds to retain and transmit the lessons of all the various śākhās which consist of widely scattered injunctions, *arthavādas* and *mantras* of many different kinds, and having observed this he was moved by his compassion to condense the meaning of the Veda in an easily comprehensible way and to teach it so. On this showing nothing is un-established. As they say "The blessed Hari took the essence of the Upaniṣads and condensed it, the Sage, out of compassion with his devotees for their con-venience."

The other objections made,[195] which are equally applicable to all Traditions of Manu and the others, are easily answered by all those who have made a diligent study of the commentaries on the Tantras and are not further enlarged upon here.

90. Objection. The thesis that the Pañcarātra Tantras are based on the Veda is disproved by the fact that we find in these very Tantras a condemnation of the Veda. *For it is said that Sāṇḍilya, failing to find a meaning of human importance in the four Vedas, learnt this śāstra.*

Refutation. This is the objection of someone who does not know the distinct meaning of the statement. For this censure does not mean to censure something deserving of censure, but rather to praise something else than that which is censured. For instance, in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa the censure passed on the pre-dawn oblation "Morning upon morning they speak untruth,"[196] is understood to praise the post-dawn oblation. It is as in the Mānavadharmaśāstra: "The Ṛgveda is of gods and deities, the Yajurveda of man, and the Sāmaveda of the deceased; therefore its sound is impure;"[197] here the censure of the Sāmaveda serves to praise the other Vedas. Or as in the Mahābhārata: "Formerly the assembled seers placed the four Vedas and the Mahābhārata in the balance, one at one side, the other at the other side. And since in bulk and in weight the latter preponderated, it is called the Great Bhārata for its bulk and weight."[198] This is said, not to belittle the Vedas, but to bestow praise on the Mahābhārata. In this same way the above statement must be taken as praise *of the Pañcarātra. Just as the censure of the pre-dawn* oblation etc. does not really intend censure, *since elsewhere in the same texts they are praised, so will it be in our case too.* In Pañcarātra, too, we frequently find praise of the Veda; for example: "Nothing that

is made up of words is superior to the Veda, thou who art seated on the Lotus. That is said by the Upaniṣads which set forth the knowledge of truth" etc.

91. Besides in the quotation *caturṣu vedeṣu*[199] the meaning is not that there is no purpose of human importance in the Vedas but simply "failing to find the purpose of human importance which is in the Vedas . . ."

Objection. However, the principal connection in this sentence is between "failing to find" and "a purpose of human importance;" not between "purpose of human importance" and "in the Vedas."

Refutation. Don't argue like that, for there is no negation in the sentence. For it is not so that this purpose of human importance is absent from the Vedas; hence the sentence "failing to find that purpose of human importance which is in the Vedas, and desirous of finding it, he learnt the Pañcarātra Śāstra," conveys that both Revelation and Pañcarātra have the same meaning.

92. The further objection[200] that Pañcarātra is non-Vedic because of the injunction that those who are qualified for Vedic sacraments etc. must undergo such sacraments described as Consecration because they are propitiations of the Lord, does not hold good. For such statements as *āgnāvaiṣṇavam. . .*[201] which enjoin the sacrament of consecration upon those qualified for Initiation etc. as accessory to the ritual of the jyotiṣṭoma etc. do not therefore become non-Vedic.

Or if the ground for its non-Vedic character is the injunction of sacraments other than the Vedic ones,

the ground is inappropriate, because of the circular argument it involves: only if the non-Vedic character of Pañcarātra Śāstra is proved, it is proved that these sacraments are really different; and if the latter is proved, it is proved that Pañcarātra Śāstra is non-Vedic.

Moreover, the ground is either that the Pañcarātra sacraments are different from all Vedic sacraments, or that they are different from some Vedic sacraments. Not the latter alternative, for this would mean that the sacrament of Initiation etc. is non-Vedic because it is different from the sacrament of Tonsure; nor the first alternative, because it does not escape the said defect? for the sacrament of Initiation is not different from all Vedic sacraments; and we have said that the difference (of Pañcarātra sacraments) from Vedic sacraments is disproved on the ground that Pañcarātra Śāstra is Vedic.

93. The objection[202] that Pañcarātra is outside the Veda, because like the Pāśupata Tantra it is not included among the fourteen sciences which are held to be authoritative of dharma, would also have an occasional application to the texts of the Bhārata and Rāmāyaṇa composed by Dvaipāyana and Vālmīki.

94. The objection that Pañcarātra is non-Vedic because it is rejected by the blessed Bādarāyaṇa is incorrect. For how could the blessed Dvaipāyaṇa[203] be thought to reject the Bhāgavata doctrine, while he himself is a supreme Bhāgavata, model for all the world? It was he who said, "This has been extracted from the Bhārata in its full length of one hundred

thousand ślokas after it had been churned with the stick of thought, as butter is extracted from curds, and curds from milk, the Brahmin from the bipeds, the Āraṇyaka from the Vedas, and the amṛta from the herbs: this *Mahopaniṣada* which is consistent with the four Vedas and the demonstrations of Sāṃkhya and Yoga is called the Pañcarātra. This is bliss, this is brahman, this is the *summum bonum*. Being consistent with Ṛk, Yajuḥ and Sāman and the Atharvāngirasas, this discipline will of a certainty be authoritative."[204]

And in the Bhīṣmaparvan too: "Brahmins, Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas and Śūdras as described are all to worship, serve and honour Mādhava according to the Sātvata ritual that has been promulgated by Saṃkarṣaṇa, at the end of the Dvāpara age and the beginning of the Kali age."[205]

Also in the Śāntiparavan: "Certainly, the Vaiṣṇava must undergo Consecration with all effort: for Hari will be particularly graceful to one who has been consecrated and to no one else. One should consecrate a Brahmin in spring, a Kṣatriya in summer, a Vaiśya in the autumn, a Śūdra in winter, a woman in the rainy season according to the Pañcarātra doctrine."[206] And likewise: "It has been made commensurate with the four Vedas on the great Mountain Meru."[207]

Now, how could Dvaipāyana reject the Pañcarātra, which is his own supreme doctrine, comprising the sense of the Upaniṣads, as follows from these and a hundred direct and circumlocutory declarations made with full respect?

95. OBJECTION. But then how to explain the sūtra *utpattyasaṃbhavāt?*[208]

REPLY. What is the intention of the sūtra?

OBJECTION. The following: Since it is expounded in the Bhāgavata Śāstra that the individual soul has an origin, and since this is impossible as it militates against Scripture and Logic, therefore this śāstra is erroneous.

REPLY. If that is the meaning of the sūtra, then how can the sūtra be intended to reject the Pañcarātra Śāstra? For the Pañcarātra Śāstras do not accept that the individual soul has an origin, which assumption would have justified the sūtra's rejection.

OBJECTION. But is it not their assertion that Vāsudeva is at once the supreme material cause and the supreme spirit; that from him the individual soul Saṃkarṣaṇa is born, from Saṃkarṣaṇa the mind called Pradyumna, and from the latter the *ego* called *Aniruddha?*

REPLY. No. The personal manifestation of God is described as being constituted by *vyūhas*,[209] and the word "individual soul" is assigned to one of these *vyūhas* for practical purposes, in order to prove clearly the differences that exist within the Adorable One, which differences are in accordance with those of the *varṇas*. It is as they say: "The four *vyūhas* are to be worshipped successively by the four *varṇas* successively." Besides, the words 'individual soul,' 'mind' and 'ego' do not denote these *tanmātras*[210] themselves, but refer to a person who is the superintending deity of these orders and whose personality is entirely different

from the order he superintends. Birth is described as the acquisition of various bodies, as is said in the statement *toyena jīvān* in the Yajurmurdhan.[211]

Besides, the Author of the Sūtras has already discarded the śruti, smṛti and profane views concerning the origination and reabsorption of the individual soul in the sūtra *carācaravpapāśrayas tu syāt tadvyapadeśo bhāktas tadbhāvabhāvitvāt.*[212] And since, moreover, the origination of the individual soul out of Brahman has been rejected in the sūtras *nātmā śruteh nityatvāc ca tābhyaḥ,*[213] it does not occasion a renewed exposition: an issue which does not need being made a topic would then be made a topic.

96. This also explains the sūtra *na ca kartuḥ karaṇam*;[214] for it is not said here that the instrument, sc. the mind, originates from the agent, sc. Saṃkarṣaṇa. For we have already stated that these names solely refer to the persons who superintendent these orders but are themselves different from them.

Objection. Then why this sūtra at all? For we do not find that instruments, like a hatchet, originate from an agent, like Devadatta, so that an instrument out of an agent makes no sense.

Refutation. Well, then you reject the general view that all instruments, vital airs, mind etc. have their origin in Brahman which itself is without the entire collection of all instruments and rests solely on its own power; this view is stated in the text: "From it springs the vital air, the mind and all the senses."[215]

Or if you do agree on this because it is clearly proved in Revelation, I ask you why you don't agree

on it because it is clearly proved in Pañcarātra. It is not a very proper procedure to deny things that are proved by smṛti; since both śruti and smṛti spring from perfect knowledge, they are equally valid.

97. OBJECTION. The sūtra *vijñānadibhāve vā tadapratiṣedhaḥ*[216] is explained as follows: The Author raises the question which one of two alternatives may be true: Are these four equally and independently sovereign, or has one a quaternity of personalities which he has assumed at his own desire? and then he points out the defect: if they are equally sovereign, none of them can be effects because they are equal; when they are different forms of one, what is the purpose of this division?

REFUTATION. That is not correct, because an alternative is impossible. For no one who holds that there is a God theorizes that the world has several Gods, least of all the Pāñcarātrikas who hold that "Vāsudeva is the ultimate material cause". But this one Bhagavān, who has divided Himself into four for reasons of sport, protects the entire world. And this position is not unjustified, because it is justified in the same manner as the appearance of second-born and first-born brothers like Bala and Bharata. For just as the Bhagavān, who has created the variety of phenomena of ether, 'Wind, Siva, Brahma etc. for His sport, and whose sole motivation is the sport of his unfathomable power, has voluntarily assumed the personalities of Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa, Bharata, Satrughna etc., without there being the possibility of logical conflict in the same manner the divisions of

Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, too, are unconflicting.

98. Furthermore, *vipratiṣedhāt*[217] may mean either "because of conflict with Revelation", on the basis of the citation "failing to find in the four Vedas....;" or "because of mutual conflict between the Tantras themselves". The former alternative, incompatibility with Revelation has already been refuted as being without valid basis. Mutual conflict between the Pañcarātra Tantras themselves, whose terminological precision has been perfected by the rules of logic governing principal matter, generality, peculiarity, quality and the like, does not exist. On the other hand, statements that lack the corroboration of logic can have no cogency; as the maxim says: "A statement must have precision perfected by logic before it can communicate its meaning."

Consequently, the Author of the Sūtras gives the lie to those exegetes who, by superimposing on the Pañcarātra Tantras (whose validity he strongly affirms as no less than that of the Vedas, in such assertions as "idaṃ mahopaniṣadam," etc.) the non-existent doctrine of the soul's origination, explain that the sūtra means to reject the Pañcarātra Tantras. Enough of the book!

99. The meaning of the sūtras is this. First the Author has set forth that the doctrines of Kapila, Kāśyapa, Buddha, Jina and Paśupati,[218] who oppose the Author's own accepted doctrine, are unnatural[219] because they conflict with Revelation and logic. Now, in order to remove the suspicion that the Pañcarātra

Tantras (which are his own accepted doctine) are equally unnatural with the other doctrines because their usual enumeration on an equal plane with the others has made them closely associated with them in people's thinking, he elicits their validity.

In the first two sūtras the *prima-facie* case is laid down: the Pañcarātra likewise has no validity, *utpattyasaṃbhavāt*, i.e., on account of the impossibility of Saṃkarṣaṇa's origination which is taught there. Why should it be impossible? Because it cannot be established in either of two possible cases; either the four *Vyūhas* are equally sovereign, or else one God exists in four persons; and in either case there is impossibility of origination. If they are equally sovereign, they cannot be created because they are equal; if only one being is admitted no origination is possible either, since a distribution within one being of creating and created parts is inconceivable.

100. Similarly *na ca kartuḥ karaṇam*: Pañcarātra has no validity for the further reason that it is impossible that the instrument, sc. the mind called Pradyumna, originates from the agent, sc. the individual soul called Saṃkarṣaṇa, for the hatchet does not originate from Devadatta. Or there is this alternative explanation of *na ca kartuḥ karaṇam*: and for the further reason that the instrument does not originate from the agent Saṃkarṣaṇa, since according to the text: "From it spring the vital air, the mind and all the senses," it is revealed that all instruments really originate from Brahman.

101. Then follows: *vijñānādibhāve vā tadapratiṣedhaḥ.* By the particle *vā* this *prima-facie* case is now reversed. What has been said, viz., that there is no validity since in neither case origination of Saṃkarṣaṇa etc. is possible, is untrue: it is not contradictory that Saṃkarṣaṇa etc. have originated. Indeed, it would be contradictory if they were not *vijñānādi.*

Vijñānādi is a dvandva compound: "knowledge and beginning," that means: Brahman; thus *vijñānādibhāve* means *brahmabhāve.* Inasmuch as they are Brahman (*brahmabhāve*), the origination is not contradictory. That is to say: by virtue of the fact that the unique Supreme Soul Vāsudeva, whose omnipotence is unbounded, enters into them through His māyā, a cause-effect relation is justified. The objection that the mind cannot originate from Saṃkarṣaṇa, on the authority of the Śruti that the mind originates from Brahman, is invalidated by the fact that he, sc. Saṃkarṣaṇa is *vijñānādi*, i.e., Brahman.

102. Furthermore, what is being said in the argument *na ca kartuḥ karaṇam?* Is it that the instrument of a certain action does not originate from the agent of that same action; or that no instrument of any action whatever originates from any agent whatsoever? If the first view is taken, we have a conflict with Inference, because the argument contains the fallacy of proving the proved. The mind, originating from the agent Saṃkarṣaṇa cannot be the instrument of Saṃkarṣaṇa's action of originating it, since it itself is the object of the action; nor can it be the instrument of the action of being originated, since it itself is the

agent of that action. If the alternative view is taken, we have a conflict with Perception, because we see that for instance a pitcher, though it be the instrument of an action of fetching water, yet originates from the agent of such an action, the potter. This the Author says in the sūtra *vipratiṣedhāt*: 'because there is conflict.'

103. As to the other explanation that has been given of these two sūtras,[220] since it is *vijñānādi*, i.e. "a ground for validity",[221] the denial of the validity of Pañcarātra is not justified, because it entails over-extension. The invalidity, which is defined by the non-origination of knowledge through repetition or dubiety in the Tantras, is rejected, because knowledge is actually had from them. In order to remove the suspicion of untruth occasioned by the speaker's character, the word *ādi* is used to convey the intended meaning that the Tantras are in fact spoken by a trustworthy person.

Consequently the meaning is this: He always has direct knowledge of the entire world by virtue of the omniscience which is part of His nature; He bestows man's wishes upon him, when He is satisfied—and he is satisfied by meditation alone; Him the experts in the Veda describe as eternally satisfied in all His desires: how then can there be defects in Him like error, deceit etc.?

104. The 'impossibility of origination,' which has been stated in the first two sūtras, is thereupon denied for Saṃkarṣaṇa and the other forms of God in the sūtra *vipratiṣedhāt*. This means either; "Because there is conflict with the Bhagavān's perception which is

inferred through Pañcaratra;" or "Because there is conflict with Śruti which is inferred from the same Tradition."

105. Or there is another interpretation: since the sūtras intend to illustrate the rules of exegesis, the author first assumes that there is a conflict between Śruti and Pañcarātra, though in fact there is no such conflict, and then reasons this out as follows: suppose that Pañcarātra is in conflict with the veda, is this śāstra then, like the statements of Manu etc., valid or invalid? This question is thereupon answered: "It is invalid, because of the impossibility of the origination of valid knowledge concerning a conflicting sense; and this impossibility itself is proved on the ground that there is independence of something that is dependent."

Thus the sūtra *utpattyasaṃbhavāt* means: "because it is impossible that a valid knowledge originates, since, as long as the dependent Pañcarātra Tradition does not start proving the validity of its own sense by establishing the validity of its basis, the cognition which originates from the independent preterpersonal scripture determines the Tradition's sense as being different, and consequently conflicting with itself. For Pañcarātra conveys that scripture is its basis only as long as the sword of direct scripture does not cut its root.

106. OBJECTION. But why should the Vedas themselves be independent, since their validity, too, depends on the direct cognition of the Bhagavān, because this cognition is their cause? Just as the Pañcarātra Traditions are dependent on His cognition, so are the Vedas too dependent on His cognition.[222]

REFUTATION. To refute this view, the statement is made: *na ca kartuḥ karaṇam*: "The Vedas are not the product of a maker, i.e. the Bhagavān. *Karaṇa* here in the sense of "things that are made or produced," by the rule "suffix-*aṇa* in the sense of the object of the action."[225] This then means that the Vedas are preterhuman.

107. *Vijñānādibhāve vā tadapratiṣedhaḥ.* If, on the other hand, it is not true that the Pañcarātra Śāstra is invalid, then what? *tadapratiṣedhaḥ*, i e. non-rejection of the origination of valid knowledge (namely, even when partly conflicting, the conflicting statement may be valid optionally), because it is based upon the direct cognition of the Bhagavān in whom error and deceit are impossible as He is a source of *vijñāna* (vijñānādi-bhāve): *Vijñāna* means "knowledge par excellence in which no mistake is possible. For since all other authors of Dharmaśāstras are not omniscient, as they are involved in saṃsāra, and since therefore they are also not entirely selfsufficient, various lapses are con ceivable in their knowledge. Whereas in the case of the Bhagavān, whose supremacy is natural and unlimited, His knowledge is the immediate insight in all *dharma* and *adharma*, which is natural to Him and true, as is known from hundreds of śrutis; it is this knowledge which in the sūtra is described as vijñāna. When such knowledge is the 'beginning,' i.e. the basis, there is non-rejection, sc. the śāstra is valid.

108. OBJECTION. But how can it be assumed that the Tantra, which conflicts with scripture, has validity? For if it is valid, it becomes optional beside

scripture; and optionality is deficient in the case of the Tantras by eight defects. Option is assumed when there is no invariable rule that something should be such and not otherwise, because there is no reason to reject, in one case or another, an alternative statement; for instance: "He must sacrifice with rice," beside "he must sacrifice with barley." In the latter case it is impossible to eliminate one or the other because neither of these statements is characterized by independence. In the former case, however, there can be no such option between scripture and Pañcarātra, because the two are not equal; for the Vedic statement is independent, because it is preterhuman, whereas the Pañcarātra statement is dependent. So how can they be alternatives and optional?

109. Refutation. Listen: because Pañcarātra too is independent.

Objection. How can a statement deriving from a person be independent?

Refutation. Let us ask the logician to explain this: must dependence on something else be assumed for a statement to be informative, to give positive certainty, or to state the truth about its content, or to serve a purpose of human importance?

All four are impossible. When the statement is heard, "One must worship the Bhagavān with the attendance due an emperor,"[224] nothing else is required for this statement to be informative, because the meaning of the words has already become known from other contexts. Nor does this small measure of dependence prove the weakness of the statement's

validity, for the same weakness would follow for śruthi too.[225]

Nor is anything else *required for the statement to give positive certainty*; for the statement "One must worship...." does not occasion doubt whether one must or must not worship, since that would entail a negation of the direct declaration of the real sense.

Nor is anything required for the statement to be true to the facts, for the knowledge produced by the statement *does not require anything outside its own* cause[226] to be true to the facts, because secondary validity is inappropriate and not admitted.[227]

Nor is it necessary for the statement to be dependent on something else in order to serve a purpose of human importance, for the proof of this purpose follows from a consideration of the entire body of doctrine. In this case, those who have undergone the afore-mentioned sacraments have knowledge of the *content of the statement when they have heard the* doctrine, and hence *they perform the "five-times-a-day"*[228] rites, which *form this content, and hence* they attain to supreme perfection; this is learnt solely from the Sastra itself.

110. Or if the objection is raised that, granted the self-validity of Pañcarātra, this validity is not complete as long as it has not been made certain that there are no defects, after it has been made certain that the *speaker is reliable*,—I reply that this view is not correct; knowledge that there are no defects does not completely establish validity, since the validity arises from the cause itself of defectless knowledge and not from the defectlessness of this knowledge.

111. Nor is positive certainty about such of the speaker's qualities as his reliability required for his statement to be defectless, because the statement's defectlessness is proved solely by its being defectless. As the Author of the Vārttika declares, "Then the qualities (of the speaker) do not exert any influence (on the validity of his statement) because (its defectlessness) is already known."[229] The same Author also shows that, even when there is certainty about its defectlessness, the existence of qualities (like reliability in the speaker) is helpful: "When defectlessness is known, they are helpful by merely existing."[230]

Nor does the validity, when it has been established require something else in order that consequent actions of acceptance, rejection etc. proceed, because action proceeds on the basis of recollection and desire. As they say, "Action proceeds on the basis of recollection and desire."

Moreover, in the case of the self-valid Vedas, too, we find this same dependence in that their validity would not be completely established as long as there were no certainty of their defectlessness after the certainty about the non-existence of their author.

112. Objection. But when the non-existence of their author is proved without effort by the non-apprehension of what ought to be there, the question of the non-validity does not arise for the Veda, for defects are impossible without something or someone in which they could reside. As they say: "In that case (the Veda) the absence of non-validity follows quite naturally from the absence of an author; therefore its validity cannot be questioned."[231]

REFUTATION. Why, in the case of Pañcarātra too no question can arise about its validity, since the absence of defects is easily proved by the fact that the omniscient and omnipotent God is its speaker; so the argument is the same.

In other words, in both cases of self-validity there is positive certainty that there are no defects; in the case of the Veda because there is positive certainty that no person is involved who could possess these defects; in the case of Pañcarātra because there is positive certainty that its speaker possesses virtues which preclude defects. It is here as in the following two cases of absence of heat: there is no heat in ether because it is certain that there is no locus for heat in ether; nor is there heat in cold water because there is coldness which precludes heat.

113. *Moreover, neither dependence nor independence is by itself a cause of invalidation.*[232] The independent cognition that some substance is silver while in reality it is nacre is invalidated by the cognition: "This is not silver:" this cognition itself is considered as dependent.[233] The cognition "This is that flame," is found to be invalidated by the inferential cognition that arises from the disappearance of oil[234]; the latter cognition itself is dependent because it arises from a sense-perception. The simple truth therefore is that which is susceptible to invalidation is invalidated by that which is not so susceptible; in our present case there is no such susceptibility either of Scripture or of Pañcarātra.

114. *Or if you think that it is impossible to give positive certainty that the Tantra is promulgated by*

Vāsudeva, as it is in conflict with Scripture, I ask you: Why then does the knowledge arise that Scripture is preterpersonal, while it is invalidated because it conflicts with Pañcarātra? They accept it that the Veda is preterpersonal just because it is Veda; but then one can equally claim that Pañcarātra is promulgated by Vāsudeva just because it is Pañcarātra. If the preterpersonal origin of the Veda is proved by the fact that there is no recollection of an author, then why not agree that Pañcarātra is promulgated by Vāsudeva just because there *is* recollection of his authorship? For there exists a strong transmission of the recollection, extending to women and children, that Keśava is the author of the Pañcarātra. So great a faith do people have in His authorship that they erect monuments according to the precepts of Pañcarātra, donating elephants, horses and great wealth in various fees.

In the Skanda Purāṇa it is said that "Kapila is the promulgator of Sāṃkhya, Keśava of Pañcarātra." Likewise in the Mahābhārata: "Nārāyaṇa Himself is the promulgator of the entire Pañcarātra. This great Upaniṣada, consistent with the four Vedas, as well as with the doctrines of Saṃkhya and Yoga, called Pañcarātra, which was revealed by Nārāyaṇa's tongue, has been taught to the sages by Nārada as he had seen it and heard it in the abode of Brahmā." From these and thousands of other statements in the Purāṇas, which are supported by the rules of interpretation, the conclusion follows naturally that Pañcarātra was indeed composed by Vāsudeva Himself. On the other hand, some experts dispute that the Veda is eternal.[235]

Therefore, the real ground for the thesis that the validity of the doctrine of the Bhagavān and that of the Veda is above question is this that both are *causes of defectless knowledge. Consequently*, because both are equally exemplary, they are optionally valid. It is with this view in mind that the wise Author of the Sūtras has explained : *vijñanādibhave vā tadapratiṣedhaḥ.*

115. OBJECTION. However, granted that error is made inconceivable by the Bhagavān's omniscience, yet, since He is also omnipotent, He can also have composed the Pañcarātra in order to deceive. Now, when people, considering this possibility, are confused in their minds as to which view they should take, that *this Sastra has been promulgated to deceive them, or* that it has been stated according to the truth with complete attentiveness of mind, what way is there to resolve their dilemma? We should prefer to decide that since it militates against Scripture it results in disaster.

REFUTATION. *To this objection the Author replies vipratiṣedhāt*, i.e., on account of the contradiction of all śruti, epic, purāṇa and worldly experience. If, without any reason, merely because the Bhagavān is omnipotent, the question is raised if He might have intended to ruin His devotees, why, then one could also raise the question whether He would not hurl even the virtuous into hell by *a whim of His omnipotence* and consequently the whole *world would fall into inactivity* ! Besides, we could also raise the question whether He did not wish to deceive people, because He is omnipotent, and thus created in the beginning the Vedas themselves with false meanings, which are also

suprasensible, took away from Brahmā[236] etc. also the power of recollecting that He was the creator of the Vedas, and from then onward set in motion the transmission of Vedic instruction until the present day: how can we be sure about it?

Or the position can be taken that since there is no evidence that, while He is indeed omnipotent, He acted up to the full measure of His omnipotence, since there is no purpose for Him to deceive people because He is satisfied in all His desires, and since He is not in the least affected by defects of partiality and cruelty etc. because He abides with natural affection for all living beings; and since, if He had composed the Pañcarātra in order to deceive, it would be impossible to demonstrate that the wise men who, up to now, learn its instructions and perform the contents of these instructions have forgotten the defects of its author, it must follow that such a suspicion does not arise; and if this view is taken, all this will equally apply to the Vedas as well.

Therefore, what possible purpose could He who is satisfied in all His desires, who is omniscient and a treasury of compassion have in deceiving the poor people who have failed to understand the meaning (of the Veda)? Or how could the supreme sages everywhere praise the Tantra as being equal to the Upaniṣads, if it had been composed in order to deceive? For thus the saints declare in Vārāha Purāṇa, the Rāmāyaṇa and the Bhārata etc. that this Tantra is an equally esoteric doctrine as the Vedas; and we declare the same. "Through Veda, Pañcarātra, through devotion and sacrifice, O Brahmin, I can be

attained, and not in any other way, even in hundreds of lacs of years. If one among thousands will grasp the Pañcarātra and, at the expiry of his karman, will die my devotee, the Vedas and the Pañcarātra will dwell in his heart forever.[237] This supreme Pañcarātra doctrine of mine, which is not difficult to grasp, that you shall reach to all the world by my grace, doubtless.[238] The Yogins mediate upon the Eternal One with Purāṇas, Vedas and Pañcarātras, and worship Him with the proper rites. Thus Sāṃkhya and Yoga on the one hand, and Veda and Āraṇyaka on the other hand are one and the same; all together they are the members that constitute Pañcarātra, O excellent one. He who sees through Veda and Pañcarātra sees truly; this great Upaniṣada, consistent with the four Vedas....'' Since the number of these and similar statements is infinite, we stop here. If you still raise the question if there cannot be ruin in such a Tantra, then there can be no faith in anything. It is with this view in mind that the Author sets forth: *vipratiṣedhāt.*

Therefore, even if there were a conflict between the Bhagavān's doctrine and the Veda, there still would be option between them; but we have already expounded that there is no conflict between them at all.

116. Objection. However, how can the venerable Author of the Bhāṣya[239] state that those parts which are in conflict are invalid: "If there be conflict, it is carefully eliminated."

Refutation. This statement means that those of frail minds, who are not strong enough to plunge into the deep ocean of rules of interpretation, must not be

disrespectful to the Veda. This is comparable to the venerable Jaimini's exposition that the fruits of acts serve to increase people's faith in the acts.

117. The contention has been voiced that Pañcarātra is invalid because "it is accepted by those who are outside the Veda."[240] But why could one not equally well contend that the Vedas are invalid because they are accepted by those who are outside Pañcarātra?

Furthermore, what exactly does this mean, being "outside the Veda," and what means "accepted by those who are outside the Veda?" Does "being outside the Veda" mean "being different from the Veda" or "doing what is forbidden by the Veda" or "being hostile to the Vedas?"

Likewise we must inquire whether "accepted" means "learnt" or "known" or "observed." In all cases the ground proves to be defective.

First of all, if "outside the Veda" means "different from the Veda," and "accepted" means "learnt," then the ground proves to be occasional, since it equally applies to the Vedas themselves: the Vedic statements, which are valid, are "learnt" by members of the three estates, which themselves are "different from the Veda." If you take "accepted" to mean "known," you do not get rid of the same defect. If the term "outside the Veda" means "different from the Veda," and "accepted" means "observed," then there would likewise be an occasional application of the ground to the Vedas themselves. If "outside the Veda" is taken to mean "performing forbidden acts," the ground has an occasional application to those statements of the Veda which enjoin expiatory

ceremonics. For since statements enjoining expiations, e.g. "One must sacrifice with the *kūṣmāṇḍa* verses,"[241] whose content is to be "learnt", "known" and "observed," by those who perform forbidden acts, are authoritative, it would follow that the ground "because they are accepted by people outside the Veda" is occasional.[242]

Nor are the Pañcarātra Tantras invalid because they are "accepted" by people hostile to the Veda, for the ground is unproved. Besides, acceptance by people hostile to the Veda does not by itself refute the validity of what is accepted. If it did, the Path of the Heretics would be unbarred; for they endeavour to uproot the validity of the Veda. Thus the naked Jainas could effortlessly render the Vedas untruthful simply by "accepting" the Vedas in some manner by way of deception.

118. OBJECTION. A consideration of such statements as "He should never use the Veda, except at a funerary offering,"[243] shows that the defect affects only the unqualified students, not the defectless Vedic statements themselves.

REPLY. Then the defect affects only the unqualified students in the case of the Tantras under discussion as well, and not the defectless Tantras themselves; so everything is the same, depending on what partisan view one takes.

Or if it be held that "outside the Veda" means "unqualified to perform Vedic acts," and that Pañcarātra is invalid, like the caityavandana statements,[244] because it is accepted by those who, being unqualified, are outside the Veda, the following distinction must be

considered: is the ground here that the Tantras are accepted by people unqualified for all Vedic rites, or by people who are unqualified for some Vedic rites? This point should be clarified.

Now, the first alternative cannot be adopted, because the ground is not proved. For there is no human being who is not qualified for any *śrauta* rite whatsoever, e.g. non-violence etc., because his humanity as such provides his qualification. Otherwise caṇḍālas etc. would do no wrong if they committed such crimes a brahmin-murder, theft of brahmin-wealth, miscegenation with caste-women, study of the Veda etc., simply because they were not qualified to observe these prohibitions. If a man does something he should not do, he commits an offence. It follows that everybody is qualified to these Vedic rites,[243] which shows that the ground is not proved and that the illustration falls short of the means of proof.

Nor can the second alternative be adopted that the Tantras are invalid because they are accepted by people who are unqualified for certain Vedic rites, because that would entail the conclusion that all Vedic statements are invalid. For every man has some Vedic rites for which he is not qualified: the brahmin is not qualified for the Royal Consecration, the kṣatriya not for the ritual drinking of soma. Consequently, this ground has an occasional application to the Vedic statements, which are accepted by qualified persons belonging to the three estates, and is therefore inconclusive. As to the illustration, the view that heaven is attained by worshipping a caitya is not invalidated by its being accepted by heretics, but by the deficiency of its cause.

119. We have already said that Pañcarātra has been accepted by the Vedic, and among all orthodox pre-eminent, sages Bhṛgu, Bharadvāja, Dvaipāyana etc. And in the present day we can also observe how exemplary persons of great learning, believing *that these rites are most effective in attaining* bliss, perform the rites of temple-building, erection of idols, prostration, circumambulation and particular festival ceremonies, just as they perform the *agnihotra* and other rituals *enjoined directly* by Scripture. *And* it is improper to maintain that their conduct has no foundation, for that would entail that such smārta rites as crepuscular worship, aṣṭakā etc., are similarly without foundation. It has been said that the conduct *of exemplary people is authoritative,*[246] *and also that* even when they do not know the cause of their custom, they do know what is proper custom.

120. If the ground for the invalidity of Pañcarātra is that it is accepted by Bhāgavatas,[247] well, then the scriptural statements of the Ekayana śākhā and the Vājasaneyaka śākhās and the means of knowledge Perception, Inference etc., would also be invalid since the Bhāgavatas accept those too! This same ground, moreover, namely that Pañcarātra is invalid because it is accepted by the Bhāgavatas, suffers from two defects; it is both *specially-occasional* and unproved.[248] Why is Pañcarātra rendered invalid by their acceptance? *If it is because they do* not belong to the three estates, then the Atharvanic statements whose content is accepted and observed by *rathakāras*, *niṣādas* and other groups which do not belong to the three estates (Statements like "The rathakāra must add fuel," "With

that he must sacrifice for the chief of the Niṣādas,"[249] etc.) would also be invalid.

Or, be it granted that the acceptance of certain rites by outcastes renders them invalid; yet, in view of the fact that the eminent brahminhood of these Bhāgavatas who follow the doctrine of the Bhagavān is evident by all criteria of knowledge, their acceptance of Pañcarātra rather confirms its validity. He says: By the same means of knowledge by which the brahminhood of one set of people is evident the brahminhood of another set of people is evident.

121. OBJECTION. But when one sees the small sons of the twice-born who wear the customary hairtuft, sacred thread, *palāśa* wood stick and *muñja* grass girdle, one knows, the moment the eyes fall on them, that they are brahmins.

REFUTATION. And in our case, when one sees learned people who day after day study the Vājasaneyaka and Ekāyana śākhās, wear prominently their sacred threads, upper garments and hairtufts, impart teaching, sacrifice, receive priestly stipends—does one not instantly know that they are brahmins? If it be held that outcastes, low-caste people etc., may also illegitimately sacrifice, teach, carry *palāśa* sticks etc. and that they behave as though they were legitimate brahmins, and that therefore neither costume nor conduct provides positive certainty that a man is a brahmin, then the same applies to other priests than Bhāgavatas.

Or be it granted that there are cases where people illegitimately display the marks of brahminhood; still,

though there may be doubt about the legitimacy of these marks in others because of their resemblance to pretenders (just as when there is a doubt that one may be mistaken about real silver too because one has mistaken nacre for silver), then there can be certainty of their being genuine brahmins in all cases when no misapprehension occurs, because otherwise doubt would conflict with Perception and lead to infinite regress.

122. Or if it be held that the others are genuine brahmins because they recollect those gotras which are peculiar to brahmins, the same applies to the Bhāgavatas; for the Bhāgavatas have the *tradition*: "*We are descendants of Bharadvāja, of Kaśyapa, of* Gotama, of Upagava."

Nor is this *recollection or tradition* of gotras unfounded or merely contemporary, for the same can be argued for all tradition of gotras. If there were doubt about descent since error could conceivably occur, this would confuse the whole world about *the authenticity of their brahminhood*. After all, anyone may fear that he really is a caṇḍāla if he suspects his mother of having had a lover; and how, my excellent opponent, can you be quite sure yourself that your birth entitled you to Veda-study? Therefore if the brahminhood of Bhāgavatas, which is *completely established* by the *recollection of the various gotras* which has been passed on in uninterrupted transmission, stands unchallenged, then there is no difference whatever in this between the brahminhood of Bhāgavatas and of others.

123. Further, if some who believe in the Supreme Person are monotheists and others who believe in

petty godlings are polytheists, is then the same authority stated for the brahminhood of the ones as well as of the others, or how else is their brahminhood known if not by that same authority? If this is the question, then listen: there remains a criterion to determine brahminhood in either case, either Perception, or Inference, or Circumstantial-Implication.

124. OBJECTION. But how can Perception convey that they are brahmins? For when we are close to two individuals whom we have not seen before, one a brahmin, the other a kṣatriya, of the same age and the same appearance, we do not immediately observe the distinction that one is a brahmin and the other a kṣatriya in the same way as we instantly observe the differentness of a goat, an elephant, a buffalo etc. Nor is it proper to maintain that the visual sense conveys the brahminhood of a nearby individual in dependence on our recollection of his father's brahminhood etc.; for that recollection itself is impossible without a previous immediate cognition, just as the recollection of the son of a sterile mother is impossible. Nor can we know from Inference that a man is a brahmin, for we do not find a concomitant mark. And such qualities as tranquillity, self-restraint, austerity, purity etc., cannot be taken as marks of brahminhood, because they are available only in the case of a good brahmin and because they are not exclusively confined to brahmins. Nor can Circumstantial-Implication furnish proof of brahminhood, because it is not lacking in season and the fact that the sentence-meaning of the statement, "In spring the brahmin must add fuel to the fire,"[230] is otherwise unestablished does not there-

fore by Circumstantial-Implication furnish proof that a man is a brahmin; for knowledge of that sentence-meaning presupposes knowledge of the word-meaning of brahminhood etc.

125. REFUTATION. All this does not make for a defect in my argument. There is no invariable rule that Perception becomes manifest only at the first contact between sense and object and not otherwise Perception is that which illumines the unmanifest while there is continuity of the operation of the senses. Thus there can be Perception of brahminhood; for when we keep our eyes open we note, immediately upon observing the particular differentiae of the genus brahminhood, that the brahminhood is quite clearly noticeable in those who belong to the families of the different gotras—Vāsiṣṭha, Kāśyapīya Saṭhamarṣaṇa etc.—, who are pure in their conduct, and who display the sacred thread, upper cloth, hairtuft and *muñja* grass girdle. Nor does it run counter to ordinary experience that the eyes can convey brahminhood in dependence on the observation of the peculiarities of genus. In every case the sense becomes the cause of the rise of determination of sense-object when favoured by the accompanying circumstances of place, time, configuration etc.[251] It is the natural function of the sense-organ as such to relate itself to these accompanying circumstances. As the author says: "*No organ of knowledge, whether in Veda or in ordinary* process, becomes efficacious in *determining* the object that is to be realized through the accompanying circumstances unless it is favoured by these circumstances."[252] Consequently the visual sense, when favoured by the recollection

of genus, gives knowledge of brahminhood without the object giving up its perceptuality. So it is evident that the visual sense can be the instrument of knowledge of genus in dependence on a variety of accompanying factors. Gold becomes manifest through its colour from copper etc., ghee is differentiated from oil, through its smell and taste; fire, which is hidden by ashes, is perceived through touching the ashes. Sound may provide us with proof that there is a horse in the distance; a pitcher etc. are known through their configuration; brahminhood through descent, and also through conduct in certain particulars, which is completely protected by the king.

It has been contended that when we see two individuals of the same age and appearance, the difference between the two does not immediately appear to the eye; but the perceptuality of their differentness is not refuted by just this. In this case the non-perception of their differentness is caused by the defect of similarity. The difference between nacre and silver, which are similar in appearance and configuration, may not be immediately visible, yet that does not mean that their difference is not visible at another time; and the same holds for the difference between brahmin, kṣatriya and vaiśya.

Or else, brahminhood is that which arises from the differentiae of genus, and such a product can empirically be known just like any other product by a process of positive and negative consideration, e.g. "what are the specific characteristics to which the elders apply the term brahminhood, or to which characteristics is the term applied?" It has been said

often that it applies to those who possess recollection of gotra, Vedic ancestry etc.; *let us not start discussing* this question again, or we must repeat our old argument: it is established that the Bhāgavatas are *brahmins, because they possess gotra etc.*

126. The objection[253] was made that the Bhāgavatas are born from a *vaiśya vrātya*, on the authority of the two statements: "The fifth one, the Sātvata, must worship the sanctuaries of Viṣṇu by royal decree;" and "he is also called a Bhāgavata; he is born from a vaiśya vrātya." To this we reply: precisely what do we learn from these two statements? Is there a simple connection of names, or must an invariable rule be stated?[254]

It is impossible to make it a rule that the words Bhāgavata and Sātvata denote a vaiśya vrātya, for that is not known from the text, and it involves overextension. In the statement, "the fifth one, Sātvata," we do not find a denial that the words Bhāgavata and Sātvata denote other meanings, for that would mean ignoring the explicit and inventing the unstated. In our statement the fifth one, who is born from an vaiśya vrātya, is understood to bear the name of Sātvata: "The fifth one, Sātvata ...", since the word 'fifth' is the operative term as it is mentioned first. And if the fifth is the Sātvata, the Sātvata is not necessarily also be the fifth, namely the vaiśya vrātya. For when the stated subject (e.g. a mountain) is possessed of fire, the predicated fire does not necessarily possess smoke.[255] Consequently the consideration if a smṛti statement of this kind cannot give certainty that the words Sātvata, Bhāgavata etc mean vrātya.

127. If it be argued that since these two words also may denote another caste (namely of the vaiśya vrātyas), then the mere fact that certain brahmins are denoted by these words proves that these brahmins belong to that caste, even though they follow the doctrine of the Bhagavān, it would also follow that, since we find the collocated word *ācārya*[256] also used to denote the issue of a lowly vaiśya, therefore an eminent brahmin who is an *ācārya* imparting teaching of the Veda with its ancillae and its esoteric teachings is thereby denoted as being a vaiśya vrātya! If, on the other hand, even though a true brahmin is denoted by the word *ācārya* which denotes a vrātya, there still can be no suspicion that he actually is a vrātya, because there is positive certainty of his brahminhood which is clearly proved by other means of knowledge, and because it is possible that the word *ācārya* is used figuratively (*ācārya* as one who "accumulates"—*ācinoti* the pupil's knowledge) for a Brahmin teacher, then in our case, too, the same argument can be made, namely thus: even though they are denoted by the terms Sātvata and Bhāgavata, which denote another caste, yet there can rise no suspicion that they actually are vrātyas, because the brahminhood of these followers of the Bhagavān's doctrine is firmly known from the recollection of completely obvious clans, Vedic ancestry etc., and because it is possible that the terms Sātvata and Bhāgavata have a figurative denotation of *sattva-vat*[257] and *bhaga-vat*.

In other words, the fact that the same word denotes both classes of people does not mean that therefore both belong to one and the same caste, lest the

true brahmin be not made into a low-caste man because he is also denoted by the word *ācārya*. We find that the word *hari*[258] also means 'frog.' Does it follow that a lion is a frog because both are denoted by the same word? Then word itself would be horned, since 'word' is denoted by *gauḥ*![259]

Consequently, just as the words *sudhanvan, ācārya* etc., which denote more than one meaning, are also used for someone born from a vaiśya vrātya, so also the words Bhāgavata and Sātvata.

128. The contention[260] *that when the conventional meaning and the etymological meaning of a* word collide, it is right to assume the conventional meaning of the term, in this case of the terms Bhāgavata and Sātvata, is not correct; for when a denotation is appropriate which is the composite of the denotations of the component elements of the words, then it is not right to assume a non-composite denotation. For he who theorizes that the words *sātvata* and *bhāgavata* have their conventional meaning in denoting someone born from a vaiśya vrātya, must also theorize that the words *sattvavat* and *bhagavat*, which are the stem and the taddhita suffix built on the stem,[261] have a different meaning in a sentence like, "having observed the sātvata rules, a man becomes a Bhāgavata because of the merits he has won in a previous existence."[262] This goes to prove the assumption that in this case the word may have a double meaning by etymology alone, because it is possible for it to be used in the sense of "issue of a vaiśya vrātya." And it is possible that those vrātyas too, despite the fact that they fail to

worship the Bhagavān directly, yet may be denoted by the words *sātvata* and *bhāgavata*, because of their work discipline of cleaning up Vāsudeva's temple, clearing away the *bali* offerings, guarding the idol etc., for it is taught that the *cāṇ* suffix may occur in the sense of a simple relation, "this is of that."[263] And it is declared that the issue of a vaiśya vrātya has the work discipline of cleaning the Bhagavān's temple etc., "and (the task) of the sātvatas is the cleaning of the deity's temple, the eating of the offerings, the guarding of the idol;" and "he must worship Viṣṇu's sanctuaries."[264]

129. Herewith is also rejected the contention that the Bhāgavatas are vrātyas because they would have the same profession. For it is one thing to clean the temple, clear away the *bali* offerings, guard the idol, and quite another thing to perform the variety of actions that are daily observed by the Bhāgavatas: the cleaning of the way to the idol, the preparation for worship, offering, daily study, and meditation. It is as it is in the case of the jyotiṣṭoma etc. In the jyotiṣṭoma, too, a carpenter has a task in making the various receptacles, soma-cups, soma-decanters, ladles etc., while the officiating priests have their tasks in reciting various different mantra recitations, representing the deity, pressing of the soma etc. And this occupational similarity, limited as it is, does not raise the question whether the priests have the same caste as the carpenters! So here, too, there is a difference between those who perform the *pañcakālikā*[265] ritual, which is established by the Bhagavān's doctrine, and the low-caste people who do the cleaning-up of the temple and are also called temple-guards.

130. Further, the contention[266] that, if the words *bhāgavata* and *sātvata* have their etymological meaning, this entails that the word *rathakāra* in the injunction "the *rathakāra* must build a fire"[267] denotes someone belonging to the three *varṇas* on account of its etymology of chariot-making,[268] is not correct. For in the case of *rathakāra* it is correct that the term refers to someone belonging to the three *varṇas*, because otherwise the springtime etc., which are given in the statement on the origin of this fire-building, would be invalidated, and because usages of a word in the sense of different castes, which is given in the mantra "*saudhanvanā ṛbhavaḥ sūracakṣasaḥ*"[269] would be invalidated.[270] Despite the fact that *rathakāra* is also a name for another caste—as learnt from the smṛti "the *rathakāra* is born out of a kariṇī by a māhiṣya"[271] (so that the *rathakāra* is born from an anuloma marriage of a kṣatriya man and a vaiśya woman), nevertheless, since, on Śankha's evidence[272] that the *rathakāra* is not forbidden to perform rites of sacrificing, fire-building and initiation, there is no conflict of qualification for rites that can only be realized through knowledge of the Veda,[273] and since the word *rathakāra* (in its etymological meaning) is inappropriate for members of the three *varṇas* because they are forbidden to follow an artisan's profession, therefore we can only conclude that in both cases different castes are denoted by the term, and so there is no conflict.

Moreover, when knowledge of the thing meant by a word is obtained from the denotation of the separate members that compose the word, then the Author of the Sūtras rules out the validity of a denotation in

which the meanings of the component members are lost, namely in *prokṣaṇīṣu arthasaṃyogāt.*[274]

Therefore, those eminent brahmins are called sātvatas and bhāgavatas who because of their pure character (sattva) devote themselves to the Bhagavān who is the Supreme Person. Later on we shall show that other smṛtis set forth the eminent brahminhood of the Bhāgavatas.

131. The further objection,[275] namely why these people should invariably be denoted by the exclusive names of Sātvata and Bhāgavata, if their brahminhood were the same as that of others, can be answered thus: there is no defect in that, for it is as it is in the case of the names *parivrājaka* and *nigada*. Certain brahmins are called bhāgavatas, just as certain brahmins are called *parivrājakas*, and certain *yajuḥ* formulae *nigadas*, though both are equally brahmins and equally *yajuḥ* formulae; namely in the statements: "The brahmins should remain, the *parivrājakas* must be fetched;"[276] "the *yajuḥ* formulae take place, not the *nigadas*; the *nigadas* take place, not the *yajuḥ* formulae;"[277] and this is so because of the interpretation: "the *nigadas* are the fourth mantra collection, or the *yajuḥ* formulae, because they are identical."

132. The contention[278] that the Bhāgavatas are bad brahmins because they perform pūjā to the God, partake of the offering substance etc. for a livelihood, is countered in the following manner: Surely not all Bhāgavatas worship Hari for their profession, for many Sātvatas are found who perform pūjā for themselves. If there are certain people who, while being Sātvatas,

follow a reprehensible profession and perform sacrifices for respectable Bhāgavatas professionally, this fact alone does not mean that one may say that they are not brahmins. A vedic priest who officiates as an *adhvaryu* at *a jyotiṣṭoma* does not thereby lose caste. If the priest were not to receive fees, the pūjā itself would remain fruitless; they take fees in order to realize completely the excellence of the pūjā. At the conclusion of the worship one must give gold to the priest according to capacity; otherwise the fruit will go to the pūjā priest himself, as is shown by the smṛti: "A sacrifice for which a small fee is given kills (the sacrificer)."[279] It is however prohibited that a covetous Vedic priest officiate as a priest after he himself has put up his demands for a fee, e.g. in the statement: ("There is an error called 'garbage'"). When the sacrificer appoints as a officiant priest who covets the office, thinking either "He should give me (a fee)" or "He should choose me." "This is as far from the sacrificer as garbage; this does not benefit the sacrificer."[280] The donation of the sacerdotal fee which is purified by faith is felicitous for both, as according to the smṛti, "He who receives the offering and he who denotes it both go to heaven."[281]

133. The statement[282] that professional worship of the deity and living off the god's treasure makes a man a devalaka must be taken to refer to the profes sional worship of, and the living off the treasure of, other deities than Vāsudeva. Thus the blessed Vyāsa: "A devalaka is he who lives on Rudra etc."[283] And there is also Sāṇḍilya's word: "All those who perform sacrifices professionally and are also not *consecrated*

are the only ones who are traditionally known as *karmadevalakas* in this world, O sage. One should not touch them or consort with them for a year." Likewise: "Certain people who are *karmadevalakas* and *kalpadevalakas* are unqualified for ritual before the deity for a period of three years. Those brahmins who, without being consecrated, perform rites set forth in the Kalpa, either professionally or for the fame of it, are kalpadevalakas. One must have pūjā offered by another professional priest who has been properly consecrated; one is unable to worship the god oneself. This is the principal offering; in another manner it is secondary." 'In another manner,' that is to say, when it is done by a non-consecrated priest. This the author elucidates: "The rite performed professionally by some priest who has not been properly consecrated is called of the lowest degree." By considering these and a hundred similar smṛti statements we can be sure that living off the deity's treasure and professional pūjā offering of brahmins who go without the sacrament of consecration as established by Pañcāratra renders them sub-Brahmins and devalakas.

134. As to the statement[284] that the Bhāgavatas cannot pass for exemplary persons because they make use of flower and food offerings, which practice is abhorred by exemplary persons, to this we say: what does the śrotriya[285] mean by left-over flowers and left-over food? When he takes it only as the flowers and the cakes,[286] he is contradicted by all the world, for nobody approves of wasting flowers and cakes. Also, a particularized prohibition[287] is not in order, because it is not established. No notion of a particularized

thing occurs when the particularization is not determined; and here it is impossible to determine the particularization.

OBJECTION. Why should it be impossible, since the particularization is that it is forbidden to use food what has been offered up *to the deity?*

REPLY. Are you now accepting the validity of Pañcarātra? For only when one admits that there is a deity present in the idols that are erected with the sacred formulae enjoined by Pañcarātra Tantra can one postulate that the particularization of the prohibition lies in the offering-up *to the deity.* For unless the validity of the Tantra is admitted, how can an idol which is set forth in the Tantra be a *deity*, and, *a fortiori*, how can the substance that is offered up for this deity's sake be *nirmālya* and *nivedya.*[466] For a deity does not exist by just being a deity; only that deity which is known to be correlated with an oblation on the authority of scriptural testimony is the deity to that oblation; that is your own doctrine.

Or if it be held that something is *nirmālya* and *nivedya* because it is admitted by the Pañcarātrikas that it is offered up to the deity, well, in that case you must also admit its purity because the Pañcarātrikas accept also that the utilization of *nirmālya* and *nivedya* is perfectly pure.

Or if you do not accept this peculiar excellence, since in your opinion the Pañcarātrikas have accepted as pure something that is really impure,—well, in that case you must accept it that the substance which is offered up is not really *nirmālya* and *nivedya,* since then

you opine that the Pañcarātrikas have adopted someone who is not really a deity by mistaking him for a deity!

In other words, inasmuch as the offering up of mere flowers, cakes etc.[289] is not approved, and because it is impossible to particularize the prohibition of utilizing these substances according to the terms of one's own doctrine, therefore the particularization must be determined in the terms of the others', i.e. the Pañcarātrikas', doctrine; and thus the offering up becomes greatly purifying. And inasmuch as therefore the utilization of *nirmālya* and *nivedya* becomes most purifying, it must needs be accepted by those who admit the validity of the Pañcarātra Tantra as well by others who do not.

135. OBJECTION. But how is it possible then that even one who admits the validity of Pañcarātra should reject nevertheless the *nirmālya* and *nivedya?* For in the Tantras the tasting etc. of the *nirmālya* is prohibited. For instance, it is said in the Sanatkumārīya Saṃhitā: "The offering that is proffered (to the deity), flower or fruit, is called *nirmālya*; that must be avoided meticulously." Similarly in another passage: "When one has eaten *nirmālya*, or the food-rests of someone who is not one's guru, one must observe a milk-vow for a month, continuously recite the eight-syllable formula, and drink the pañcagavya, in order to be purified."[290] Likewise in the Indrarātra: "One should not live off the Supreme God, nor eat the *nirmālya* offerings." Also: "And the *nirmālya* offerings are never fit for consumption." Similarly in another Saṃhitā: "One should not eat the *nirmālya* offerings,

nor smell them, nor step over them."—How then can one accept the purity of the utilization of the *nirmālya* when we thus know from several Saṃhitās that it is prohibited?

REFUTATION. To this he says: The utilization of a proffered substance which has been offered up to the deity is not condemned if it is done within a period of ten *nāḍikās*.[291] Thus in the same Indrarātra: "The wise one must let the offering-cake stand for ten *nāḍikās*. This period of time has been prescribed both for night and for day. They condemn the *nirmālya* that has stood for more than this period of time; thereupon he must throw it in water, or in fire, or bury it in the ground."

OBJECTION. But what is said here is not to praise the tasting etc. of the *nirmālya*, but to prescribe that the substance of the cake pūjā is thrown away after a period of ten *nāḍikās*. In the statement: "He must let the offering cake stand for over ten *nāḍikās*," the injunction is laid down that when the proffered flowers, cake etc. in general have been taken off as *nirmālya*, because they have now fulfilled their ritual function, they must be kept by way of accessory pūjā rite for a period of ten *nāḍikās*. And consequently even a study of the conclusions of your own Tantras shows that the touching etc. of the turmeric powder, the food offerings and the water used to clean the idol's feet is not established by Tantric doctrine. Now, where are you!

REFUTATION. Where are you, loquacious debaters, witless fools who have been swallowed by your own tongue which plays around with a grain of

knowledge! Your objection looks black and white at once, like the moon with its spots. This prohibition applies only to fools like you, since all this is indeed to be observed by Vaiṣṇavas who are qualified to do so, and thus it is capable of wiping off a multitude of sins in the same way as the drinking of soma at a Vedic sacrifice; for it is not to be touched by others, just as the puroḍāśa cake[292] is not to be touched by dogs! Thus in the Īśvara Saṃhitā, "It is difficult to find in this world a true votary of the lord, my son, and, among those who are, it is even more difficult to find a disposition which is truly pure enough for the foot-water, or to use the garlands etc. which have been mentioned in the doctrine. Therefore, O six-faced One, all this which is purified by the formulae and the glance of the Bhagavān is forbidden to those who lack this disposition and are not votaries." And in another passage: "The saffron, sandal, camphor and oils that have been taken off Viṣṇu's body are supremely purifying." Likewise in the Padmodbhava: "He who wears the powder that is taken of Viṣṇu's body on his head obtains the fruit of a Horse Sacrifice and glories in Viṣṇu's heaven." Similarly in the Īśvara Saṃhitā, "No blame should be put by statements arising from ignorance on all that is used, the perfume, flowers etc., (the water) of the idol's bath etc., and the curds, milk etc. Those who condemn this divine purifying agent because they consider it *nirmālya*, those witless detractors of its power will go to hell."

The above statements which to the consecrated prohibit the use of *nirmālya* at the time mentioned in the time instruction[293] must be understood to mean a

time subsequent to that when the (offerings to) the chief of the Bhagavān's retinue[294] is being used. Since the garlands, sandal etc. which are offered up to the Bhagavān, later on, after the Viśvakṣena offering, become unfit to eat, therefore the Sātvatas use the *nivedya* etc. before that time. Consequently the use of the *nirmālya* is a cause of excellence for the Sātvatas.

136. Moreover, it is our postulation that the exemplary people hold the *nirmālya* of *other* gods in contempt; this is postulated like the drinking of soma (which is good) because it is Vedic (in contrast to the drinking of liquor which is evil). So I have said that those who do not accept the validity of the Bhagavān's doctrine are unable to determine what is *nirmālya*. When it is properly determined (namely according to the Bhagavāns doctrine) the Bhagavān's *nirmālya* proves to be extremely purifying, as is demonstrated by the statements of all Vedic teachers. In a matter for which the only means of knowledge is verbal testimony, it must be so as verbal testimony says that it is. Unless one is deaf, one cannot say that there is no verbal testimony concerning it.

For instance it is said in the Brahma Purāṇa: "The *nivedya* of Viṣṇu is declared by the sages to be pure and fit for consumption; one who eats other *nirmālya* and *nivedya* must perform the *cāndrāyaṇa* in expiation. The *mālya* which is taken from the body of Viṣṇu takes away evil and is holy. He who wears it on his head goes to supreme bliss." It follows that the smṛti statement that a man who eats *nirmālya* and *nivedya* must perform the *cāndrāyaṇa*[295] should be taken

to bear upon the *nirmālya* of Rudra, Kālī etc. Thus in the Mahābhārata: "Meditating in one's heart upon Hari, one must offer food to Him with full attention, thereupon pick up this food again with the middle-finger and the thumb, and then sacrifice it bit by bit, saying: "Prāṇāya svāhā, Apānāya svāhā, Vyānāya svāhā, Udānāya svāhā, Samānāya svāhā." Likewise in another passage, "what has been offered to the god must be given to a brahmacarin."[296] Thus in the Mahābhārata: "The saintly knowers of the Pañcarātra ate in his house that which had been left over by the Bhagavān, as a means to attain to bliss, as supreme nourishment."[297] And likewise the blessed Śaunaka: "He himself eats the *nivedya*." He who condemns Viṣṇu's *nivedya*, whose purity is proved by hundreds of similar smṛtis and which dispels the fear of rebirth, really ignores the statements of the smṛti because of his heterodoxy and ought to have his tongue cut off

137. OBJECTION. But how can the *nivedya* be a means for the *prāṇāgnihotra*? The exemplary people do not approve of a means for homa etc. for which no building bricks are used. Nor can a substitution of another substance do duty as a homa, because he lives off food that has been obtained according to taste. Nor can a substitution of another consumption be made to replace the *nivedya*, for scripture enjoins upon the twiceborn a meal in the evening and a meal in the morning, as follows from the prohibition: "One should not take food in between."

REFUTATION. That is no defect, since the multitude of deities, like prāṇa etc. are revealed to be parts of Viṣṇu, in the same way as Viśvaksena, the chief

of Viṣṇu's retinue. For just as the flowers, cake etc., though proffered to the Bhagavān but actually given to Viśvakṣena shows that He is familiar under various guises, or just as at a sacrifice the soma juice that is left over by the *hotar* is pure to the *adhvaryu*, so it is also with the *nirmālya*.[298]

Moreover, only scripture can be our criterion for what is to be eaten and what is not to be eaten. When it says that something is fit to be eaten, what injunction are we to invent ourselves? Just as the same rule governs both the periodical and the desiderative *agnihotra*, so the same rule governing the eating of the *nivedya* applies also to the *prāṇāgnihotra*.

138. As to the remark[299] that from the observance of different sacraments, from conception ceremony to cremation, it follows that the Bhāgavatas are not brahmins, here again ignorance is to blame. It is not your Honour's fault that the Bhāgavatas, who have the *Vājasaneyaśākhā* in the transmission of their family line, observe the sacraments of conception ceremony etc. according to the manner laid down by the gṛhyasūtras of Kāṭyāyana etc. Those who perform the forty sacraments which are enjoined by the Ekāyana scripture while giving up the dharmas of the Veda, from the recitation of the *gāyatrī* onward,[300] they properly follow the rules laid down by the gṛhyasūtras of their own śākhā and do not abdicate their brahminhood because they fail to follow the rites of a different śākhā; since otherwise it would follow that other brahmins too would forfeit their brahminhood because they fail to perform the rites enjoined by other

people's śākhā. For everywhere among brahmins we find customs that differ according to birth, cāraṇa, gotra, qualification etc. Even though one ritual is understood for all śākhās, still all the various dharmas relating to mutually different qualified performers do not all together accumulate in any one place. And the Aspirants who are distinct from those brahmins who are qualified for rites of the *aindrāgneya* etc.,[301] which are means leading to the enjoyment of rewards like heaven etc., as enjoined by the three Vedas, and who themselves are qualified for the rites of the Ekāyana, rites which alone are the means of attaining to the Bhagavān, viz. knowledge, cleansing the way to the Lord, preparation of worship and oblation, as enjoined by the Ekāyana scripture, are brahmins too. It follows that the non-observance of certain rites enjoined by different śākhās does not mean that either one forfeits his brahminhood—that the Ekāyana śākhā is preterpersonal scripture has been enlarged upon in the *Treatise on the Validity of Kāśmīra Āgama*,[302] and is therefore here not further discussed. But since it is quite obvious that the Bhāgavatas, which we are discussing here, are connected with the dharmas of the three Vedas, like the sāvitrī recitation, there is no possible support for the suspicion that they are really vrātyas because they would have abandoned these Vedic dharmas.

139. May Nāthamuni[303] be victorious, he to whom the Three Principles are immediately evident by virtue of his own miraculous power, he by whose pupils the arrogance of the rivals of the Sātvata Doctrine is terminated after their own view was rent to pieces by

variously apposite arguments, he whose spirit is for ever the abode of the feet of Mukunda.

May, for the length of this Aeon, play on the pious, enchanting and irreproachable sayings of the extensive collection of prose and verse compositions which eclipse the cleverness of the befuddled, conceited and witless assembly of the evil crowd of the rivals of the Sātvata doctrine, whose spirit has been increased by the glorious Nāthamunīndra,[304] and by which all the unholy powers are cleansed.

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NOTES

1. To Yāmuna, God's omniscience consists in this unlimited percipience, so that, as he will argue below (§ 109), the validity of Pañcarātra does not rest only on Scripture, but also on Perception.

2. In the *pūrvapakṣa* the principal opponents introduced are what one may already call smārta brahmins, and among them especially the orthodox followers of Mīmāṃsā. No Vedānta opposition will be discussed.

3. *śabda*, and its synonyms, have been translated variously as Verbal Testimony, Verbal Evidence in general, or Scripture in particular, depending on the context.

4. *prāmāṇa* has generally been rendered with "means of knowledge," sometimes with "criterion."

5. *jagati or loke*: "in the world of experience, in common experience."

6. Punctuate after *iti* which closes the question introduced in *pṛṣṭo vyācaṣṭām*; *abhi-ni-viś* "to stick to a partisan view (in the teeth of contrary evidence)." I take *bāla iva* as sandhi for *bāle iva*, the meaning being that the objector takes the view that something limited (the boy) is really unlimited (mature adult).

7. *siddhasādhana*, one of the defects of an argumentation by which proof is sought of that which is already proved or established. Space (*ākāśa*) is, by definition, unlimited and cannot illustrate the thesis that something finite can be infinite.

8. *vibhu* in the sense of "omnipresent, infinite."

9. namely, the Pañcarātra postulation that such tantric ceremonies as consecration (*dīkṣā*), etc. are means leading to the summum bonum.

10. In the standard inference: the mountain has fire, because it has smoke, as in the case of the kitchen.

11. Yāmuna throughout treats Sātvata and Bhāgavata as synonymous.

12. *pauruṣeya* and *apauruṣeya*; the latter has in the sequel been rendered with "preterpersonal." Person here does not mean only "human person" but "any being endowed with personal features, including God."

13. "Eternal Scripture" (*āgama*) is preter-personal scripture, since any verbal statement originating from a person is cotemporal with that person, and the *pūrvapakṣin* does not admit the existence of an eternal personal deity.

14. *arthāpatti*, throughout translated "circumstantial-implication". It is a kind of inference by which is established something that must be established, yet is not established by another means of knowledge; for example: "Devadatta, who is well-fed, does not eat by day:" since he cannot be well-fed without eating at all, it is deduced, by circumstantial implication, that he eats by night.

15. namely, the relation of being a means to a certain end.

16. KMS 1.3.2 *api vā kartṛsāmānyāt pramāṇam anumānaṃ syāt* "*smṛti* is authoritative, because both *smṛti* and Veda have the same agent performing its mandates."

17. The morning and evening oblations, the New and Full Moon oblations, and the soma sacrifice, examples respectively of *nitya* (daily recurring), *naimittika* (occasional) and *kāmya* (desiderative) rites.

18. *aṣṭakā* is the name of the 8th day after Full Moon in the winter and *śiśira* months, on which an oblation is performed for the deceased (Manu 4.119; 150).

19. the crepuscular observances.

20. the point is taken up in detail infra §§ 119 ff.

21. respectively *yoga*, whereby the component parts of the word are given their own meaning; and *rūḍhi*, the total meaning of a word that has become conventional and does not necessarily correspond to the meanings of its

component parts. *Rathakāra* means by *yoga* "chariot-maker, cartwright," by *rūḍhi* a caste which is not at all characterized by this profession.

22. *adhyayanasiddhabuddhyaṅgatvabhaṅgenāpi*. Such a "connotation" is, for example, that the *rathakāra* in the literal sense of cartwright is disqualified for Vedic ritual, because a cartwright is a śūdra; on this point see infra.

23. *upanayana*, which is the first step to his acquisition of Vedic knowledge.

24. Manu 10.23.

25. the term "by royal decree" shows that it is a *caste* profession. Quotation not identified

26. not found in Auśanasasmṛti (AAS 48).

27. unidentified.

28. unidentified.

29. Manu 10.40.
This point is detailed upon infra §§ 134 ff

30. unidentified.

31. unidentified.

32. not in Devalasmṛti.

33. unidentified.

34. not in Atrismṛti; Avāluka is unknown to me, kalpadevalaka can be explained as a professional kalpa priest, kalpa either in the sense of ("unorthodox) ritual," or 'astrological mansion'; gaṇabhogadevalaka is likewise obscure, but probably refers to unorthodox priest engaged in gaṇa worship.

37. namely, *dīkṣā*.

38. namely, the four Vedas, six Vedāṅgas, the Purāṇas, Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya and *Dharmaśāstra*.

39. BrS. 2.2.42.

40. A Naiyāyika. Traditionally, Nyāya does not accept the Mīmāṃsā view that the Vedas have not originated from a person.

41. The argument is thus: The Veda is of personal origin, because it is language; language is invariably found to originate from persons. The Naiyāyika compares the Mīmāṃsaka's view in the terms of this argument with the standard inference: the mountain has fire, because it has smoke.

42. *avatāra* "descent, emergence." The meaning is as follows: Dharma is by definition that action which leads to a certain end by suprasensible law. Since the process (the means-end relation) is suprasensible, there can be no other authority for it than Scriptural authority.

43. This envisages the world as the sum total of the fruits (*phala*) brought about by observance or non-observance of dharma, which is thus instrumental to world creation.

44. cf. Udayana, Kusumāñjali 4.1.

45. Since they are products, they have been produced by a person (God) who knew the means by which to produce them (dharma and adharma).

46. This is the Mīmāṃsā view which holds that the dharma and adharma as instruments in creation are always the dharma and adharma of a particular intelligent being whose body is itself the product of dharma and adharma and can therefore never, however intelligent he may be, control them. The Mīmāṃsaka admits that the universe, being made up of parts, is subject to origination and destruction, but never at one time, since all entities presuppose former acts that have brought them about.

The law of dharma and adharma necessarily operates eternally. No agency is possible which can intervene in this eternal operation from act to act, by either beginning or ending the universe. On this cf. Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 137 ff. for the Prābhākara view, and Ślokavārttika, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra 47-116 for the Bhāṭṭa view.

47. lit. "that which is unprecedented, not known before, sc. by other means of knowledge;" in Mīmāṃsā it describes especially that suprasensible power inherent in the act which makes it produce its result.

48. The argument is that one cannot know that the act will indeed produce an effect until this effect has materialized; thus the act's power—*apūrva*—cannot be known beforehand as the instrument of effectuation. By the Naiyāyika's definition only one who knows what instruments are effective in production can actually produce.

49. unidentified.

50. *mantra* and *arthavāda*: the terms indicate that the Naiyāyika continues to address the Mīmāṁsaka, for these of course are Mīmāmsā terms, *mantra* being the Vedic formula used at the ritual, *arthavāda* the descriptive, non-injunctive passages of Brāhmaṇa and later Vedic texts.

51. RV. 10. 90. 14.

52. Yāmuna concurs in the Mīmāmsaka's refutation of the Naiyāyika's views, to the extent that he too rejects that the existence of God can be proved by reason; but he will counter the Mīmāṃsā assertion that God cannot be proved at all, that in fact there is neither room nor purpose for a God in the universe. For Yāmuna, God has all the characteristics He has for the Naiyāyika, but he proves them from Scripture, not reason.

53. That which makes the Veda authoritative, i.e., a means of valid knowledge, is just this that it communicates knowledge of *apūrva* facts, e.g., that a soma sacrifice is a means of attaining heaven, i.e., generally matters pertaining to dharma.

54. the individual soul.

*55. supra note.

56. Since the *apūrva* power is suprasensible, it can never be perceived, and the assumption of a God who 'supervises' and controls this power because he perceives it is absurd.

57. read *na labhyate 'virodhe' pi*; the meaning is this: when a certain fact (the eternality of pots) cannot be proved by a ground (recollection) because this ground contains a contradiction (it is recollected that pots having existed cease to exist), this does not prove that the same ground (recollection) cannot prove the eternality of earth, mountains, etc., when there is no contradiction contained in it (nobody has recollection of a vanishing mountain).

58. *adhikaraṇasiddhānta* is a conclusion which, as soon as one thing is established (e.g., that there is a world creator), establishes another topic discussed (e.g., omniscience). On this question, cf. Tarkabhāṣā 43.

59. It is the contention of Mīmāṃsā that words and their capacity of conveying meaning are eternal.

60. Sequence, of course, supposes priority and posteriority of the entities in sequence, while eternals are co-eternal.

61. *kramāvāntarajāti*; the difference resides in the createdness of the Pañcarātra and the uncreatedness of the Veda, which introduces a difference of degree between the word sequences of both corpora of verbal statements.

62. This is Yāmuna's objection, which states the extent to which he concurs in the preceding Mīmāṃsā argument against Nyāya.

63. This starts the discussion of the Prābhākara theory on the limitations of the validity of verbal statements. First general Mīmāṃsā views on the subject are discussed.

64. The validity of *śabda* lies in its communicating contents that cannot be known through other means of knowledge. What I translate as 'facts' are more literally "established

entities," established, that is, by other means of knowledge than *śabda*. A scriptural statement of the kind "grass is green" is not strictly valid in the sense that, in order to know that grass is green, we need a scriptural statement to that effect. Another proving factor, e.g., the means of knowledge Perception, may turn up conceivably and thus make the scriptural statement superfluous; or we may find that grass is not invariably green, but changes its colour, which would reverse the scriptural statement. Scriptural validity, i.e., Scripture's being a means of knowledge, is to the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka, its being the *sole* means of knowing a particular thing. To the Prābhākara this validity is ideal in the case of injunctions concerning actions which, suprasensibly, lead to a certain desired end.

65. The injunction concerning the *odana* oblation includes an injunction concerning the preparation of the *odana* and the fetching of firewood for the cooking. Since experience shows that for a cooking fire one needs firewood, this *kārya* is not strictly known on scriptural authority.

66. This objection ignores the priorities among pramāṇas, or means of knowledge; for the Prābhākara, Perception, etc. are prior to, take precedence of, Scripture in case of perceptible, etc. contents. Generally Perception is prior to Inference. To Yāmuna, therefore, no priority of Perception to Scripture is given, which is expected since in his view Scripture may also be an account of (God's) Perception, as in the case of Pañcarātra.

*67. This sums up the conclusion of the refutations of both the Naiyāyika's and Mīmāṃsaka's views: the defects consequent upon the Nyāya proofs of God are avoided on the basis of scriptural examination, since Scripture can indeed validly pronounce on God.

68. The Prābhākaras, who are notorious for the *gaurava* 'complicatedness' of their argumentations.

69. "Denotation, denoting power, denotativeness" in the following Prābhākara discussions have to be understood as the power of verbal statements to provide unprecedented and non-superfluous knowledge concerning their contents. In the Prābhākara view, a verbal statement by itself is denotative only in injunctive forms, while substantive statements have denotation either through contextual connection with injunctive statements, or (but this is not strictly "true" denotation) through repetition of otherwise knowable facts. This view, which has obviously been developed for scriptural statements in the first place, is thereupon extended to ordinary language as well, and is thus expressed in the following theory about learning language which is here understood. A child learns what certain sentences 'mean' by observing the action which his elders take upon hearing these sentences. When he knows no language meaning (*vyutpatti*), he may acquire knowledge by first hearing one adult tell another to "get the cow," and subsequently observing that the other is getting the cow: by associating the two events he knows that an order to get the cow was the content of the first adult's statement "get the cow." A remark without consequent action (e.g., " It is hot today,") cannot convey any such knowledge to one who does not know language. The process of the child knowing the sentence meaning is here described as *arthāpatti* "reasoning by circumstantial implication;" since there is no other ground for the second man's getting the cow, it must have been the first man's statement.

70. Thus Śalikanātha, Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 182: *niyojyaḥ sarvakāryeyaḥ svakīyatvena budhyate.*

71. That is to say that the denotativeness of the words composing the statement is dependent upon the injunctive denotation of the statement as a whole.

72. The *liṅādi* verbal terminations of Sanskrit to which in English correspond verbs compounded with auxiliaries like "should, must, to be to, ought to."

73. For example, a sentence: "He desires to go to heaven," which has the verb in the indicative, followed by a statement "he should sacrifice with a soma sacrifice," where the verb is injunctive, is truly denotative in spite of its indicative form, since it is obviously subordinated to the injunctive sentence, to which it describes the performer's qualification: only one who desires to go to heaven has title to, is qualified for, the performance of a soma sacrifice.

74. This is an example like "it is hot today;" the young father's happy countenance is not considered an action.

75. E.g., the sentence "he who desires to go to heaven offers the soma sacrifice," is an injunctive statement in indicative form.

76. This is the Prābhākara view of the denotativeness of single words, summarized in the formula *anvitābhidhāna*, which is short for *kāryānvitābhidhāna* "denotation of words syntactically connected in an injunctive sentence."

77. This point will be taken up and confirmed infra § 64.

78. E.g., a statement "there are fruits on the river bank" does not by itself, self-sufficiently, create in the hearer the knowledge that there are fruits on the river bank; the means of knowledge here really is inference, since the hearer must infer that the speaker knows what he is talking about, that he knows that *fruit* means 'fruit', *river bank* 'river bank,' etc.

79. This is again the Prābhākara view. The Bhāṭṭa view is somewhat different; according to the latter the upaniṣads are *arthavādas* (subsidiary substantive statements laudatory of elements of injunctions) to the eternality of the performer's personality (*ātman*), which eternality is presupposed by the efficacy of the injunction: e.g., the injunction "he who desires heaven must offer with the soma sacrifice" supposes the immortality of the performer.

80. Ch Up. 1.5.1.

81. In this the Prābhākara concurs with the Bhāṭṭa. Injunctions without time of fruition specified are not guaranteed to bring about the desired effect during the present lifetime of the performer.

82. I read *ata evārthavādānām*.

83. On this point see KMS 1.2.1, with Śabara's bhāṣya.

84. On the Bhāṭṭa view of omniscience, cf. Kumārila, Samb. 47-59; 114-116.

85. i.e, the appropriateness or propriety of a word in collocation with other words; in the sentence "his mother is barren," 'barren' is obviously inappropriate.

86. The identification is considered an *arthavāda*, i.e., laudatory of the sacrificial pole

87. The relation between God and the texts has to be proved. I read *yadi* ca for *api ca*.

88. unidentified.

89. RV. 10.90 14

90.

91. Mahānār Up 11.12.

92. Kaṭh Up. 3.9.

93. Śvet Up. 6.9.

94. Viṣṇu Pur. 1.1.31.

95. Not in Manusmṛti; reference perhaps to Manu 1.9—10?

96. I read *tathāpi*.

97. Muṇḍ Up. 1.1.9.

98. Śvet Up. 6.7.

99. unidentified.

100. supra § 12.

101. supra § 11.

102. Kumārila, Ślokavārttika 2.114.

103. BĀ Up. 4.5.14.

104 Ch Up. 6.11.3.

105. Ch Up. 6.2.1.

106. Ch Up. 6.2.3.

107. Taitt Up. 3.1.1.
The whole sentence includes *tena jīvanti*, on which the present exegesis of bhūta is based.

108. Bh G. 18.61.

109. namely, that they are born (*jātāni*) and die (*prayanti*).

110. Śvet Up. 4.5.

111. Bh G. 13.19.

112. Kaṭh Up. 2.18.

113. Kaṭh Up. 2.17.

114. sc. of knowledge.

115. here used as synonymous with Pāśupata.

116. I read *rītyā*.

117. *pratijñārthaḥ*, the object or content of the *pratijñā*, which is the first step of the five-membered syllogism, e.g., "the mountain has fire" (*parvatasyāgnimattvam*). It does not therefore coincide with the Subject. In the proposition both S and P must be siddha, established as existing somewhere; a non-thing like a hare's horn can be neither S nor P.

118. this "non-apprehension of what should be there (*yogānupalambha*) is the criterion by which we know the absence of a thing. Here it is the absence of truth in Pañcarātra that needs be proved by *yogānupalambha*, if the objector's contention that Pañcarātra is invalid-through-reversion be correct.

119. I have difficulty in understanding the argument unless I assume an illogicality. By stating as his ground "since in āgama we have its meaning exactly conveyed as it is" the objector not only agrees with the preceding argumentation that on inferential grounds Pañcarātra is *not*

invalid, but even goes so far as accepting that it is *valid* in other words, confuse non-invalidity with validity. Then, because of this validity (*svārthasya tathātvāvabodhanāt*), there arises a conflict with a deviating statement of the Veda *which has its own validity*; *since only* one can be true, it follows that when Pañcarātra is true by inference, it is untrue by Veda. But I don't see how the objector can reasonably infer the validity of Pañcarātra, since its meaning or content is admittedly suprasensible. Yāmuna himself has not argued that *Inference proves the validity*, but *that Inference cannot* disprove the correctness of the thesis.

120. a *hetvantaram constitutes on the part of the debator a con*fession of *importance since the* ground *which he* gave does not hold and he has to produce a different ground. By the rules of debate this means a defeat.

121. *infra* §§ 76 f.

122. The founder of the school of logic.

123. The Vedic injunction *na hiṃsyāt sarvabhūtāni* "one should not injure any being" raises the question of the validity of injunctions which do require injury to beings. But this is a secondary question which does not affect the validity of the Veda as a whole. Similarly, the thesis "Pañcarātra is valid" is not disproved by the possible *mention in the* valid Veda *of* something that conflicts *with something in Pañcarātra. So far* the argument is *not for* validity but *against invalidity*.

124. Since pots are knowable, the ground would also apply to prove the eternality of pots and all things that are knowable.

125. Since only earth (as an element) possesses smell, this ground has no general applicability.

126. Like the ground "because it is knowable" *which applies* to things regardless of whether they are eternal or not.

127. Obviously, if the ground were not known, it could not be stated.

128. This objection seems to speak to the summary denial that the ground is unestablished through reversion.

129. Be it repeated that the validity, authoritativeness, etc. of Verbal Statements (i.e , *śabdaprāmāṇya*) is founded on the basic assumption that statements truly and accurately communicate their things-meant (*artha*), that a word accurately conveys its meaning. Among these things-meant Yāmuna includes facts as well as *kāryas*, hence the following debate with the Prābhākara.

130. supra § 37.

131. Yāmuna here takes up the Prābhākara's theory that a child learns the meaning of language through the action his elders take on hearing a statement, so that the denotativeness of language is defined by its injunctiveness. He uses the Prābhākara's example of the factual statement: "A child is born to you." A child who does not know language has no way of understanding the meaning of this statement because the young father's happiness conveys nothing specific But, asks Yāmuna, suppose the same child has witnessed his father reception of the cheering news and the subsequent preparations for a birth ceremony. Since one follows immediately upon the other, the child associates one with the other and can thus understand the meaning of the statement, though the statement itself was no injunction, but a communication of an established fact.

132. Then, one may suppose, the child would not so readily associate the birth ceremony with the previous communciation.

133. supra § 36.

134. The things-meant or denoted by the word.

135. Yāmuna's argument is that the injunctive, etc. terminations of the verb denote the injunction as their thing-meant (*padārtha*); but what makes this injunction

'meaningful' is not that it is an injunction, but that it is connected with someone who is qualified to accept the injunction, e.g., in the injunction *svargakāmo yajeta*. The injunctive *yajeta* has no meaning or purpose unless there is a "desire for heaven;" the meaning of the injunction thus is connected with the consequence of this desire of heaven, namely, that somebody who has this desire is prepared to do something about it.

136. *ardhajaratī* is a half-old woman; the *ardhajaratīyanyāya* is used to indicate that the opponent wants to have it both ways and that consequently his argument, like a half-old and half-young woman, is useless either way.

137. Misra's text here has *yady api pravṛttyanupapattisamadhigamanīyaiva śabdaśaktis* "the denoting power of language is to be known only through the impossibility of operation," which makes no sense. The reading must be corrupt, in *anupapatti* we may find a corruption of *vyutpatti*, in *pravṛtti* perhaps a corruption of *kāryārthe* or *kāryārtha—*. I read conjecturally *kāryārthe vyutpattisamadhigamanīyaiva*, which gives the required sense.

138. This holds for those statements which are not verifiable by other means of knowledge, for if they are verifiable, they are no means of knowledge in their own right.

139. read *na hi kriyakārye vyutpannaḥ sthāyi kāryam*.

140. *sthāyi*; the Prābhākara view is that the *kārya* has a lasting efficacy beyond the inevitably transient action it involves; for the *kārya* must remain in order to effect the fruit of the action at any time after the completion of the action.

141. Yāmuna objects that we cannot have two altogether different denoting powers in langauge, one to convey a transitory thing, another to convey a non-transitory thing. The only possible explanation is that of *lakṣaṇā* "figurative usage," which remains related to the *mukhyā vṛttiḥ* "principal usage." But he will deny the entire construction (67).

142. This is the Prābhākara view, which holds that in the injunction *niyoga svargakāmo yajeta* the *sādhya* (object to be realized) is not *svarga*, but the entire *niyoga* (cf. Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 190), so that the statement of the injunction would become the means (*sādhana*) to realize that *sādhya*, sc. the injunction.

143. Cf. Prakaraṇapañcikā p. 182.

144. Nothing can become a fact (*siddha*) as long as it is still to be made a fact (*sādhya*) by a 'factualizing' means (*sādhana*); thus as long as it is related with such a means it cannot be a fact.

145. This is the principle of *ekavākyatā*: a statement can contain only one injunction, otherwise there is *vākyabheda*: what should be one sentence is split up into two.

146. Quotations not identified; but for the argument, see Prakaraṇapañcikā, p 183 ff

147. No specific fruits are attached to *nitya* rites.

148. *māhātmya*, which corresponds to *prādhānya*, *pradhānatā*

149. BĀ Up. 5.6.1.

150. Not to be found in the major Upanisads.

151. supra §35.

152. supra §42.

153. read *ity asat* for *iti yat*.

154. Śvet Up. 3.19.

155. Śvet Up. 6.8.

156. cf supra note.

157. supra note 86.

158. supra § 36.

159. This must refer to the śruti *sa yo ha vai tat paraṃ veda brahma veda brahma bhavati* (quoted Rāmānuja, Vedārthasaṃgraha, 91), which I have been unable to locate.

160. Taitt Up. 2.1.1. *brahmavid āpnoti param*.

161. This must refer to Taitt Up. 2.1.1 *so'śnute sarvān kāmān saha brahmaṇā vipaścitā*, but *sa sāmagaḥ* is obscure, unless one may regard it as a corruption of *vipaścitā*.

162. Partial quotations from Taitt Up. 2.1.1, Muṇḍ Up. and an unidentified source.

162a. Nṛsiṃhapūrvatāpanī Up. 2.4 (which reads *purastād* for *parastād*) and Śvet Up. 3.9.

163. not identified.

164. not identified.

165. Could this refer to Varāha Purāṇa? Cf. infra.

166. Viṣṇu Pur., 1.1.31.

167. Not in Manusmṛti.

168. A little known Vedic branch (if it was a Vedic tradition), from which certain Vaiṣṇava sects derive their authority; cf. infra §138.

169. These quotations could not be identified.

170. BĀ Up 4.1.5.

171. Viṣṇu Pur. 6.4.40.

172. cf. Varāha Pur., 72.4, which reads *padyate* in b.

173. cf. Varāha Pur. 70 26 *na tasmāt parato devo bhavitā na bhaviṣyati*. It is clear from several quotations from this Purāṇa that Yāmuna's text had different readings, not all of them better.

174. Matsya Pur. 290.15.

175. The Linga, Vāyu and Bhaviṣyat quotations could not be verified.

176. Title of one of Yāmuna's treatises.

177. read *sa hi sahajasaṃvedanasākṣātkṛtadīkṣārādhanādidharmaḥ*.

178. External signs worn by Śaiva sectarians.

179. Śvet Up. 3.8.

180. "The Doctrine of the Five Chapters."

181. The highest material evolute; the śloka is out of order.

182. The text reads *gūḍhācāramukhasmaśānabhasitāvasānaḥ paraḥ*, which is a corruption; I read, wholly conjecturally *gūḍhācabhasmasnānaśayanādikriyāparaḥ*.

183. The text reads *yogo dhāraṇam ucyate hṛdi dhiyām oṃkāra-pūrvaṃ tathā*, and seems out of order. The sense is clear however.

184. corresponds to Varāha Purāṇa, 70.36 *tvaṃ ca rudra mahābāho mohaśāstrāṇi kāraya | alpāyasaṃ darśayitvā mahayālu maheśvaraḥ*.

185. cf. Varāha Pur., 70.41, which in cd reads *nayasiddhānta-saṃjñābhir mayā śāstraṃ tu darśitam*.

186. cf. Varāha Pur., 70.38, which reads in cd *śāstreṣvabhirato loko bāhulyena bhaved ataḥ*.

187. nearest is Varāha Pur., 70.42, *tadā pāśupataṃ śāstraṃ jāyate vedasaṃjñitam*.

188. cf. Varāha Pur., 70.21, *yad vedabāhyaṃ karma syāc chāstram uddiśya sevyate | tad raudram iti vikhyātam tan neṣṭam gaditam nṛṇām*.

189. cf. Varāha Pur., 70.40, *māṃ viṣṇor vyatiriktam ye brahmaṇaś ca dvijottama | bhajante pāpakarmāṇas te yānti narakam narāḥ*.

190. not identified.

191. read *yeṣām* for *eṣām*.

192. not identified.

193. supra § 52.

194. Taitt Up. 2.8.1.

195. supra § 12.

196. Aitareya Br.

197. Manusmṛti, 4.124.

198. Mahābhārata 1.265 f.

199. supra § 17

200. supra § 17

201. āgnāvaiṣṇava, name of a sacrificial cake offered at the dīkṣaṇīyeṣṭi.

202. supra § 17.

203. The author of the Brahmasūtras is identified with Vyāsa-Dvaipāyana, composer of the Mahābhārata

204. Mahābhārata, 12 340 (129.76) ff.

205. Mahābhārata, 6.66 (3012).

206. Mahābhārata not identified.

207. Mahābhārata not identified.

208. BrS , 2.2.42.

209. '*Divisions' of the Supreme God* as Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha.

210. *tanmātras* here in the sense of the "higher evolutes."

211. *toyena jīvān visasarja bhūmyām*, MahānārUp., 1.4.

212. BrS. 2.3.16 (17). Translation: "A word descriptive of moving or unmoving beings, has not a secondary meaning [in referring to Brahman], because such a being's existence depends on Brahman's existence."

213. BrS., 2.3.17 (18). Translation: "The ātman is not born because there is no śruti to that effect, and because of its eternality, which is proved by the śrutis."

214. BrS., 2.2.43.

215. Muṇḍ Up., 2.1.3.

216. BrS., 2.2.44.

217. BrS., 2.2.45.

218. In BrS., 2.2.

219. *asāmañjasya*, taken from BrS., 2.2.37.

220. supra §§ 96, 97.

221. i.e., as a *tatpuruṣa* compound "the beginning (source) of (valid) knowledge:" *vijñānādibhāve* "since He (God) is a source of valid knowledge."

222. cf. supra § 18.

223. *karmaṇi lyuṭ* Pāṇini.

224. not identified.

225. in order to understand any statement, one must first know the meaning of the words that compose it; this may be called dependence, so that to this extent any statement is dependent for its informativeness on other and prior knowledge; but this must also apply to Vedic statements.

226. If the cause (here: God) is above suspicion, the statement will be accurate.

227. *guṇataḥ prāmāṇyasyāyuktatvād anabhyupagamāc*; my understanding is that a statement has its validity by itself, and no secondary validity in the sense that its content must first be validated by some other means. The validity itself must be proved (namely by the character of the personal author or by its preterpersonal origin), but once proved, the statement itself is valid.

228. Vaiṣṇava rite observed five times a day: *pañcakālikā*.

229. Ślokavārttika, 2.6 7 ab.

230. ib. 2. 67 cd.

231. not identified.

232. this speaks to 108, that the independent cognition cancels the dependent cognition, if there is conflict between them. Yāmuna makes the point that this is not invariably true; that neither dependence nor independence is a cause of invalidation, *sāpekṣanirapekṣatve* is a dual and requires the correction of *kāraṇam* into *kāraṇe*, if my understanding of the text is correct.

233. namely, because it requires another cognition in order to be denied.

234. namely, in the example of the burning lamp: is it the same flame that burns at six o'clock and at seven o'clock? We don't see the flame change or be succeeded by another flame. Only inference shows that since there is a different amount of oil in the lamp at different times, it is different oil that is burning as a flame, so that the flame is really different. The sense perception is of the varying amounts of oil.

235. The Naiyāyikas.

236. Since Brahmā is the creator of the world, he can know whether there were Vedas or not before creation; by taking away *Brahmā's memory, God in His omnipotence* could start the myth of the preterpersonal origin of the Veda.

237. not identified.

238. not identified.

239. Śābarabhāṣya and KMS.

240. supra § 17: *vedabāhyagṛhītatvāt.* I have rendered *gṛhīta* by 'accepted' to cover approximately the variety of meanings that Yāmuna detects in the word.

241. *Manusmṛti, 8.107.*

242. People who do prohibited acts follow Vedic expiations; but if acceptance by people who commit forbidden acts is *sufficient to deny the validity of what they accept, this* means that the validity of the Veda would be denied.

243. Manusmṛti.

244. supra § 17: this Buddhist injunction is outside the Veda in one sense.

245. For the observance of a prohibition *is as much a ritual* action as the observance of an injunction.

246. supra § 14.

247. supra § 16.

248 supra § 59.

249. Quotations not identified; the *groups enumerated are* śūdras, and yet by Vedic injunction have to observe, i.e., to accept, the few Vedic injunctions addressed to them Do they by their acceptance *invalidate these injunctions?*

250. not identified.

251. read deśakālasaṃsthānāditi.

252. not identified.

253. supra § 15.

254. i.e., is the same name used for several groups or only one?

255. The argument is: if S is P, then P is not therefore S. The example is 'parvato 'gnimān dhūmavattvāt' if we interchange S and P, we get parvato dhūmavān agnimattvāt, but this is not true, for though there is no fireless smoke, there is smokeless fire. Similarly here: the fifth may be a sātvata or a vaiśya vrātya, but being the fifth does not make the sātvata a vaiśya vrātya.

256. In the Manu quotation supra § 15.

257. explained below, § 130.

258. Hari has apparently a meaning 'lion.' Or did Yāmuna think of Nṛsiṃha?

259. gauḥ can mean 'cow' and 'word.'

260. supra § 15.

261. taddhita suffix, cf. Pāṇiṇi.

262. 'conventionally' the two words are synonymous, 'etymologically' they have different meanings.

263. Pāṇini.

264. quoted supra.

265. supra note.

266. supra § 15.

267. not identified.

268. For the word means etymologically "maker of chariots, carts."

269. not identified.

270. By refusing to accept a rūḍhi meaning the authority of the Vedic statements concerning all the features of the sacrifice made by the now disqualified chariot-maker would be lost, and the authority of the statement that caste names may designate more than one caste would also be lost.

271. cf. Amarakoṣa, 10.4.

272. not verified.

273. which is the prerogative only of the three varṇas.
274. KMS.
275. supra § 15.
276. not identified.
277. not identified.
278. supra § 16.
279. cf. Manu, 11.40.
280. AitBr., 3.46.
281. not identified.
282. supra § 16.
283. This and the following quotations could not be identified.
284. supra § 16.
285. a Brahman erudite in the Veda and following its observances.
286. If he does not believe that God is present in the effigie, the offerings are obviously not used and cannot be characterized as left-overs. The priest's avoidance of them would simply amount to sinful waste.
287. He must make his prohibition specific, in order not to prohibit the priest from using food that is otherwise wasted. But he cannot determine the specification on his own terms.
288. used flowers and used food offerings.
289. without divine utilisation.
290. The pañcagavya is a substance in which the 5 products of the cow are mingled.
291. one nāḍikā is a half muhūrta.
292. cake used at Vedic offerings.
293. namely, in the above statement on the 10 nāḍikās.
294. Viśvaksena, to whom pūja is performed after the main pūjā.
295. as quoted supra § 16.

296. Mahābhārata quotations not verifiable.
297. The ritual taking of food is considered a performance of the prāṇāgnihotra.
298. The hotar is the principal reciting priest at the soma sacrifice, the adhvaryu the main executive
299. supra § 17.
300. namely, at the upanayana ceremony.
301. aindrāgneya, name of a srauta ritual.
302. Name of a work of Yāmuna.
303. Predecessor of Yāmuna at Śrīranga.
304. Nāthamuni compiled the sayings of the Vaiṣṇava saints, the Āḷvārs.

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